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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The existing research on the first merger waves in the 
United States, Britain, and to a lesser extent in Germany, has 
produced valuable information on the rise of the modern 
industrial enterprise. These studies reveal important
similarities as well as a few significant differences in the 
nature of the economic development of these nations. A new 
merger series for Canadian manufacturing industry was generated 
to provide a further comparison. In addition, a large pool of 
information was gathered concerning the workings of promotional 
syndicates, corporate flotations, and secondary financial 
markets. This aggregate data, in conjunction with a case study 
of the most prominent Canadian promoter of the era and the 
companies he consolidated, is used to determine the relationship 
between security financing and the evolution of manufacturing 
industry in Canada.
An explanation of the cause of the first Canadian merger 
wave, 1909-1912, is based on individual case evidence and the 
results of causality tests using aggregate data. The necessary 
pre-condition to a merger wave was the emergence of a broad 
market for Canadian industrial securities. Although high stock 
prices stimulated merger waves in Britain and the United States 
at the turn of the century, the first Canadian merger wave had to 
wait another decade until the expansion of the Canadian market 
and the tapping of the British market for Canadian "industrials"
permitted large-scale flotations. The potential profits which 
were available through corporate reorganisation, rationalisation 
of manufacturing and distribution networks, and monopolisation, 
were reflected in the higher rates of return which British 
investors sought en masse in the new Canadian securities. This 
flood of British capital in turn accelerated the industrial 
transformation taking place in Canada and encouraged further 
mergers. High stock prices triggered the first merger movement 
as they had in Britain and the United States. Corporate 
financiers became merger promoters as they catapulted 
propositions into consolidations large enough to be listed on 
public stock exchanges and to be of interest to prospective 
investors. High-risk financial methods provided the incentive to 
financial intermediaries to broaden this market as quickly as 
possible and, therefore, to deliver the maximum amount of cash to 
the new industrial consolidations.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE LAURIER BOOM, MERGERS AND THE RISE OF THE 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE
1.1 Integrating history and theory
This thesis attempts to determine the relationship between 
developments in finance and merger activity; this will then be 
related to the emergence of the modern industrial enterprise1 in 
Canada. To achieve this objective, the following inquiry will be 
divided into a qualitative and a quantitative examination. 
Chapters Two through Five deal with the former while Chapters Six 
through Eight grapple with the latter. The final chapter is an 
attempt to integrate both forms of analyses —  the micro- 
qualitative and the macro-quantitative —  to produce a richer and 
hopefully more accurate explanation of the relationship between 
mergers, financial change, and the second industrial revolution 
in Canada. Both parts necessarily employ different
methodologies. The first, uses an inductive case-study
methodology commonly employed in analytical business history
^This concept is based on A.D. Chandler's distinction 
between the traditional firm —  a personally-owned, single-unit 
enterprise, generally producing a single product and operating 
within one geographic area —  and the modern business enterprise. 
The latter is multi-unit, carries out a number of economic 
activities over a number of geographic areas with decisions 
monitored and coordinated by a managerial hierarchy. A.D. 
Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
1
while, the second, relies on an aggregate, statistical approach.
Evidence in the first part of the thesis is mainly drawn 
from the records of the most significant merger promoter of the 
first Canadian merger wave: Max Aitken, later to become Lord
Beaverbrook. Aitken*s operations and his main promotional
vehicle, the Royal Securities Corporation, provide a particularly 
illuminating study of the finance of manufacturing industry
because of the relative comprehensiveness of the existing
2 .documentation. Since the methods used by Aitken to finance
manufacturing industry were substantially the same as those used 
by the other promoters and financial intermediaries of the day, 
the case study can support certain general conclusions.
The evidence generated will also be used to analyse the 
causes of the first Canadian merger wave of 1909-1912 and to 
provide answers about merger causation generally. The Canadian 
evidence can be used as a check on theories which have been 
developed based on the experiences of Britain, Germany, and the 
United States. Attention is also directed to the fact that the
^To the best of my knowledge the records of other Canadian 
industrial promoters and the issue houses and trust companies 
that handled merger issuances in the early twentieth century are 
no longer in existence. For example, the records of the Dominion 
Securities Corporation and its general manager, E.R. Wood, cannot 
be located, nor the records of A.J. Nesbitt (an ex-employee of 
Aitken and the Royal Securities Corporation) and the 
International Trust Company. After Aitken, Wood and Nesbitt and 
the companies they represented were among the most important 
promoter-financiers of the first Canadian merger movement.
2
Canadian merger wave occurred one full decade after similar waves 
in Britain and the United States, and eight years after the 
German merger wave. The following analysis of these issues —  
the importance of mergers as well as their causation and timing 
—  is based upon a new series of Canadian merger statistics 
covering the years from 1885 to 1918. These statistics were 
generated according to a structure and methodology described in 
Chapter Seven while the results are presented in Chapter Eight.
1.2 Mergers. finance capitalism and the second industrial 
revolution
Mergers appear to be an integral part of the economic 
history of those nations which experienced a second industrial 
revolution during the last third of the nineteenth century. 
Although much debate surrounds what is precisely meant by a 
phrase like "industrial revolution” it is a convenient device to 
describe a basic shift in the long-run trajectory of an economy 
—  a fundamental (if not always rapid) transformation of the
*5
means of production as well as the organisation of production.
3I will bypass the dispute that is currently raging over the 
existence of an "industrial revolution” in terms of a 
quantitative takeoff or discontinuity in growth by submitting 
that it is still useful as a qualitative concept. J. Komlos, 
"Thinking about the Industrial Revolution", JEEH. vol. 18, no. 1 
(Spring 1989)? R. Cameron, "A New View of European
Industrialization", EHR. 2nd ser., vol XXXVIII, no. 1 (February
1985)? P. Mathias, "The Industrial Revolution —  Concept or 
Reality", The Race for Modernisation; Britain and Germany since 
the Industrial Revolution, eds. A.M. Birke and L. Kettenacker 
(Munich, 1988); N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during
3
The first industrial revolution was based on the textile, 
iron, and heavy chemicals industries, using coal as fuel and 
steam-engineering as the energy-convertor. Ushered in by 
advances in the chemical and electrical sciences, the second 
industrial revolution can be distinguished from the first by new 
long-term investment in steel, precision machinery, synthetic 
chemicals, and electrical power generation.4 Although not 
generally done, portland cement should be added to the list of 
new industries as it comprised the essential component in the new 
building and construction methods of the late nineteenth 
century.5
In the last three decades of the nineteenth century and the 
first decade of the twentieth these new industries increasingly 
supplanted the sectors upon which the first industrial revolution 
was based. The cluster of technological innovations in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century necessitated different
the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1985).
^The works employing this concept are too numerous to 
mention but the standard reference is D.S. Landes, The Unbound 
Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969) .
5 . .C.W. Condit, "The First Remforced-Concrete Skyscraper", 
Technology and Culture, vol. 9, no. 1 (January 1961); P. Cusack, 
"Agents of Change: Hennebique, Mouchel and ferro-concrete in
Britain, 1897-1908", Construction History, vol. 3 (1987); R.
Lesley, "The Cement Industry of the World", Cement Age (January 
1907), and History of the Portland Cement Industry in the United 
States (Chicago, 1924); A.J. Francis, The Cement Industry 1796- 
1914: A History (London, 1977).
4
organisational structures as well as fundamental changes in 
finance. Unlike the manufacturing enterprises of the first 
industrial revolution, where fixed costs were low relative to 
working capital, the new industries required enormous fixed 
capital investments.6 The public flotation of securities 
became one of the main instruments for delivering large amounts 
of money to industry for long-term investment.
Organisational changes took the form of the progressive 
replacement of the single-unit family firm by the multi-unit, 
publicly held corporation administered by a hierarchy of 
professional managers —  a transformation experienced by all 
advanced industrial nations. To be sure, the precise form of 
this evolution and its timing differed from nation to nation but 
the similarities remain more striking than the differences. This 
permanent and qualitative transition to a "corporate economy" has 
been explored mainly by business historians employing the
7
concepts pioneered by Alfred Chandler.
between 1782 and 1832, for example, the proportion of fixed 
capital to total assets ranged between approximately 9 per cent 
and 33 per cent: S. Pollard, "Fixed Capital in the Industrial
Revolution", JEH. vol. XXIV, no. 3 (September 1964).
7
A.D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters m  the
History of the American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 
1962), The Visible Hand, op.cit., and "The Emergence of 
Managerial Capitalism", BHR, vol. LVIII, no. 4 (Winter 1984). 
The literature based on the Chandlerian paradigm is now quite 
voluminous but the following references are representative of 
this category of work: L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate
Economy (London, 2nd ed., 1983); Managerial Hierarchies:
Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial 
Enterprise. eds. A.D. Chandler and H. Daems (Cambridge, Mass.,
The industrial nations undergoing this shift from atavistic 
to managerial capitalism also experienced merger movements in the 
two decades preceding the Great War, mainly concentrated around 
the turn of the century. Such movements first struck in the 
United States and Britain. They were followed a few years later 
by similar movements in Germany, France, Japan, and Canada. Even 
if they were more of a symptom than a "cause” of the modern 
corporate economy, mergers were intimately linked with its 
transformation. The multi-firm consolidation waves of the turn 
of the century signalled the brief domination of finance 
capitalism forming a bridge between family and managerial 
capitalism.8
This intermediate or "bridging" stage of capitalist 
development was marked by the development of an international 
market in industrial securities, the rapid growth and linking of 
organised exchanges for the trading of securities, and the 
predominance of promoter-financiers in manufacturing industry. 
This period also witnessed the apparent supremacy of "financial"
1980); J. Kocka, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise 
in Germany", Law and the Formation of the Big Enterprise in the 
19th and Early 20th Centuries, eds. N. Horn and J. Kocka 
(Gottingen, 1979)? T. Yui, "Development of Industrial
Enterprises in Japan, 1880-1915", Business and Economic History. 
2nd ser., vol. 17 (1988).
8I am drawing on Chandler's concept of financial capitalism 
which is surprisingly consistent with Hilferding's concept of 
finance capitalism. See R. Hilferding, Finance Capital; A Study 
of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (London, 1981, 
translation of 1910 German publication).
6
over "industrial" objectives during the years in which the new 
enterprises remained dependent on such promoters for raising 
capital. In the process, the second industrial revolution 
spawned new forms of financial institutions or changed the nature 
of existing financial intermediaries to make them more responsive 
to the large capital requirements of industrial enterprises.
The precise path this took varied from one industrial nation 
to the other depending on the existing institutional 
configuration upon which the changes were grafted. In Germany 
and Japan, for example, the rise of joint-stock mixed banks which 
were willing to promote and float industrial securities and which 
developed strong links to the stock exchanges appear to have
Q
dominated this stage of finance capitalism. Although some
See R. Tilly, "German Banking, 1850-1914: Development
Assistance for the Strong", JEEH. vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 
"Mergers, External Growth, and Finance in the Development of 
Large-Scale Enterprise in Germany, 1880-1913", JEH, vol. XLII, 
no. 3 (September 1982), and "Banking Institutions in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective:. Germany, Great Britain and the 
United States in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 145, no. 
1 (March 1989); W. Feldenkirchen, "Capital Raised and its Use by 
German Mechanical Engineering Firms in the 19th and Early 2 0th 
Centuries", German Yearbook on Business History (1983)? C.P. 
Kindleberger, "Financial Institutions and Economic Development: A 
Comparison of Great Britain and France in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries", EEH. vol. XXI, no. 2 (April 1984). Also 
see J. Hirschmeier and T. Yui, The Development of Japanese 
Business. 1600-1980 (London, 2nd ed., 1981), pp. 193-96, where 
they describe the establishment of certain government banks such 
as the Hypothek Bank (1897) and the Industrial Bank (1902) as 
well as the operations of Japan’s commercial banks and the so- 
called Instrumental Banks, which had a close relationship with 
one specific industrial firm, all of which served to provide 
long-term capital to manufacturing industry.
7
eventually became involved as underwriters in security issues, 
British investment banks were not major participants in providing 
finance to domestic or foreign manufacturing industry. Morgan 
Grenfell & Co., the first major British merchant bank to become 
involved in financing industry, did not do so until the 1920s. 
Instead, an entirely new and very personal institution sprang up 
to supply this need —  the corporate promoter. H. Osborn 
O'Hagan, the premier financier of the period, as well as infamous 
promoters like Ernest T. Hooley and Horatio Bottomley dominated 
the British financial scene during the 1880s and 1890s.^ In 
the United States, investment banks were not so reticent about 
raising capital for manufacturing enterprises through security 
issues, although J.P. Morgan & Co., the first major house to 
become so involved, waited until 1901 when the way had already 
been cleared by corporate promoters like John R. Dos Passos, 
Charles Flint, and John W. Gates. Some promoters used trust 
companies rather than banks as their institutional vehicle for 
raising capital because of their less restrictive legal 
environment. Although calling themselves trust companies, these
*S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London, 1984), 
pp. 98-103; P.L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914: The
Finance and Organization of English Manufacturing Industry 
(London, 1980), pp. 210-44; H.O. O'Hagan, Leaves from mv Life. 2 
vols. (London, 1929); S.F. Van Oss, "In Hooley Land", The 
Journal of Finance, vol. V (January 1899); J. Armstrong, "Hooley 
and the Bovril Company", BH, vol. XXVII, no. 1 (January 1986); 
A.E. Harrison, "Joint-stock company flotation in the cycle, 
motor-vehicle and related industries, 1882-1914", BH, vol. XXII, 
no. 2 (July 1981) ; Dictionary of Business Biography, eds. D.J. 
Jeremy and C. Shaw (London, 198 5).
8
issue houses little resembled similarly called financial 
intermediaries performing traditional trust services.11 In 
Canada, promoters often used financial intermediaries known as
bond houses as their institutional vehicle to promote the
12flotation of corporate securities. A few followed the American 
example of using trust companies but this practice was much more
t*t . . .  .
limited in Canada. Whatever institutional vehicle was chosen, 
however, corporate promotion and security underwriting remained 
very personal activities in Canada, Britain and the United States 
relative to the continental European nations and Japan where they
“t .r . Navin and M.V. Sears, "The Rise of a Market for 
Industrial Securities, 1887-1902", BHR, vol. XXIX, no. 2 (June 
1955) ; V.P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers. 
1854-1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), and Investment Banking in 
America (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); J.M. McFadden, "Monopoly in 
Barbed Wire: The Formation' of The American Steel and Wire
Company", BHR. vol. LII, no., 4 (Winter 1978); L. Neal, "Trust 
Companies and Financial Innovation, 1897-1914", BHR. vol. XLV, 
no. 1 (Spring 1971).
TO . . ,
The Royal Securities Corporation and the Dominion 
Securities Corporation were the first and most prominent bond 
houses in Canada. ^
TOThrough his management of the Montreal Trust Company, Max 
Aitken pioneered the use of the trust company as a vehicle for 
promotional activities'but felt rather restricted in its use. In 
reply to a request for information on the rapid growth of trust 
companies in Canada from the publisher of Trust Companies, a 
monthly magazine "devoted to trust company, banking and financial 
interests of the United States", Aitken blamed the limitations 
imposed by the large Canadian banks: "If I were to write my
views on the Trust Company situation in Canada, I do not think 
they would be at all satisfactory. I think Trust Companies are 
doing about as impecunious and uninteresting a class of business 
as can possibly be transacted, and in addition thereto, that 
these Trust Companies will never improve their class of business, 
because the Banks will not allow them." BBK, letter, Aitken to 
Luhnow, 10 November 1909, A/41/misc T.
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were institutionalised within joint-stock financial 
intermediaries.14
In Canada, both the first and second industrial revolutions 
lagged a few years behind similar developments in other newly 
industrialising nations like the United States and Germany but 
proceeded ahead of nations like Australia and Argentina. The 
first industrial revolution came in the form of textile, brewery, 
flour milling, iron, rolling stock and farm implement 
manufacturing. In the 1850s and 1860s, factories gradually began 
to spring up along the Lachine Canal in Montreal and the small 
communities surrounding Lake Ontario.16 This development, 
however, was not accompanied by significant changes in corporate
See R. Tilly, "Banking Institutions in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective: Germany, Great Britain and the United
States in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", op. 
cit. .
^ h e  steel industry, for example was not established in 
Canada until the first decade of the twentieth century. W. 
Armstrong, "Thinking About 'Prime Movers': The Nature of Early 
Industrialization in Australia, Canada and Argentina, 1870 to 
1930", Australian-Canadian Studies. vol. 1 (January 1983)? 
Argentina. Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative
Development. 1870-1965. eds. D.C.M. Platt and G. di Telia (New 
York, 1985).
G. Tulchinsky, The River Barons: Montreal Businessmen and 
the Growth of Industry and Transportation. 1837-1853 (Toronto, 
1977); J. McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic 
Development in Quebec and Ontario until 1870 (Toronto, 1980); P. 
Craven and T. Traves, "Canadian Railways as Manufacturers, 1850- 
1880", Perspectives on Canadian Economic History, ed. D. McCalla 
(Toronto, 1987); M. Denison, Harvest Triumphant: The Story of
Massev-Harris (London, 1949)? J.M. Gilmour, Spatial Evolution of 
Manufacturing: Southern Ontario. 1851-1891 (Toronto, 1972).
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organisation or industry financing . Industrial needs were such 
that no sophisticated hierarchy of management was established. 
Moreover, retained earnings and the occasional loan from family, 
friends, or financial intermediaries were generally sufficient 
for the relatively modest requirements of single-plant operations 
manufacturing for local needs.
The second industrial revolution in Canada, however, did 
produce fundamental changes in corporate organisation and 
management as well as in industrial financing. Security issues 
became a critical source of capital, as retained earnings and 
family wealth were found inadequate to meet the very large 
capital needs of the new multi-unit enterprises springing up in 
the new manufacturing sectors such as steel and electric-power 
generation. As firms became multi-unit operations the need for 
security financing became much more pronounced. During the peak 
of manufacturing growth, Canada experienced its first sustained 
merger wave. Multi-firm consolidations became the main method 
employed to ensure that firms had the requisite size and national 
stature to obtain finance directly through public security 
issues.
In the decade immediately preceding the Great War, Canadian 
industry found itself in the bridging stage between family and 
managerial capitalism. As in other advanced industrial nations, 
this period of finance capitalism was relatively short-lived but
11
it left a lasting impression on the observers of the day, as it 
had a decade before in Britain and the United States. Talk of 
mergers and trusts dominated the contemporary press. Most 
citizens were bewildered by the new forms of high-risk security 
financing, with "stock-watering” as its obvious characteristic. 
The corporate promoters of the day became the most envied, feared 
and despised characters. Their methods were little understood by 
the general public and even by many businessmen steeped in the 
simpler financial practices of the past. High-risk financing is 
dimly understood even today by business and financial historians.
Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner originally wrote a 
novel entitled The Gilded Age to satirize the ”all-pervading 
speculativeness”, optimism, materialism, and flexible ethical 
standards that seemed to become part of the "American character" 
after the hard years of the Civil War.17 It was also a 
description of the wealth which flowed so easily to those engaged 
in what appeared to be non-productive pursuits, particularly 
high-finance. Of course, the living embodiment of all these 
qualities was the corporate promoter. The term will be used here 
to describe this same psychological state of optimism and skewed 
distribution of wealth which was prevalent to a greater or lesser 
degree in all the industrial nations. However, it could better 
be applied to a later period. The 1870s and 1880s were largely
T7
J.A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth. 1877-1890 (New York, 
1968), pp. 1-4.
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years of severe deflation for the industrialised world. Not 
until the latter half of the 1890s did a long cycle of 
inflationary growth set in. It was accompanied by precisely the 
optimism and speculativeness that Twain described in the 1870s 
only now it had spread beyond the United States and was on a 
level never before witnessed. The years after 189 6, until the 
crushing depression of 1913 and the horrors of the First World 
War, were similarly experienced throughout the industrial world. 
The era was recalled affectionately and variously as "la belle 
epoque", the Edwardian years, and the Laurier boom. It was truly 
the gilded age for the industrial world.
1.3 The Laurier boom and manufacturing in Canada
The second industrial revolution in Canada coincided roughly 
with the period of economic prosperity which began in 1896 and 
ended with the recession of 1913. As the majority of the years 
happen to fall within the time that Wilfred Laurier was Prime 
Minister of Canada, this period is referred to by historians as 
the Laurier boom. A statistical outline of the nature of this 
boom is necessary to provide the backdrop for the stage of 
finance capitalism in Canada. During the early 1960s, the 
existence of the Laurier boom was brought into question by 
economic historians in a series of revisionist articles. Using 
newly generated national accounting statistics, these scholars 
concluded that economic growth, particularly industrial growth,
13
had been relatively continuous from 1870 to the 1930s; the
evidence could not support the traditional notion of a sharp
. . T8upward surge beginning m  1896.
More recent research, however, supports the traditional 
view. A completely reworked series of national income estimates 
reveals the singular nature of the remarkable growth experienced 
by Canada between 1896 and 1913. This work resurrects the 
original conclusion that a sharp upward expansion of investment 
had begun to take place by 1896 after years of relative 
stagnation and even depression during the 1870s, 1880s and early
T9 . .1890s. The new estimates, particularly when revised using an 
appropriate deflator, also support the traditional view of a 
tremendous increase in manufacturing which pushed the Canadian 
economy forward for the next 18 years. The relevant figures for 
extensive growth (real Canadian GNP) and intensive growth (output
TO ,
For statistics on manufacturing output in particular see 
G.W. Bertram, "Economic Growth in Canadian Industry, 1870-1915; 
The Staple Model and the Take-off Hypothesis", CJEPS. vol. 29, 
no. 2 (May 1963), and "Historical Statistics on Growth and 
Structure of Manufacturing in Canada, 1870-1957", Conference on 
Statistics 1962 & 1963. eds. J. Henripin and A. Asimakopulos
(Toronto, 1964) .
T9 . . . .On the initiative and under the direction of Professor 
M.C. Urquhart, a team of seven scholars spent a decade preparing 
a new set of National Accounts covering the period 1870 to 1926. 
The main body of these results is contained in M.C. Urquhart,
"New Estimates of Gross National Product, Canada, 1870-1926; Some
Implications for Canadian Development", Long-Term Factors in 
Economic Growth, eds. S.L. Engerman and R.E. Gallman (Chicago,
1986).
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per capita) are displayed in Table 1 below while the relevant 
figures for annual growth by industrial sector can be found in 
Appendix A .20
Table 1
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATES OF REAL CANADIAN GNP 
SELECTED PERIODS, 1870-1928
Period Real GNP
Real Output 
Per Capita
1870-1877
1877-1896
1896-1913*
1913-1928
2.48%
2.73%
7.26%
2.23%
0.84%
1.55%
4.83%
1.46%
* The years of the Laurier boom
SOURCE: M. Altman, "Revised Estimates of Real Canadian
GNP and Growth and Pre and Post World War Two Volatility 
of the Canadian Business Cycle with Some Comparison to the 
American Record", unpublished paper, Department of 
Economics, University of Saskatchewan, 1989, p. 45.
This prosperity was naturally enough reflected in the 
population figures in which immigration was the stimulus. Word 
of the country's unlimited future spread and Europeans finally 
began to look upon the northern fringe as a desirable new home. 
For the first time in its history, Canada became favoured over 
the United States as a locus of immigration. In addition, fewer
Altman, "A Revision of Canadian Economic Growth: 1870- 
1910 (a challenge to the gradualist interpretation)", CJE, vol. 
XX, no. 1 (February 1987).
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Canadians were emigrating to the United States than in the 
decades preceding 1896. Although Canada's population growth
rate was considerably lower than the American rate for the last
decades of the nineteenth century, it substantially exceeded the
21 .American rate during the years of the Laurier boom. Canadian 
population growth statistics are summarised by census decade in 
Table 2.
Table 2
POPULATION AND RATES OF GROWTH BY DECADE 
CANADA, 1871-1941 
(population in millions at beginning of decade)
Rate of Net
Decade Population Increase Immiaration
1871-81 3.7 17.2 -1.5
1881-91 4.3 11.7 -3.4
1891-01 4.8 11.1 -2.7
1901-11 5.4 34.2 15.1
1911-21 7.2 21.9 4.3
1921-31 8.8 18.1 2.6
1931-41 10.4 10.9 -0.9
SOURCE: M.C. Urquhart, "Canadian Economic Growth 187 0-
1980", Discussion Paper no. 734, Institute for Economic
Research, Queen's University, 1988, p. 6 .
While population increase served to boost absolute growth in 
the economy, novel organisational methods and technological
^l.C. Urquhart, "Canadian Economic Growth 1870-1980",
Discussion Paper no. 734, Institute for Economic Research, 
Queen's University, 1988, p. 52.
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advances, often imported from Europe and the United States but 
sometimes developed in Canada, served to boost labour 
productivity and per capita growth. Economic growth during the 
Laurier boom exhibited three main features: a very high rate of 
gross fixed capital formation, a significant rate of domestic 
savings and, possibly the most significant attribute, an enormous 
net capital inflow mainly from Britain in the form of portfolio 
investment and, secondarily, in the form of American direct 
investment in manufacturing plants.
The level of investment in infrastructure, transportation, 
agriculture, and industry was on such a large scale that even a 
relatively high level of domestic savings was insufficient to pay 
for it and the Laurier boom witnessed a veritable deluge of 
foreign investment. In the decade preceding the First World War, 
Canada received almost all the capital flowing from Britain to 
the Empire. Taking the period 1884-1914 as a whole, the only
nation which received more investment from Britain was the United
22States. For the period 1902-1914, "Canada was the largest
borrower in the last great surge of British lending", according 
to Edelstein, "absorbing perhaps a third of British lending in
22 .L. E. Davis and R.A. Huttenback, "The Export of British
Finance, 1865-1914", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, vol. XIII, no. 3 (May 1985).
17
23the years before World War I."
Capital formation rose dramatically in 1905-06 reaching a 
peak about 1912. No single year in the interwar period, 
including the most prosperous year of 1929, exceeded the ratio of 
capital formation to GNP achieved in any of the years between 
1904-14. It would take until the mid-1950s before a comparable 
level of capital formation could be attained. Investment in 
fixed capital formation was "clearly the engine of growth" during 
the Laurier boom, according to M.C. Urquhart, the chief architect 
of the new series of National Accounts for Canada.24 This 
coincided, not incidentally, with the first major wave of 
industrial mergers in Canada. According to M. Altman's revised 
estimates of Canadian manufacturing growth based on the
nc
statistics generated by Urquhart , the expansion of the domestic 
manufacturing sector played a critical, and until now, largely 
ignored role in the spurt of growth. In the space of a few short 
years a fundamental transformation took place —  from a country
^1. Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High 
Imperialism: The United Kingdom. 1850-1914 (New York, 1982), p.
287.
^M.C. Urquhart, op.cit.. p. 28.
^M. Altman, "Revised Estimates of Real Canadian GNP and 
Growth and Pre and Post World War Two Volatility of the Canadian 
Business Cycle with Some Comparison to the American Record", 
unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of 
Saskatchewan, 1989.
18
heavily dependent on the export of staple resources a modern 
industrial power emerged. Most of this thesis examines the 
manner in which this tremendous process was financed and how 
mergers themselves were a conduit for investment.
19
CHAPTER TWO 
FINANCE AND MANUFACTURING
2.1 The inadequacy of existing forms of finance
In terms of how manufacturing was financed, there is little 
evidence that the experience of Canada during its first 
industrial revolution differed markedly from that of the older 
industrialised nations of Europe. Almost all of the money 
invested in the establishment and expansion of manufacturing 
activities came from retained earnings supplemented by the 
personal savings of the families and the relatives and friends of 
those who owned the means of production. The capital 
requirements of the textile, iron and other industries of the 
first industrial revolution were "usually within reach of a 
single person or family, and the successful enterprise could 
build the growth of each period on the profits of the one 
before.”1 In addition, a limited amount of money was advanced to 
manufacturing enterprises by banks and similar financial 
intermediaries. By the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, however, larger enterprises began to raise
1D.S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change
and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the 
Present (Cambridge, 1969), p. 78.
2 . . . .Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution, ed. F.
Crouzet (London, 1972); P.L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830- 
1914: The Finance and Organization of English Manufacturing
Industry (London, 1980).
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money through direct capital issues as traditional sources of 
finance became inadequate.** In doing so, industrial companies 
followed a pattern first set by governments in the early 
eighteenth century and eventually adopted by banks, insurance 
companies, railways and utilities in the latter half of the 
century.
The transition to security financing was gradual or sudden 
—  incremental or discrete —  depending on whether it took place 
in an older industrialised nation or a newly industrialising 
nation. Where the span of time between the first and the second 
industrial revolution was large, as in Britain and France,
3 . . .Although there is little evidence for this period, most 
scholars assume that retained earnings remained the single most 
important source of corporate finance from the first industrial 
revolution to the present. Based on this case study of the 
Canadian merger movement of 1909-1912, I think there is a 
possibility that security financing was temporarily more 
important than retained earnings as a source of corporate finance 
during such financially buoyant periods. This will remain 
speculation, however, until a detailed study is undertaken on the 
relative importance of profit retention, bank advances and 
security issuances for the period in question. Evidence on the 
level of profit retention is scattered: Capital Formation in the
Industrial Revolution, ed. F. Crouzet, o p . cit.; T.S. Ashton, 
Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, 1951) ; 
P.L Cottrell, o p . cit.. More systematic studies on the sources 
of corporate finance for twentieth century British business 
indicate that retained earnings form the largest percentage of 
new funding to industrial companies. Capital issues are second 
in importance, generally one-third the level of retained 
earnings. Bank credit is the least important source of finance. 
P.E. Hart, Studies in Profit. Business Saving and Investment in 
the United Kingdom. 1920-62 (London, 1962); A.W. Goudie and G. 
Meeks, Company Finance and Performance: Aggregated Financial
Accounts for Individual British Industries. 1948-1982 (Cambridge, 
1986) .
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technological, organisational, and financial changes occurred in 
a gentler and more evolutionary manner. Families were able to 
accumulate the wealth necessary for gradual expansion through the 
profits obtained from industrial operations which extended over 
generations. Consequently, there was not the same degree of 
urgency for an infusion of investment from a large body of 
outside investors. In addition, existing financial institutions 
had the breathing space to slowly adapt to changing capital 
requirements and supply the more limited needs of industry 
without radically altering their form.4
In the new industrialisers, however, relatively undeveloped 
capital markets went through revolutionary changes to keep pace 
with equally revolutionary technological and organisational 
transformations. This applies to capital markets in the United 
States and Germany but the process was even more abrupt in 
nations such as Canada and Japan where the first and second 
industrial revolutions were further compressed. All four nations 
saw the rapid adoption of financial innovations, and by the First 
World War, these same nations were not only leading the way in 
the technology, organisation, and management of new industries 
but were providing the initiative in financial change. Indeed,
4L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 2nd 
ed., 1983); M. Levy-Leboyer, "The Large Corporation in Modern 
France", Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives in the 
Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, eds. A.D. Chandler and 
H. Daems (Cambridge, Mass., 1980);
22
. . 5the two developments were intimately connected.
2.2 Development of a market for industrial securities
The notion that a well-developed market for industrial 
securities is a prerequisite for any sustained merger wave was 
first advanced by G. Stigler, T. Navin and M. Sears.6 Their 
evidence was restricted to the evolution of the American market 
for industrial securities and its relationship with the Great 
Merger Wave. The securities of domestic manufacturing companies 
became an accepted form of investment after the progressive 
entrenchment of government, municipal, railroad, bank and public 
utilities securities.
Security financing was central to American industrial 
expansion for a number of reasons, including a rapidly expanding 
domestic economy, a compressed industrialisation, an absence of 
large amounts of inter-generational family wealth, and a
Tilly, "Mergers, External Growth, and Finance in the 
Development of Large-Scale Enterprise in Germany, 1880-1913", 
JEH, vol. XLII, no. 3 (September 1982) ; A.D. Chandler, "The 
Emergence of Managerial Capitalism", BHR, vol. LVIII, no. 4 
(Winter 1984) ; J. Hirschmeier and T. Yui, The Development of 
Japanese Business. 1600-1980 (London, 2nd ed., 1981)? E.P. 
Neufeld, The Financial System of Canada: Its Growth and
Development (Toronto, 1972).
6G . Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger", AER, vol. 
XL, no. 2 (May 1950) ; T.R. Navin and M.V. Sears, "The Rise of a 
Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902", BHR. vol. XXIX, no. 
2 (June 1955).
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7relatively weak and undeveloped banking system. During the
Great Merger Wave, new industrial promoters like John W. Gates,
Charles Flint, John R. Dos Passos, and the Moore brothers of
Chicago, began to regularly use a new form of financing
. 8industrial enterprises which involved stock-watering.
This type of financing had first been pioneered during the 
trust consolidation wave of the early 1890s. It received a 
temporary setback with the financial panic of 1893 itself caused 
by a crash of newly listed industrial stocks which nevertheless 
slowly regained their value during the next four years. By 1898, 
industrial securities had found a sizeable niche among a general 
investing public now prepared to digest enormous doses of new
7L.E. Davis, "The Capital Markets and Industrial 
Concentration: The U.S. and U.K., A Comparative Study", EHR. 2nd 
ser. , vol. XIX, no. 2 (May 1966), and "Capital Immobilities and 
Finance Capitalism: A Study of Economic Evolution in the United 
States 1820-1920", Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, vol. 
1, no. 1 (Fall 1963); L. Neal, "Trust Companies and Financial 
Innovation, 1897-1914", BHR. vol. XLV, no. 1 (Spring 1971); G. 
Smiley, "The Expansion of the New York Securities Market at the 
Turn of the Century", BHR. vol. LV, no. 1 (Spring 1981); J.B. 
Baskin, "The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in 
Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: Overcoming Asymmetric 
Information", BHR. vol. LXII, no. 2 (Summer 1988).
8 . . . .  . .Although it is difficult to ascertain precisely what was
meant by stock-watering during the years in question, I propose 
the following working definition: the issuing by a joint stock 
company of more securities than can be justified by the existing 
assets and the proven earning power of the company. This is 
slightly less restrictive than the more conservative definition 
of watered stock endorsed by the Monetary Times: the creation by
a joint company of liabilities to shareholders against which 
there are no tangible assets; MT, 16 September 1911, p. 1215.
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industrial security issues.9 The innovations introduced by the 
new industrial promoters were eventually adopted by more 
traditional railroad financiers like J.P. Morgan Jr. Although 
reluctant to do so at first, in 1901 Morgan began using high-risk 
methods of finance. Morgan's United States Steel Corporation 
became one of the most visible high-risk flotations of the merger 
wave, in large part because of its enormous capitalisation of 
$1,404 million dollars —  an amount substantially in excess of 
the value of the company's existing assets.30
Before high-risk financing was introduced, securities were 
issued only on the existing value of an enterprise. Two classes 
of securities existed —  bonds (debt capital) and common shares 
(equity capital). Bonds were issued against the value of the 
most stable property owned by the enterprise, generally land and 
buildings.31 Common shares were issued on the value of the
Q
T. R. N a v m  and M. V. Sears, op.cit.
^ h e  United States Bureau of Corporations alleged that US 
Steel's capitalisation was 47 per cent in excess of the 
capitalised value of its component parts, some $986 million. 
V .P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers. 1854-
1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 466-74 and 487-91. For a 
general discussion of the acceptance and role of high-risk 
financing in American investment banking, see V.P. Carosso, 
Investment Banking in America (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).
^ h e  North American term "bond" can easily be confused with 
the British term "debenture". The two terms actually refer to a 
range of instruments with one common characteristic: "they are
documents which either create or acknowledge a debt" without 
creating any ownership interest in the corporation. J.H. Farrar, 
Company Law (London, 1985).
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remaining property of the firm (all the property if there was no 
outstanding bond issue) as well as the firm's proven earning 
power. As less tangible items such as goodwill, trademarks, 
patents, and future earning power began to be recognised as 
valuable assets, a new concept was introduced in corporate 
finance. These intangible and more speculative items were hived 
off from the more tangible assets of the firm, each group being 
represented by a different class of security. Common shares 
began to be used to embody the value of these intangibles while a 
new class of security, the preference share, was created to
represent the firm's existing asset value and proven earning
32power.
High-risk financing was based on this division between the 
securities representing the "real assets" of a firm and the 
securities intended to capture the potential of an enterprise; 
common shares were now free to perform this later function. In 
actual North American practice, this potential value was more 
often than not the anticipated benefits which a promoter hoped 
would flow from a physical consolidation or a financial 
reorganisation. He himself accepted common shares rather than 
cash as payment for his services and he, in turn, paid for the 
services of underwriters and brokers in common shares rather than
G. Evans, "The Early History of Preferred Stock in the 
United States", AER, vol. XIX, no. 1 (March 1929), and "Preferred 
Stock in the United States 1850-1878", AER. vol. XXI, no. 1 
(March 1931).
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cash. All were willing to take their profit in this more 
speculative form because the potential reward was so much greater 
than .a simple commission payment. The common share became a 
speculative "kicker” used, in effect, to lubricate the whole 
issue process.
To the extent that common stock was issued at all it was
water; and it often made up between 30 and 60 per cent of the
total debt and equity security issues of the vast majority of
industrial flotations in the United States and Canada after 1898.
In this sense, stock-watering was a constituent part of North
American industrial finance until security practices changed
decades later through legislation and the use of shares without 
*npar value.
In high-risk financing, only the senior securities —  bonds 
and preference shares —  would be directly used to raise money 
and, ultimately, these were the only securities on which the 
company itself would realise. The share issue would generally be 
sold to the promoter-investment bank as a whole, thus
13
J.C. Bonbnght, ”Non-Par Stock: Its Economic and Legal
Aspects”, OJE. vol. 38, no. 2 (May 1924); J.M. Landis, ”The 
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933”, George 
Washington Law Review, vol. 28 (1959)? D.S. Levin, "Regulating
the Securities Industry: The Evolution of a Government Policy”, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1969? G.D. Nash, 
"Government and Business: A Case Study of State Regulation of 
Corporate Securities, 1850-1933”, BHR. vol. XXXVIII, no. 2 
(Summer 1964); L. Loss, Securities Regulation (Boston, 1961).
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guaranteeing the sale as far as the industrial enterprise was 
concerned. For taking on this degree of risk, bonus common stock 
was ™given" to the promoter. The promoter would form an 
underwriting syndicate and release part of this bonus common 
stock to the underwriters for sharing the risk of issuance with 
him. If a substantial block of securities was involved, then an 
even larger group would sub-underwrite the issue taking a smaller 
percentage of bonus common stock as payment. These underwriters 
and sub-underwriters would distribute the securities among a wide 
group of brokers who would receive a further but still smaller 
percentage of bonus common stock. Finally, these brokers would 
sell the senior securities to investors occasionally releasing
some of their bonus common stock as an incentive to investors to
14purchase when this was necessary.
By including a bonus common stock percentage to small 
investors, a speculative element was added to the purchase of any 
industrial bond or preference share. The North American investor 
found these common stock bonuses more appealing than his European 
counterpart. One financial periodical of the day speculated that
See C. Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, Monopoly's Moment: The
Organization and Regulation of Canadian Utilities. 1830-1930 
(Philadelphia, 1986), pp. 118-124, for an excellent discussion of 
high-risk, or what these authors term "new-style", financing. 
Also see, A.S. Dewing, Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1914) and Corporate Finance (New York, rev. 
ed., 1931); as well as L.H. Haney, Business Organization and 
Combination (New York, 1934); J.T. Flynn, Security Speculation: 
Its Economic Effects (New York, 1934).
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this was due to the more risk-loving nature of North Americans:
-Investment offerings with a common stock bonus have 
found favor in Canada and the United States. It may be 
because the American thoroughly enjoys the speculative 
element...In his own words he is fond of taking a long 
chance. The British investor... is more conservative 
and may lose something thereby... One thing assured is 
better to him than two things doubtful.
Whatever the reason for this preference, the system as a 
whole was designed to provide the maximum incentive to get an 
issue sold. High-risk financing could (and did) produce immense 
profits for the promoters involved, but it could also result in 
disastrous failures for promoters and companies. Syndicate 
promoters, underwriters, and brokers put their livelihood and 
reputations on the line each time they contracted into a major 
flotation. Moreover, the danger of high-risk financing was not 
limited to promoters, investment banks, underwriters, investors, 
and the companies being provided with capital in this manner. 
The volatility and extremely cyclical nature of high-risk finance 
could shake the financial system itself to its feet as it did in 
1893 and 1903. Although the crash of American industrial stocks 
first triggered a financial panic on the New York Stock Exchange 
on these occasions, the interconnectedness of the industrialised 
world's capital markets meant that financial centers from 
Montreal and London to Berlin and Paris also suffered a steep
3%T, 22 November 1909, p. 2211.
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decline in share prices. This was followed by a drop in 
industrial investment and economic recession.^
2.3 The evolution of finance for Canadian manufacturing industry
It was natural for Canadian financiers during the Laurier 
boom to employ high-risk methods of finance first developed in 
the United States. Like the organisational and technological 
changes made by Canadian manufacturers, however, this was not a 
passive process of imitation but an active process of adaptation 
which involved domestic innovations as well as modifications to
17 . . .suit Canadian conditions. Such conditions included a smaller 
and more geographically dispersed domestic market, a shallower 
pool of investment capital and a politically dependent
^The industrial or "real” side of this process was 
described in the business cycle (United States) and trade cycle 
(Europe) literature of the early twentieth century and later by 
econometricians and economists attempting to explain the cyclical 
nature of the industrial economies. These include W.C. Mitchell, 
Business Cycles (New York, 1913); J.A. Schumpeter, Business 
Cycles (New York, 1939); R.G. Hawtrey, Trade and Credit (London,
1928); A.C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations (London, 2nd ed.,
1929) ; R. Fels, American Business Cycles 1865-1897 (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 1959).
^This is briefly reviewed in the company case studies of 
Chapter Four. In "Technological Adaptation in Canadian
Manufacturing, 1900-1929", JEH, vol. XLIX, no. 3 (September 
1989), P.J. Wylie established that Canadian industry greatly 
adapted and transformed American technology for Canadian use. 
This may be accurate but employing D.S. Landes' concept of 
challenge and response, it must be admitted that although the 
Canadian response went beyond mere imitation, the challenges,
; whether they were in the form of organisational changes or major 
technological advances, were from outside of Canada.
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relationship with Britain.
-The market for Canadian industrial securities did not evolve 
as early as the American market for a number of reasons. On the 
supply side, the capital requirements of roost Canadian 
manufacturing enterprises could be satisfied in the traditional 
manner. Before the early twentieth century, only a few 
manufacturing enterprises had enough of a "national" presence to 
be well-known to investors throughout the country and thus for 
their securities to have been easily traded. The vast majority 
of Canadian manufacturers in the late nineteenth century remained 
small; their reputations did not extend beyond the regions or 
even the towns in which they were located. Their capital
requirements could be met by a combination of retained earnings, 
family savings, and the occasional bank advance to pay for a 
major extension or change in plant or equipment or to cover 
expenses during a temporary slump.
To these sources of finance we can add the direct investment 
of community members in such manufacturing enterprises. This 
last source took the form of security issues restricted to the 
local community or region. These local subscriptions for
industrial securities were likely more important to the finance
of manufacturing in North America than in Europe because of the
relative lack of large pools of intergenerational family wealth. 
Such securities were often issued upon the transformation of a
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sole proprietorship, partnership, or family-firm into a joint- 
stock company, a process which was accelerating during the 1880s 
and 1890s in Canada. Shares were sold to family members and the
ip t
prominent citizens of the community. Announcements m
financial periodicals like the Monetary Times reflected the 
community nature of such industrial enterprises:
Incorporation has been granted by Ontario letters 
patent to the Simcoe Peat Fuel Company, Ltd; capital 
$20,000: head office, Barrie. The parties are all of 
Barrie, viz: William Reiner, clergyman, Andrew Hay,
school teacher? John George Scott, coal merchant; 
William Douglas MacLaren, dentist? David Henry 
MacLaren? druggist? William Alves Boyes, barrister-at- 
law, and Sophia Boyes, his wife.
Such stocks and bonds, once purchased, were rarely traded, 
even in the community where the enterprise was located. The 
securities sold by these local manufacturers reflected the value 
of their existing plant, equipment, stock, and past 
profitability: an asset value relatively easy to corroborate by
TP , ,
Examples of such small local issues abound in the Monetary 
Times such as the $80,000 issue of the Facer Solid Steel Car 
Wheel Co. of Perth, Ontario, MT, 13 September 1895, p. 333? the 
Canon Stove and Oven Company, Ltd., incorporated by Charles 
Cannon of London, Ontario, with a capital of $20,000? and the 
Peterboro Underwear Company, Ltd., incorporated by some 
manufacturers and merchants in Peterborough, Ontario, with a 
capital of $40,000, MT, 3 February 1899, p. 1029? or the 
incorporation of the Thomas Bell & Son Manufacturing Company of 
Wingham, Ontario, by Thomas Bell, Harry O. Bell, Fred Johnson, 
Jessie Bell and Nellie Bell, with a capital of $95,000, MT, 17 
February 1899, p. 1083.
^MT, 31 March 1899, p. 1281.
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community members. Although preference shares were used by the 
largest Canadian companies beginning to be listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, local manufacturing issues were restricted to 
common shares representing the actual present value of the 
enterprise.
Although different in many important respects, the origins 
of the large national and international industrial flotations of 
Canadian manufacturing enterprises can be found in such community 
stock subscriptions. Moreover, they provide one reason why so 
many Canadians with relatively modest incomes bought securities 
in the later flotations; they were already accustomed to 
investing in the securities of local manufacturing firms. Thus, 
when these same concerns were eventually swallowed up in multi­
firm consolidations to form "national” enterprises in the 1909- 
1912 merger wave, these investors were less hesitant than they 
might have been in purchasing the new securities.20
Until the regular appearance of such consolidations and
^The Canadian Car and Foundry flotation, a merger of two 
Montreal concerns with an Amherst, Nova Scotia manufacturer, 
provides some evidence of this. A disproportionate number of the 
Canadian shares distributed by Canadian Car were purchased by 
residents of Amherst, a small manufacturing town with a 
population of less than 10,000, and the residents of Nova Scotia 
who had previously been large investors in Rhodes-Curry. LSE, MS 
18000/145B/759, application to grant a quotation for $3.5 million 
common stock and $5.0 million seven per cent cumulative preferred 
stock of Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited dated 4 March 
1910, and general list of shareholders of Canadian Car and 
Foundry Company, Limited as of 30 June 1910.
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national issues, however, the facilities for the public trading
of industrial securities in Canada would necessarily remain
, 71
primitive relative to developments in New York and London. 
Before the twentieth century, even some of the largest 
manufacturing enterprises in Canada did not publicly list their 
shares. The farm implement manufacturer, Massey-Harris, for
example, remained a closely-held corporation until 1927 when 
control passed to the senior partner of a major Canadian 
investment house. With a total of $3.5 million worth of shares 
distributed among the officers and the Massey and Harris families 
in 1893 it was certainly large enough to exploit effectively a 
public flotation. Moreover, in an industry of rapid
technological and organisational changes, it could have greatly 
benefitted from the occasional large inflow of capital which such 
flotations generate. Nevertheless, the company chose not to 
raise capital in this manner and relied almost entirely on family 
savings and profit retention for its long-term growth, a prudent 
strategy perhaps but one which resulted in slower growth.
Within a short time after the formation of the International 
Harvester Company by J.P. Morgan & Co. in 1902, Massey-Harris was 
no longer in the forefront of the agricultural implement
^R.C. Michie, "The Canadian Securities Market, 1850-1914", 
BHR, vol. LXII, no. 1 (Spring 1988); J.F. Whiteside, "The Toronto 
Stock Exchange and the Development of the Share Market to 1885", 
Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 20, no. 3 (Fall 1985); E.A. 
Collard, Chalk to Computers: The Story of The Montreal Stock
Exchange (Toronto, 1974).
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industry. Massey-Harris was not as vigorous as its largest 
competitors in setting up branch plant subsidiaries throughout 
the world and it only began manufacturing tractors years after 
other major implement companies. The company did not appoint a 
professional general manager from outside the Massey-Harris 
"family" until 1920. Although Massey-Harris (later to become 
Massey-Ferguson) would eventually emerge as one of the world’s 
largest tractor and farm implement multinationals, it did so only 
after the separation of ownership from control was effected, 
after a professional hierarchy was put into place, and after it 
was reorganised administratively along the same lines as its 
major competitors such as International Harvester and John Deere 
& Co.22
Like the agricultural machinery industry growing up around 
Lake Ontario, the textile industry emerging in and around
rn ,
Montreal produced some very large enterprises. Unlike Massey-
Denison, Harvest Triumphant: The Story of Massey-Harris 
(London, 1949), pp. 119-245; E.P. Neufeld, A Global Corporation: 
A History of the International Development of Massev-Ferguson 
Limited (Toronto, 1969), pp. 1-23; W.G. Phillips, The
Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada: A Study of Competition 
(Toronto, 1956), pp. 25-34; H. Kramer, "Harvesters and High 
Finance: Formation of the International Harvester Company", BHR. 
vol. XXXVIII, no. 3 (Autumn 1964); V.P. Carosso, The Morgans: 
Private International Bankers. 1854-1913. op.cit., pp. 479-81 and 
490-91.
^ h e  earliest mention which I could find of a Canadian 
manufacturing company with its shares listed on a Canadian 
exchange was a textile company in 1885 . The Canada Cotton
Company with an issued capital of $2.0 million was listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. Its $100 par value shares had a market 
value of $30. MT, 2 January 1885, p. 758. This company was
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Harris, however, the textile companies resorted to security 
issues very early on and were the first Canadian enterprises to 
be quoted on public stock exchanges. The two largest were the 
Dominion Cotton Mills and Canadian Colored Cotton Mills 
companies. Each had an authorised capital of $5 million by the 
early 1890s. These companies had a national presence and both 
had their stock listed on Canadian exchanges in 1894. In spite 
of this, trading activity seems to have been quite limited and 
both companies did not become modern industrial enterprises with 
professional management until late in the twentieth century. The 
early development of Dominion Cotton (which became Dominion 
Textile in 1905) and Canadian Colored Cotton more resembled the 
British textile firms where families remained a powerful force
until the interwar period and where loose alliances with other
34companies often took the place of real integration.
The few large enterprises willing and able to sell their 
securities to a national body of investors were an inadequate 
foundation upon which to build a sophisticated Canadian
eventually swallowed up in the 1892 Canadian Colored Cotton Mills 
amalgamation. It is important to note that cotton manufacturing 
was the foremost industry in terms of men employed, capital 
invested, value of output and rate of growth during the first 
industrial revolution: D.S. Landes, op.cit.. p. 89.
'V
B.J. Austin, "Life Cycles and Strategy of a Canadian 
Company: Dominion Textile, 1873-1973", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Concordia University, 1985. These British companies are 
described by L. Hannah in the Rise of the Corporate Economy. 
op.cit.
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securities market or develop further the secondary trading 
markets in Montreal and Toronto. And when the first Canadian 
industrial giants did seek capital through direct security issues 
they went directly to Britain, bypassing the Canadian capital 
market. Moreover, these companies did so without the
services of a professional promoter. In 1895, when Dominion 
Cotton sold £  308,200 ($1,500,000) worth of securities in
London, the sale of the issue to a British investment house was 
personally handled by David Morrice, the major shareholder and 
chief executive of the company.
The political and social connection with Britain encouraged 
Canadian manufacturers of the requisite size and credentials to 
use the London market. This was both a cause and consequence of 
the substantial British ownership in these early industrials. 
The Acadian Sugar Refinery Company of Halifax, for example, was 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1893 but not on the 
Canadian exchanges until many years later. The exposure to new 
British financial methods likely led to the gradual adoption of 
preference shares but there is no evidence that such Canadian 
companies utilised high-risk forms of finance during the early 
1890s or that common stock played the role of speculative
^MT, 1 November 1895, p. 556; 15 November 1895, p. 623 ? 22 
November 1895, p. 654.
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2Slubricant.
2.4 Expansion of the Canadian capital market
The first truly modern flotation in Canada employing the 
principles of high-risk financing was the infamous Canadian Cycle 
and Motor Company issue of September, 1899. None of the 
constituent five companies that made up the Canada Cycle merger 
would have been large enough to effect a public flotation but 
together they inflated themselves up to an authorised capital of 
$6 million issuing $2 million worth of preference shares to the
^The capital stock of the Nova Scotia Steel Co., Ltd., the
predecessor of the Nova Scotia Steel & Coal Co., was made up of
both preference and ordinary shares likely in addition to some 
bonds and debentures. MT, 13 September 1895, pp. 333-34. A 
systematic examination of the Monetary Times from 1885 forward 
discloses only one example of the use of preference shares by 
industrial companies before that time: The Acadia Sugar Refinery 
Company which was a consolidation of the Nova Scotia, Halifax and 
Moncton sugar refineries in 1893. The shares of the old 
companies appear to have been restricted to common stock and 
capitalisation was expressed in Canadian dollars, whereas the new 
company's equity capital was divided between common and 
preference shares and expressed in pounds sterling. MT, 23 
January 1891, p. 897? 4 August 1893, p. 131. Acadia was likely
influenced by British practice which had established the use of
the preference share for industrials by the early 1890s. This is 
reflected in a English free-standing company with operations in 
Canada —  the Anglo-British Columbia Packing Company, Limited —  
which was a merger of nine salmon canneries on the Pacific coast 
of Canada in 1891. Its share capital of 200,000 pounds was 
divided between preference shares and common shares. JIT, 22 May 
1891, p. 1429.
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public.27 Bonus common stock was not offered to the public as an 
incentive to purchase Canada Cycle's preference shares nor was it 
used to pay for the properties entering the consolidation. 
Instead, all of it was used to lubricate the issue by paying off 
the promoting syndicate, underwriters and brokers.
Greed, inexperience in high-risk financing, and bad luck 
combined to ensure the failure of the new company. Very 
generously rewarding themselves with common stock (which soon 
became valueless), the promoters dangerously overcapitalised 
Canada Cycle. As the promoters then began to squabble over 
profits, the market for bicycles became saturated. The company 
was insolvent within two years but its final demise was deferred
a few more years through financial reorganisations which
26considerably deflated its original capital stock. The most 
widely read Canadian business weekly of the age, the Toronto- 
based Monetary Times, was, at least initially, decidedly negative 
about the importation of high-risk financial methods to Canada 
and criticised stock-watering as a danger to the economic system
In The Financial System of Canada: Its Growth and
Development. o p . cit.. p. 476, E.P. Neufeld states that 
preference shares were not allowed under federal legislation 
until 1899.
2BMT, 1 September 1899, p. 278-79? 13 December 1901, pp.
753-53? 4 April 1902, p. 1296? 8 July 1904, p. 36? H.G.
Stapells, "The Recent Consolidation Movement in Canadian 
Industry", unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1922? 
M. Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Business Times of 
Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart. 1858-1939 (Toronto, 1978), pp. 67-74.
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as a whole. Reporting in full length on the financial failure of
Canada Cycle, it campaigned for a return to more conservative
29methods of finance.
Despite the bad publicity, the new methods immediately 
caught on and a series of successful and very profitable company 
flotations followed on the heels of the Canada Cycle fiasco. 
Many of these related to utility enterprises but a significant 
number of new manufacturing companies were also floated between 
1899 and 1901. These included Canada Furniture Manufacturers'30, 
Canada Foundry31, Dominion Iron and Steel32, and United Factories. 
The last issue differed from its predecessors in offering
20MT, 13 December 1901, pp. 752-53; 3 January 1902, p. 850; 
4 April 1902, p. 1296; 8 July 1904, p. 36.
■^his was a merger of 17 Ontario furniture manufacturers 
consummated in January 1901. The company issued $775,000 of its 
preference stock at par to the general public while $1 million 
par value common stock along with $525,000 preference stock was 
used to purchase the assets of the companies entering the merger. 
MT, 11 January 1901, pp. 898-899, prospectus of Canada Furniture 
Manufacturers',Limited; AFR. vol. I (July 1901), p. 78.
31Canada Foundry's share capital of $500,000 was divided 
equally into preference and common shares. In May, 1900, the 7 
per cent cumulative preference shares were issued to the public 
with the promise that they would soon be listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange. No bonus common stock was offered to 
investors, this presumably kept by the original owners and 
promoters of the company. MT, 4 May 1900, p. 14 57, prospectus of 
The Canada Foundry Company, Limited.
32Dominion Iron and Steel issued $3 million 7 per cent 
cumulative preference stock to the public in March 1901. This 
was out of a total capital of $5 million preferred stock, $15 
milLion common stock and $8 million first mortgage bonds. Each 
$100 nominal share was offered at $85 without a common stock 
bonus. MT, 18 March 1901, p. 1176.
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investors bonus common stock with the purchase of every
preference share, a technique already being employed in Canadian
utility promotions such as Mexican Light and Power and Sao Paulo
Tramway, Light and Power. This practice soon became
institutionalised to the extent that the majority of share issues
during the Canadian merger wave of 1909-1912 offered investors
34bonus common stock.
Nevertheless, the success of other industrial flotations 
and, perhaps more importantly, the profitability of the numerous 
utility flotations of the period encouraged the continuing use of 
high-risk financing in spite of broadside attacks in the press on 
the dangers of overcapitalisation. The stock market downturn in 
1903 damaged the financial viability of some high-risk industrial 
promotions, in particular, Dominion Iron and Steel, resulting in 
a two-year lull during which promoters and investors temporarily 
avoided large high-risk issues. By 1905, however, aided by a 
rising stock market, more industrial promotions were advanced.35
^^ MT, 4 October 1901, pp. 438-39, prospectus of United
Factories Limited, (a merger of three major woodenware 
manufacturing companies in Ontario and Montreal); C. Armstrong 
and H.V. Nelles, Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 1896-1930 (Toronto, 1988); D. 
McDowall, The Light: Brazilian Traction. Light and Power Company 
Limited. 1899-1945 (Toronto, 1988).
•^See Appendix D, Table 25.
See MT, 5 June 1903, p. 1641, for a list of Canadian 
industrials and a comparison of their common and preferred stock 
prices in 1902 and 1903. Although the Canadian market suffered 
less than the American, Dominion Iron and Steel*s common stock 
dropped 85 per cent in value and the value of its preferred stock
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The formal security markets reflected these changes. From only a 
couple of manufacturing companies with shares listed on the 
Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges in 1898, “industrial” 
listings climbed to 35 by 1905.36 Fueled by the Canadian merger 
wave of 1909-1912, this number would more than double during the 
next five years.37
2.5 The British capital market and Canadian manufacturing
Despite its expansion, the Canadian market for industrial 
securities could not keep pace with the rapid growth of 
manufacturing in Canada and its enormous demand for capital. The 
Canadian investing community and the pool of savings available 
was simply too small to finance the tremendous expansion of 
capital stock taking place during the latter half of the Laurier
declined by approximately 82 per cent.
■^he term "industrial" was used by financial manuals and
the press of the day to embrace the securities of manufacturing 
companies, but they also included the occasional corporate
security which could not easily fit into the other well-
designated categories of insurance, bank, land, loan, mortgage 
and saving, trust, light and power, mining, navigation, steam 
railway, electric railway, telegraph, telephone and cable company 
securities. For example, of the 35 industrials listed by the 
Annual Financial Review for 1905, only three would not properly 
fall into the 1948 Canadian Standard Industrial Classification of 
manufacturing industry: the Hudson's Bay Company, the Terminal
Warehouse and Cartage Company, and the Windsor Hotel Company. 
AFR. vol. VI (July 1905), p. 5.
^AFR. vol. XI (April 1911)? vol. XI (November 1911).
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boom.36 In the years preceding the Laurier boom, being part of 
the British empire meant that Canadian government and railway 
securities were classified as colonial securities. Consequently, 
British investors treated Canadian securities more like a 
domestic, and therefore intrinsically safer, investment relative 
to many "foreign" securities. British investment had, in fact, 
fueled the large influx of British portfolio capital into Canada 
during the 1880s when the Canadian Pacific Railway and the 
Canadian government first began borrowing heavily in the British 
market. This was followed by a lull until the Laurier boom 
when British investment once again began to flow into Canada. 
This flow turned into a flood after 1907 as can be seen in Table 
3 below.40 - The merger boom, as it affected mainly industry, 
served to increase dramatically the amount of capital entering 
this sector relative to other categories of investment.
At p. 48 of "The Canadian Securities Market, 1850-1914",
BHR, vol. 62, no. 1 (Spring 1988), R.C. Michie makes a rough
calculation of the number of Canadian investors in 1913: 144,125
individual investors which amounts to 1.3 5 per cent of the total 
population.
39M. Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High
Imperialism: The United Kingdom. 1850-1914 (New York, 1982);
W.P. Kennedy, "Foreign Investment, Trade and Growth in the United 
Kingdom, 1870-1913", EEH. vol. II, no. 4 (Summer 1974) ? The
Export of Capital from Britain 1870-1914. ed. A.R. Hall (London, 
1968); L.E. Davis and R.A. Huttenback, Mammon and the .Pursuit of 
Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism. 1860-1912 
(Cambridge, 1986).
40Table 3 is expressed in nominal value. Table 21 in
Appendix B contains a list of Canadian manufacturing company
issues floated in London between 1905 and 1913 and includes the
nominal (par) and the actual (market) value of the issues.
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Table 3
CANADIAN CAPITAL RAISED IN LONDON MARKET, 1905-1914 
(in millions of pounds sterling - nominal value)
Manufacturing
Year total manufacturing as a % of total
1905 13.53 0.59 4.3%
1906 6.43 0.30 4.7%
1907 11.20 0.54 H •£%
1908 29.35 1.06 3.6%
1909 37.41 3.98 1 0 .6%
1910 38.45 5.62 1H.6 %
1911 39.86 4.96 12.4%
1912 32.96 3.44 1#.4%
1913 47.36 3 - <fc3 7 .2%
SOURCE: Appendix B.
Since the London capital market acted as a conduit for world 
investment, particularly investment from continental Europe, it 
is difficult to say with precision how much of this investment in 
Canadian manufacturing industry originated in Britain.41 
Nevertheless, the evidence collected at the time, as well as the 
case studies examined here, indicate that between 1908 and the 
Great War, the British were the single most significant group of 
investors in the larger Canadian manufacturing promotions. In 
addition, British investment almost equalled the Canadian 
contribution to total investment in Canadian industrial 
securities. Although Canadians invested less in the large
^ e e  D.C.M. Platt, Britain's Investment Overseas on the Eve 
of the First World War: The Use and Abuse of Numbers (London, 
1986), for a discussion of such problems.
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concerns floated on the London market than the British, they 
invested correspondingly more in the smaller ventures floated 
only or mainly on the Canadian market.
Table 4 below provides a snapshot of the origin of ownership 
in industrial securities of 22 Canadian corporations in 1914. 
According to this sample, approximately 57 per cent of total 
shares were held in Canada, while about 37 per cent were held in 
Britain. An insignificant amount was held in continental Europe 
while slightly less than 3 per cent was held in the United 
States. In very general terms, the results in Table 4 conform to 
the individual case studies discussed below. These figures may 
even underestimate the level of British ownership during the 
height of the Canadian merger movement as many British investors 
were already divesting themselves of foreign and colonial stock 
holdings because of the exigencies of the First World War.
A perusal of the shareholder lists submitted to the London 
Stock Exchange after the public flotations of three industrial 
companies promoted by Max Aitken reveals that the vast majority 
of the sterling bonds and shares were purchased by British 
investors. Only a negligible number of continental Europeans 
purchased the shares of these particular Canadian industrial 
firms. A more detailed study of ownership in Canadian Car and 
Foundry revealed that a mere 1.6 per cent of the sterling 
preference shares were purchased by Europeans from the continent
45
Table 4
NATIONAL HOLDINGS IN 22 CANADIAN INDUSTRIALS, 1914 
(Number of shareholders and value of shares)
Country common $ mil preference $ mil
Held in S/holders Value* S/holders Value*
Canada 4,365 47.178 5,274 15.551
Britain 2,305 12.433 4,534 14.336
USA 238 1.459 275 1.684
France 319 1.037 126 0.399
Germany 19 0.039 5 0.041
Belgium 10 0.030 10 0.015
Holland 8 0.470 6 0.017
Other 116 0.470 57 0.380
* Although not specified, it is likely that share value 
was expressed in nominal rather than market value thus 
vastly over-weighting the market value of the common 
shares.
SOURCE: Derived from the MTAR (January 1915), p. 33.
whereas 98.4 per cent of close to 37,000 shares were
purchased by residents of Britain and Ireland.42
The figures for the common shares sold (or passed on to 
British underwriters and brokers as promotional profit) are even 
more extreme. Of the $2,830,000 par value common shares issued 
on the London market, 99.6 per cent were in the hands of British
LSE, MS 18,000/168B/936, application to grant a quotation 
for $6,496,300 of seven per cent cumulative preference stock of 
The Steel Company of Canada, Limited dated 22 April 1912; LSE, 
MS 18,000/153B/335, application to grant a quotation for 
$19,000,000 ordinary shares of Canada Cement Company, Limited 
dated 24 May 1911? LSE, MS 18,000/145B/759, application to grant 
a quotation for $3,500,000 common stock and $5,000,000 seven per 
cent cumulative preferred stock of Canadian Car and Foundry, 
Limited dated 4 March 1910.
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residents. Canadians held the largest number of shares issued in 
North America. Americans owned 16.1 per cent of Canadian Car's 
stock, a not insignificant amount, but held less than one per 
cent of the common stock. Table 5 below summarises the results 
aggregating the total number of common and preferred shares 
issued in pounds sterling and Canadian dollars.
Table 5
DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES IN 
CANADIAN CAR AND FOUNDRY COMPANY, LIMITED 
(as of 30 June 1910)
Held in Common Percent Preferred Percent
Britain 28,189 80.5% 36,165 72.3%
Canada 6,680 19.1% 11,126 22.3%
USA 20 2,130 4.3%
France 74 0.2% 419 0 .8%
Germany - 100 0 .2%
Holland 15 -  - -
Norway - 40 -
Belgium 22 -  - -
New Zealand - 20 -
Switzerland - 10 -
TOTAL 35,000 50,000
SOURCE: LSE, MS 18,000/145B/759, general list c
shareholders of Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited 
as of 30 June 1910, enclosed in an application for 
quotation.
Unquestionably, the growth of a market for Canadian
industrial securities in Canada before the First World War was 
directly connected to the evolution of a market for Canadian
industrial securities in Britain. This relationship can be
analysed within the context of a case study of the most
47
significant Canadian securities corporation specialising in 
industrial flotations and the merger promoter who guided its 
operations.
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAX AITKEN: INVESTMENT BANKER AND MERGER PROMOTER
3.1 ~ Max Aitken and the creation of the Roval Securities
Corporation
William Maxwell Aitken, later known as Lord Beaverbrook, was 
the most significant promoter of Canadian industrial 
consolidations before the Great War. Relative to the attention 
lavished on Beaverbrook1s role as British politician and 
minister, newspaper baron and the intimate of Winston Churchill, 
his career as a financier and company promoter has been largely 
overlooked.1 Aitken and his investment firm, the Royal 
Securities Corporation, played a role similar to the dominant 
industrial financiers of Britain and the United States during the 
gilded age. In terms of per capita size and national importance, 
his merger flotations in the Canadian steel, cement, and rolling 
stock industries find their counterpart in H. Osborne O'Hagan's 
cement and brewery merger financings in Britain and J.P. Morgan & 
Co's financing of mergers in the American steel and agricultural
F.A. Mackenzie, Lord Beaverbrook: An Authentic Biography
(London, 1931); E. Middleton, Beaverbrook: The Statesman and the 
Man (London, 1934)? T. Driberg, Beaverbrook: A Study in Power 
and Frustration (London, 1956) ; P. Howard, Beaverbrook: A Study 
of Max the Unknown (London, 1964)? A. Wood, The True History of 
Lord Beaverbrook (London, 1965); K. Young, Churchill and 
Beaverbrook: A Study in Friendship and Politics (London, 1966); 
A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972).
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. . 2 implement industries.
Born in 1879 and raised in a small community in the province 
of New Brunswick, Max Aitken began his working life as a clerk 
and apprentice in a law office. His restless nature and his 
inattention to legal detail, however, cut short his legal career 
and, at the age of eighteen, Aitken moved to Western Canada where 
he set up some small businesses including a bowling alley in 
Calgary. With nothing much to show for his efforts except more 
debt, Aitken moved back to Eastern Canada around 1900 and tried 
to peddle insurance policies. Things improved but slightly when 
he switched to selling corporate bonds from door to door. It was 
at this time, however, he met Nova Scotia's most influential 
capitalist, John F. Stairs, possibly while trying to sell him 
some securities.3
Impressed by the young man's aggressive but captivating 
temperament, Stairs took Aitken under his wing. By 19 02, Aitken
P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers.
1854-1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 390-96, 465-98; H.O.
O'Hagan, Leaves from mv Life. 2 vols. (London, 1929). Out of all 
Beaverbrook's biographers, A.J.P. Taylor, o p .cit.. best covers 
his Canadian promotional and financial activities but much was 
necessarily neglected in a book which concentrated on British 
politics and society.
3BBK, letter, Brock to Aitken, 11 May 1906, A/8/misc B. 
Beaverbrook describes this part of his early career in Mv Early 
Life (Fredericton, N.B., 1964), and Friends: Sixty Years of
Intimate Personal Relations with Richard Bedford Bennett (London,
1959). John F. Stairs obituary in MT, 30 September 1904, p.421.
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found himself handling the finances of Stairs' numerous and far-
flung enterprises. President of the Nova Scotia Steel & Coal
Company (Scotia), the Eastern Trust Company, the Consumers
Cordage Company and the Trinidad Electric Company, as well as a
large investor in many of the Canadian tramway and utility
operations then being established in the Caribbean and Latin
America, Stairs was able to provide Aitken with an excellent base
from which to develop the range of financial skills central to
company promotion and investment banking. Aitken became involved
in the purchase and sale of bonds and shares in companies like
Acadia Pulp and Paper, Demerara Electric, Mexican Light and
Power, and Sao Paulo Traction, Light and Power. He worked
directly in financing Nova Scotia industrials such as Robb
Engineering and its American subsidiary Robb-Mumford, the Munro
4Iron Works, and Scotia.
In 1903, Stairs decided to centralise the financial 
management of his various enterprises by establishing the Royal 
Securities Corporation (RSC). The company was created, in part, 
because of the refusal of local Halifax brokers to sell Scotia
BBK, A series, various correspondence, 1903-1905? G/l/1902 
letter-book; G/19/misc business dealings, various correspondence. 
T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of 
the Maritimes, 1880-1910", Acadiensis, vol. l, no. 2 (Spring 
1972) , p. 24.
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bonds.5 Stairs’ closest Halifax associates, including the
lawyer-promoters Robert E. Harris and Charles Cahan, came
together to provide the capital for the RSC. Stairs became
President and made his young protege the Secretary and manager of
the RSC. The corporation was to be the bond and share issuing
house for the group's ventures as well as the chief conduit
through which new capital would be sought for Scotia, the largest
of the group’s interests.6 The vehicle chosen, a securities
corporation, was the second of its type to appear in Canada
although, in less than a decade, dozens more like it from Halifax
7to Victoria would be created.
The creation of the RSC gave Stairs and his colleagues a 
nucleus for all their future investments in manufacturing and 
financial services in Nova Scotia and utility ventures in the
Although I could not find documentation on the precise 
reasons for the formation of RSC at the time, Aitken stated the 
following a few years later: "Five or six years ago Mackintosh
and McCurdy [two major Halifax stock brokers] would not or could 
not sell Scotia Land Bonds. We started the organization for the 
purpose." BBK, letter, Aitken to Cahan, 11 February 1908, 
A/20/Cahan.
^BK, Certificate of first meeting of the RSC held on 28 May 
1903? letter, Aitken to Harris, 4 November 1903, A/l/misc H; 
letter, Aitken to Cahan, 4 June 1903, A/l/misc C.
7 . .The first was the Dominion Securities Corporation created 
in 1901 by George Cox and a group of Toronto financiers who were 
involved in his various enterprises. E.R. Wood was the manager 
of Dominion Securities but the history of the company is little 
known despite its importance. For a brief discussion of Dominion 
Securities see M. Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and
Business Times of Sir Joseph Flavelle. Bart. 1858-1939 (Toronto, 
1978), pp. 60-69.
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West Indies. Although they were more financiers than
industrialists, the RSC group —  Stairs, Harris, Cahan and Aitken
—  exercised enormous power over manufacturing enterprises in
Atlantic Canada. This was most obviously reflected in the
stewardship of Scotia itself, one of the largest enterprises in
the Maritimes. Stairs, himself president of the steel company
for many years, was, after his death in 1904, succeeded by Robert
Harris. Harris then held the presidency for the following
decade.8 The RSC group also had directors placed on the boards
of Robb Engineering, Robb-Mumford, Acadia Sugar Refining, the
9Eastern Trust Company and other Nova Scotia corporations.
In the first years of the RSC, Aitken lived up to Stairs's 
expectations and made a handsome profit for the RSC's major 
shareholders, including himself. Even while devoting a large 
amount of his time to servicing the considerable capital needs of 
Scotia, Aitken was able to build up a large clientele in the 
retail end of the securities business. More importantly, Aitken 
was encouraged by the RSC's major shareholders to purchase the
Cantley Papers, PANS, M.G. 1, vol. 169, letterbook, 1903- 
1907, various letters, Thomas Cantley, general manager of Scotia 
to Harris and Stairs. BBK, letter, Aitken to Cahan, 9 March 
1905, A/5/misc? letter, Aitken to Ross, 29 August 1905, A/7/W.D. 
Ross, July-December.
^Robb Engineering Company Papers, Dalhousie University 
Archives, miscellaneous papers box, historical employees file, 
"Memo on Robb Engineering Works Limited, Chronologically Compiled 
by F.F. Mackenzie", and letter, J.A. Mumford and D.W. Robb to
G.W. Cole, 17 March 1903. MT, 30 September 1904, p. 421.
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control of enterprises in order to reorganise and amalgamate them 
into more profitable ventures.30
Aitken, like many of the contemporary promoters, was 
essentially a securities salesman who made a living from the 
difference in price at which he bought an issue or part-issue of 
securities and the price at which he sold them to brokers and 
investors. Looked at from this angle, the difference between the 
RSC and a stock-brokerage firm was only a matter of degree. As a 
retailer of securities the RSC would compete with such firms and 
for many years RSC's salesmen travelled throughout the Maritimes 
and central Canada selling stocks and bonds from door to door.31 
From the beginning, however, the RSC emphasized the wholesale end 
of the securities business. It differed from the brokerage firms
in the number of new flotations which it sponsored and the amount
. . . .  . 1 2of underwriting activity it engaged in. Although required to
carry a broad range of securities to satisfy its retail
^BBK, letters, Harris to Aitken, 17 August 1905 and 26 
August 1905, G/19/misc business dealings.
^ h e  RSC's retail activity was described by C. Armstrong in 
''Making a Market: Selling Securities in Atlantic Canada before 
World War I", CJE, vol. XIII, no. 3 (August 1980).
^ h i s  was always a matter of degree as most brokerage firms 
also engaged in the buying of entire issues, often municipal 
securities, but they were more engaged in the "retailing" end 
than RSC. On the other hand, some so-called brokerage firms like 
McCuaig Bros. & Co. of Montreal were much closer to wholesale 
securities corporations like the RSC and Dominion Securities in 
that its wholesale purchasing and underwriting operations were 
likely more significant than its retail business.
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customers, the RSC made most of its profit in floating, 
underwriting and selling its own specialties —  the securities of 
the companies created by Aitken —  and the RSC's salesmen were 
instructed to push these stocks and bonds. With time, as the 
RSC's specialties became increasingly popular with a broad 
section of the Canadian (and eventually, British) investing 
public, brokerage houses began to carry the RSC's lines as a 
matter of course. This allowed the RSC to reduce its retail 
selling department and concentrate on its far more profitable 
wholesale, underwriting and promotional activities. From 1905 
on, Aitken concentrated on amalgamating existing companies, 
achieving the size and degree of market power necessary to make 
the new organisation's securities attractive to brokers and 
investors. Aitken first put together utility enterprises in 
which monopoly power was guaranteed by concessionary agreements. 
He subsequently used his experience in utilities to negotiate 
industrial mergers with monopoly power or, at any rate, that had 
the appearance of monopoly.14
^7hen Aitken temporarily sold out control of the RSC in 
1908 he confidentially confided to Charles Cahan that: "We have
lost money for the past two years on the selling department in 
Montreal and Halifax. Were it not for the money we made in 
promotions, we would have lost our capital long ago... we have 
eliminated the selling organization, which has now become 
unnecessary because the brokers are all anxious to deal in our 
securities." BBK, letter, Aitken to Cahan, 11 February 1908, 
A/20/Cahan. For the next 18 months while he repurchased control 
of the RSC, Aitken used the Montreal Trust Company as his main 
vehicle for company promotion. BBK, A/15/Montreal Trust, 
A/40/Royal Securities.
n BBK, A series, various correspondence, 1903-1909.
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3.2 Electric lighting and tramway financing
Aitken's first experience was with the Trinidad Electric 
Company, a thermal electric, street lighting and tramway 
operation established at the turn of the century by Cahan on 
behalf of Stairs, Harris and some other financiers from Halifax 
and Montreal. In 1903, Aitken engineered the flotation of a 
$450,000 issue, approximately $200,000 of which was offered to 
the public. He then had the $1.2 million common stock of 
Trinidad listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange to enhance the 
value of the shares to future purchasers. To broaden the market, 
Aitken sold securities in Trinidad to the island's business elite 
as well as to the company's own salaried employees in Port-of- 
Spain. The flotation was a success and the RSC turned a handsome 
profit.15
During the next three years Aitken through the RSC would 
purchase control of other antiquated street railway operations in 
the Caribbean. He reinvigorated a thermal electric and tramway 
operation in British Guiana and set up a holding company in Cuba
TC
BBK, letter, Aitken to Ames, 2 8 May 19 03, A/l/misc A? 
letter, Aitken to F. Clarke, 21 August 1903, A/l/misc C; 
letters, Aitken and Ross, 28 September 1903, 17 November 1903, 3 
December 1903, 8 December 1903, 11 December 1903, A/2/W.D. Ross; 
letters and telegrams, Aitken and Pitblado, 5 December 1903, 7
December 1903, 10 December 1903, 11 December 1903, 14 December
1903, A/l/misc 0,P; letters, Smith to Aitken, 19 December 1903, 
21 December 1903, 24 December 1903, A/2/R. Wilson Smith, Meldrum 
& Co.
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to manage the RSC’s diverse interests in electric generation and 
distribution, tramway operations and real estate speculation. In 
each case, the RSC would make an initial flotation on the 
potential of an operation with more modern equipment. 
Proprietary interests were protected by monopoly concessionary 
agreements negotiated with the pertinent government authorities 
ensuring the absence of competition in providing electric 
lighting and trolley services.
Aitken used high-risk financial methods in all of his 
utility flotations. Common stock was used as promotional profit, 
rewarding the underwriting syndicate, sub-underwriters and 
brokers. Some bonus common shares were released to investors to 
"sweeten" the purchase of preference stock and bonds. Investors’ 
money was channelled into constructing new power plants,
replacing mule-drawn trolley lines with new electric tramway
17lines and obtaining new rolling stock. Aitken soon established 
the Montreal Engineering Company, a spinoff of the RSC, to supply 
engineering goods and services more cheaply and more quickly to 
the RSC’s family of utility companies and began to move his base 
of operations from Halifax to the financial capital of Canada,
^BBK, A series, various correspondence, 1903-1906.
^BBK, prospectuses of Camaguey Company, Limited, Trinidad 
Electric Company, Limited, and Demerara Electric Company, 
Limited, G/19/early financial circulars. AFR. vol. VIII (April, 
1908), pp. 487-88. BBK, A series, various correspondence.
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TO
Montreal.
In 1906, Aitken incorporated The Porto Rico Railways 
Company, Limited, up to that time the largest utility promotion 
undertaken by the RSC. Investors were attracted to the company's 
securities because of Puerto Rico's status as a ''stable colony" 
of the United States, and Aitken was able to successfully float 
three consecutive issues of securities, the second two batches of 
which were purchased in the midst of the 1907 financial
IQ . . . .depression. With funds m  hand, the utility company
constructed a hydro-electric plant at Comerio Falls as well as a 
steam railway connecting the tramway line in the capital city of 
San Juan with another community 25 miles from the capital. 
Relying almost entirely on security issues to finance 
construction and extensions, the company had a total issued 
capital of $5.8 million by 1907. Originally incorporated under 
the laws of Canada, the company reincorporated as Puerto Rico 
Railway, Light and Power Company in 1911 in accordance with a new 
law requiring all companies which intended to continue doing
BBK, letter, Aitken to Teele, 2 October 1906, A/10/Teele? 
1907 correspondence, Aitken and R.T.D. Aitken, A/ll/misc A? 1907 
correspondence, Aitken and F. Clarke, A/13/F.C. Clarke.
TQ ,
Porto Rico's 1912 British bond issue prospectus called the 
investor's attention to the fact that: "Puerto Rico is a Colony 
of the United States of America, and its products have free 
access to the United States markets, thus giving Puerto Rico 
decided commercial advantages over other West India islands, as 
evidenced by the trade statistics in this prospectus." BBK, 
G/19/early financial circulars.
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business on the Island to file their articles of incorporation in 
Puerto Rico. One of the largest industrial operations in Puerto 
Rico, it continued to be run from Canada by the RSC and its 
affiliates until its expropriation by the Island authorities in 
1944.20
With the Puerto Rico Railways flotation, however, Aitken 
found himself cornered in two ways. First, he and other Canadian 
promoters were exhausting the possibilities for profitable 
utility ventures in the Caribbean and Latin America.21 Aitken 
had carefully investigated tramway and electric lighting 
propositions in Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela but none 
of them met his exacting standards for profitability, stability 
of national currency and safety of capital. American
nn
BBK, A series, various correspondence,1906, 1907, m
particular 1906 correspondence between Aitken and Teele (the 
RSC's chief engineer), A/10/Teele? Porto Rico prospectus, 
G/19/early financial circulars; AFR. vol. VIII (April 1908), pp. 
4 50-54; S.J. Randall, "The Development of Canadian Business in 
Puerto Rico", Revista/Review Interamericana. vol. 7 (1977).
^hese promoters, including Aitken and the Halifax 
financiers, are the subject of C. Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, 
Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters in Latin America and the
Caribbean. 1896-1930 (Toronto, 1988). D. McDowall's The Light: 
Brazilian Traction. Light and Power Company Limited. 1899-1945 
(Toronto, 1988) is a case study of the largest of the Canadian 
utility promotions.
^BBK, letters, Aitken to G. F. Pearson, 14 August 1905, 
A/6/misc N-P; letter, Aitken to T.G. McMullen, 29 August 1905, 
A/6/misc M; letter, Harding to Aitken, 26 December 1906, A/5/G-H; 
letter, Aitken to Teele, A/10/Teele; Aitken to Gossler, 11 
January 1906, A/9/misc G; letter, Aitken to Plummer, 16 January 
1906, A/9/misc O-Q; letter, Bruce to Aitken, 31 January 1906, 
A/8/misc B.
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propositions came forward at this time but they were too marginal 
to be profitable. In addition, Canadian and American utility 
investments were beginning to be threatened by public 
ownership.23 When one such proposition was offered to him in 
1907, Aitken declined, stating: "In view of the Municipal
Ownership wave which is sweeping the country I decided some time
. . . , , , 31ago not to increase my present interest in public utilities." 
Porto Rico was to be Aitken's last electric lighting and tramway 
promotion.
3.3 Breaking into the British capital market
The other limitation Aitken encountered was the narrowness 
of the Canadian market for his electric lighting and street 
railway securities. This was evident in the three Porto Rico 
security flotations of 1906-07. Already facing stiff competition 
from rival utility offerings from larger Canadian operations in 
Mexico and Brazil, Aitken realised that he had to find a market 
outside Canada for the Porto Rico securities. To start with he 
brought a New York firm into the underwriting syndicate which was 
expected to sell approximately one-fifth of Porto Rico's bonds in
23BBK, letter, Aitken to Gunn, 3 May 1906, A/10/misc T, 
(concerning the Tacoma, Washington, proposition); letter, 
Patterson to Aitken, 24 September 1906, A/9/misc O-Q, (concerning 
the Hamilton-Galt interurban railway).
^BBK, letter, Aitken to H.G. Blair, 26 October 1907, 
A/ll/misc B.
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the United States.25 Although Aitken was one of the first 
Canadian promoters to tap into American capital markets —  he 
raised most of the finance for the Robb Engineering 
reorganisation in Boston for example —  he understood that this 
market was too shallow for Canadian utility companies and that 
greater opportunities lay in Britain where Canadian government 
and business had consistently been able to borrow very large sums 
of money. Consequently, like all the major Canadian financiers 
of the day, Aitken looked to the immense capital market of London 
to sell millions of dollars of Porto Rico securities.
In 1906, Aitken sent an agent to set up an office in London 
as a base to sell Porto Rico bonds and other securities issued 
through the RSC. At this point Aitken was unsure of the reaction 
his offerings would receive in Britain and expenses were kept to 
a minimum. The trial failed miserably in part because of the 
London agent's initial lack of knowledge of British financial 
practices. The agent did manage to contact some of the largest 
brokerage firms in London and Glasgow, including Foster & 
Braithwaite, Fielding & McLeod, and Fergusson, Guthrie & Co, but 
after examining the RSC's utility prospectuses, all politely 
declined the business. The British brokers were unwilling to
J.G. White & Co. of New York were responsible for the 
distribution of Porto Rico bonds among American brokers. BBK,
1907 correspondence, A/ll/Ames.
^BBK, letter, Farrell to Aitken, 12 October 1906, 
A/8/Farrell.
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take a chance on the relatively small and unknown companies being 
promoted by the RSC. Moreover, they were unhappy with being 
offered only a small part of the issue —  Aitken was still 
reserving the lion’s share for the Canadian market —  an 
unprofitable affair relative to selling a whole issue. Aitken*s 
British office was closed down permanently at the end of 
December, 1906, and a firm of London stockbrokers, H. Vigne and 
Sons, was temporarily selected to act as the RSC's 
correspondents. Aitken*s agent concluded that there was ’'nothing 
to prevent this work being taken up again in the future, but it
27 .would have to be on somewhat different lines." In particular, 
Aitken was told that, in future, he should reserve whole issues 
for the British market because of the reluctance of British 
brokers and investment bankers to deal with small lots.
The financial crisis of 1907, however, emphasized the 
urgency of making a new market. Arthur Nesbitt, the manager of 
the RSC's new Montreal office, was sent to Britain and spent the 
next 12 months trying to make a market for RSC's in-house line of 
securities. While concentrating on placing a large issue of 
Porto Rico bonds with a major investment house, Nesbitt also 
attempted to unload on various British and European bankers and
27BBK, letter, J. S. Harding to Aitken, 29 December 1906, 
A/9/misc H.
2BBBK, 1906 correspondence, J.S. Harding and Aitken, 
A/9/misc H.
brokers miscellaneous RSC securities no longer selling on the 
Canadian market. Displaying tremendous energy, Nesbitt
successfully obtained interviews with some of the largest 
investment bankers of Britain including Chaplin, Milne & Co., 
C.J. Hambro & Son and Arburthnot Latham, as well as the London 
houses of Robert Fleming & Co., Dunn, Fischer & Co. and Sperling
. . 29& Co., which specialised m  Canadian issues. Following the 
tracks of another young salesman who had, the previous year, sold 
$600,000 worth of "Rio and Mexican bonds” to the Swiss banks for 
Dunn, Fischer & Co., Nesbitt travelled to Geneva and Zurich.30 
Nesbitt then tried his luck in Belgium and Germany where he 
attempted to sell his Porto Rico bonds to the Banque Centrale 
Anversoise, J. Brunner (a private Belgian banker) and the 
Deutsche Bank. Nesbitt failed in all these attempts but upon his 
return to Britain he got a few nibbles. He then made a temporary 
partnership agreement with Dunn, Fischer & Co. to use their 
contacts and made further sales. By the time the agreement was 
terminated in late 1907 and early 1908, Nesbitt was selling
29I found the Appendix 1 and 2, pp. 2 00-2 04, of S. Chapman's 
The Rise of Merchant Banking (London, 1984) to be very useful on 
the relative importance and spheres of influence of London 
investment banks. In the BBK, A series, there is continual 
reference to Sperling as an underwriter of Canadian issues in 
competition with the RSC's promotions.
•^BBK, letter, Nesbitt to Aitken, 24 July 1907, 
A/16/Nesbitt. The salesman estimated that there were about $3 
million Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power bonds held in 
Switzerland by 1907.
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. . T]substantial blocks of RSC securities on his own.
In fact, it was British capital that saved the two Porto 
Rico flotations of 1907. The North American market shut down 
completely as the financial crisis deepened in October. The 
meagre sales in Canada and the United States were incapable of 
supporting the Porto Rico promotion. As a consequence, Aitken 
realized the advantage, if not the necessity, of making a market 
in Britain for all future promotions. He heeded Nesbitt*s advice 
concerning the arranging of dividend payments through a London- 
based bank, of issuing regular reports on RSC properties to 
European investors and of listing future promotions on the London 
Stock Exchange. Based on the efforts of its tenacious Montreal 
manager, the RSC finally gained the expertise to tap into the
rr>
British capital market.
3.4 The transition to industrial promoter and investment banker
From the RSC's experience in London, Aitken realised that 
"industrials" were becoming as acceptable to investors as utility 
promotions, particularly in situations where companies had, or 
were perceived to have, monopoly power. The appearance of 
monopoly power could be more easily achieved in a country such as
3LBBK, 1907 correspondence, Aitken and Nesbitt, 
A/16/Nesbitt.
■^Ibid.
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Canada with its small domestic economy protected by high tariffs. 
Aitken would also face less competition from his fellow promoters 
in industrial issues. Even while the largest Canadian utility 
promotions —  the Mexican, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro issues —
were already beginning to saturate the British demand for this
class of security, investors were clamouring for the securities 
of large industrials such as the United States Steel Corporation.
Aitken began to look around at Canadian industries which 
appeared to have a future of rapid growth as well as a corporate 
configuration amenable to reorganisation always with his eye on 
what would be acceptable to British investors. He examined 
primary and secondary steel, rolling stock, portland cement
manufacturing, and flour milling; industries centrally involved 
in the immense investment in transportation, urban infrastructure
33
and wheat production then taking place in Canada. By early 
1909, he was ready. In a twelve month period, Aitken would 
promote the three largest and most significant mergers in 
Canadian manufacturing industry. In August, 1909, an
amalgamation of 10 cement companies called the Canada Cement 
Company, with a total authorised capital of $38 million, was 
incorporated. Two months later, the Canadian Car and Foundry 
Company, a merger of the three largest rolling stock
manufacturers capitalised at $16 million, was floated on the
33
BBK, 1909 and 1910 various correspondence, A series, 
G/19/Stelco, G/19/Canada Cement, G/3/C.H. Cahan.
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British capital markets. The following June, The Steel Company
of Canada (Stelco) was incorporated with a total authorised
31capital of $35 million.
Although he had previously been involved in industrial 
flotations, Aitken had been dismissive of their inherent 
profitability preferring the utility business until 1908. What 
caused him to change his mind was likely the same factors that 
made other promoters begin to concentrate on Canadian industrial 
ventures at the same time. No doubt the exhaustion of utility 
promotions in foreign countries as well as the threat of public 
ownership of utilities in Canada played an important role but the 
rapid growth of Canadian manufacturing itself was the most 
crucial factor.
Using Morris Altman's revised annual estimates for 
manufacturing output illustrated in Figure 4 of Appendix A, we 
can see real value added in manufacturing began a rapid climb 
upward from 1897-98 to 1913 interrupted only by intermittent 
financial panics which disturbed the market for industrial 
securities and lowered industrial output in the subsequent
"XT
calendar years. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this growth
31BBK, prospectuses of Canada Cement Company, Canadian Car & 
Foundry Company, and Stelco, G/19/early financial circulars.
Altman, "Revised Estimates of Real Canadian GNP and 
Growth and the Pre and Post World War Two Volatility of the 
Canadian Business Cycle with Some Comparison to the American 
Record", unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University
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and the impact of these periodic financial depressions on the 
expansion of manufacturing is by examining the year to year 
change in real value added in manufacturing from 1895 to 1914 as 
shown in Table 6 .
Table 6
ANNUAL CHANGE IN REAL VALUE ADDED 
IN CANADIAN MANUFACTURING, 1895-1904 
(1900 = $100 million)
Year Chance Year Chance
1895 -5.9 1905 51.7
1896 3.8 1906 40.1
1897 19.8 1907 20.4
1898 22.8 1908 -38.0
1899 -7.2 1909 57.5
1900 6.6 1910 32.9
1901 7.0 1911 9.9
1902 37.2 1912 33.9
1903 8.9 1913 -9.6
1904 -7.5 1914 -69.2
SOURCE: Derived from M. Altman, "Revised Estimates of
Real Canadian GNP and Growth and the Pre and Post World 
War Two Volatility of the Canadian Business Cycle with 
Some Comparison to the American Record", unpublished 
paper, Department of Economics, University of 
Saskatchewan, 1989, Table 9, pp. 52-53.
Steel, portland cement, and rolling stock were among the 
growth sectors of manufacturing in absolute and relative terms. 
The capital goods industries provided the main inputs for the 
finished product industries as well as the foundation for the 
transportation and urban infrastructure investment which formed
of Saskatchewan, 1989.
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such a large part of fixed capital formation during this 
period. When selecting mergers, Aitken concentrated precisely 
on the most rapidly growing manufacturing sectors of the economy.
3.5 The nature of profits in merger promoting
The mergers produced during the gilded age engendered 
widespread hostility largely because of the common belief that 
unscrupulous promoters and uncaring owners were sacrificing the 
future viability of business in Canada for short-term windfall 
profits. The occasional well-publicised case of fraudulent 
company promotion seemed to legitimate such charges. By the time 
the leading Canadian financial periodical joined the chorus of 
daily papers in attacking the shenanigans of these confidence 
men, there was little question that the majority of Canadians had 
a generally bad impression of the promoter sui generis. The 
average Canadian was repeatedly warned of the danger such men 
posed:
In the wake of the great prosperity... came an army 
of financial fakirs, possibly the most big, bold and 
bad in the history of Canadian finance. Not only did 
they march into mining investment fields, the most 
famous of their spheres of action, but also into 
general commerce, and even into the conservative 
banking world. It was proved again and again that,
shrewd and cautious as is the Canadian, he was led away 
from the paths of conservatism into the backwoods of
. C . Urquhart, "Canadian Economic Growth 1870-1980", 
Discussion Paper no. 734, Institute for Economic Research, 
Queen’s University, 1988.
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77wild gambling and sorry company promotion.
In fact, these fraudulent promotions were the exception 
rather than the rule and the majority of promoters generally
TO
acted within the accepted bounds of financial practice. The 
more common charge levied against promoters was profiteering. 
The difficulty in analysing the validity of this more general 
indictment lies in the paradoxical nature of high-risk financing 
itself. On the one hand, high-risk flotations invariably 
involved "stock-watering”. This resulted in most merged firms 
starting their lives highly overcapitalised, threatened by large 
fixed-debt loads and by the generous dividend expectations of the 
common shareholders. On the other hand, given that promotional 
profit came in the form of bonus common stock rather than 
commissions, the value of this profit was entirely contingent on 
the long-term success of the enterprise being formed.
^MT, 11 January 1908, p. 1113.
■^The fall of infamous British promoter Ernest T. Hooley was 
the major story of the day in the Canadian financial press. MT. 
8 July 1898, p. 55; 12 August 1898, pp. 209-10. There were a
few financial confidence men promoting Canadian mining and timber 
companies with fictitious assets. I could find only one example 
of a fraudulent promoter of mergers in manufacturing industry —  
F.H. Malcolm's Western Canneries Company, Limited, promotion —  
although many were conducted in a reckless manner. l£T, 5 December 
1908, p. 917. See MT, 18 April 1908, p. 1753, for J. Gordon 
Leslie's fraudulent promotion of the Canada Consolidated Cobalt 
Company on the London market.
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If the. purpose of the consolidation was a mere promotional
gimmick not based on economic rationalisation or pursued without
a strategy of vertical integration as well as technological and
organisational modifications, then, barring sufficient monopoly
power, the new enterprise would fail? this would force down the
value of its common shares from an already low initial price to
zero. Any attempt by a promoter to sell out during such a
decline —  in fact underwriting contracts obliged promoters to
buy heavily at such times in order to support the price —  could
only result in a more precipitous decline in prices. In this
sense, high-risk financing ensured that promoters had a stake in
the future viability of the operation and often learned "their
industry" inside out before purchasing options on properties.
Before a block of common stock could be traded in for a large
cash profit, the company had to succeed in real economic terms
►
or, in the case of a monopoly, continue to exert market power by 
blocking the entry of potential competitors. In this sense, the 
reward of high-risk finance was a long-term profit connected to 
the efficiency and profitability (or monopoly power) of the new 
corporation.
The only manner in which a promoter could make a quick 
short-term profit in high-risk financing without resorting to 
fraud was by "flipping" properties. He could purchase an 
interest in a property and then sell this interest at a highly- 
inflated value to his own promotional syndicate. As a member of
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the syndicate, however, he was stuck with any damage this might 
do to the financial viability of the new enterprise. If the 
amount was paid in cash, then the company would be short of money
for working capital in its first year or two. If the syndicate
made a stock payment for the property interest, this would add to 
the overcapitalisation of the company. Since the promoter's 
profit was most dependent on the eventual value of the company's
common stock and this, in turn, was dependent on the company's
actual performance, this type of short-term profit could harm the 
promoter's long-term profits.
In the Stelco promotion Aitken obtained a short-term profit 
in precisely this manner. Aitken purchased a steel finishing 
company for $4 million and then demanded approximately the same 
amount in the stock of the consolidation being put together by a 
syndicate he formed. The other members of the syndicate refused 
to pay out this amount suspicious that Aitken had paid far less 
for the property. Aitken then proposed that the property be 
assessed and he agreed to put in or take out cash according to 
the results of the independent appraisal. The appraisal came in 
at just over $5 million and Aitken took out $1 million in cash in 
addition to the $4 million in common stock. Although Aitken's 
action did no irreparable long-term damage to the new company, it 
ultimately paid for Aitken's quick profit. To cover the $1 
million cash shortage, Stelco had to make do with less working 
capital and within months was issuing additional securities.
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Aitken's profit was justified by contract but this was not
always the case with promoters. The desire to make a quick
profit by •'flipping" a property at a highly inflated value
damaged both the new company and the reputation of the promoter 
himself. Promoters could get away with such short-term
profiteering only if they desired a very short career. Even in 
Aitken's case, the transaction created suspicions that Aitken had 
given a misleadingly low valuation for the steel finishing firm 
only to purposely entice the other members of the syndicate into 
an agreement where he could extract a large amount of cash. The 
result created so much animosity that it is unlikely that Aitken 
could have continued his career as promoter in Canada. In fact,
33after the Stelco deal, he moved to England.
Obviously, the profits derived from successful high-risk 
flotations were the main motive behind merger-making for Aitken 
and his fellow promoters, but the owners of existing 
manufacturing enterprises had similarly powerful incentives to 
give up their ownership interests in the enterprises forming the 
new mergers. Unlike promoters, however, owners could choose 
whether or not to have a stake in the success of the new 
operation by demanding a cash pay-out or agreeing (in some cases
^BBK, letter, Wilcox to Aitken, 15 June 1910, and 
telegram, Aitken to L. Harris, 22 June 1910, G/19/Stelco; 
letters, Mosher and Aitken, 26 June 1910, 30 June 1910, A/49/misc 
M. This incident is well-covered in W. Kilbourn, The Elements 
Combined: A History of The Steel Company of Canada (Toronto,
1960), pp. 76-77.
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insisting) to an exchange of securities in the new enterprise for 
their existing shares. When the amount offered by promoters 
exceeded what they considered the inherent worth of the 
enterprise or the prevailing value represented by existing share 
prices, controlling shareholders sold out to capture this excess 
amount as a profit to themselves. They could also benefit by 
participating in the promotional syndicate floating the new 
enterprise, if invited to do so, and thereby take a share of the 
common stock profits.
In all of Aitken's three largest industrial promotions, most 
of the owners accepted stock in the new consolidation rather than 
cash for their old shares. At times they were encouraged to take 
cash, such as in the first stage of the Canada Cement merger when 
Aitken felt that cash settlements were less expensive relative to 
stock settlements. At other times, Aitken insisted on a stock 
settlement such as that forced on the International Portland 
Cement Company in the final stages of the Canada Cement merger 
negotiations. In other cases, such as the Canadian Car 
consolidation, two firms agreed to accept a stock settlement, 
while a third would only accept a cash payout. The aggregate 
result, however it was achieved, was that the majority of old 
owners had a direct stake in the long-term viability of the new 
enterprise and generally acted in these long-term interests 
during the promotional stage.
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Motives are based on perceptions of an uncertain future 
which may be erroneous and motives alone cannot explain the 
ultimate success or failure of an enterprise but they can be used 
as a reference point. This is not to deny the possibility that, 
despite the prevalence of short-term profit motives, an 
enterprise might still succeed, or that the most well-planned and 
integrated consolidation might still fail in spite of the best 
long-term objectives of the promotional syndicate. Nevertheless, 
it can hardly be disputed that the short-run profit motive acted 
against the best interests of the new company while the long-run 
profit motive worked for the success of the corporation. The 
only way we can determine whether promoters and owners had short- 
run or long-run motivations is by examining case studies such as 
those provided in the following Chapter. Each case varied in the 
profit motivations of owners and promoters but also in the other 
motives which may have led to merger. These other motives 
include the attempts to deal with industry over-capacity caused 
by rapid technological change, the efficiencies to be gained from 
instantaneous vertical integration, and the procuring of monopoly 
rents. No general statement can be made concerning the presence 
or absence of these motives; each case must be examined within 
its appropriate technological and organisational context.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COMPANY CASE STUDIES
4.1 The impact of capital structure on corporate evolution
Raising money through security issues has always been an 
expensive proposition relative to the cost of borrowing money 
from financial intermediaries or the opportunity cost of relying 
on retained earnings. The Macmillan Committee in Britain, for 
example, estimated that, even as late as the 1920s, the fixed
costs of a small issue could amount to 20 per cent of the final
amount raised; and this in what was still the most sophisticated, 
well-functioning and likely least expensive capital market in the 
world.1 These costs —  the preparation of prospectuses, the
purchase of advertising, the professional fees of appraisers,
lawyers, accountants, and the commission fees of brokers —  do
not include the non-commission "fees" of promoters and
underwriters which varied with the success of the issue.2
1L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 2nd 
ed., 1983), pp. 6 6 , 220.
Evidence of the non-commission costs of security issues is 
difficult to find because of the form in which they were paid 
(promotional stock) and the promotional syndicate's concealment 
of these payments from outsiders, including the controlling 
shareholders of the companies being purchased, as well as 
potential shareholders and the press. These costs were almost 
never stated in prospectuses during the gilded age. The Steel 
Company of Canada, Limited, Annual Report, 1914, however, 
revealed a cash payment of §104,475 for the underwriting of 
§850,000 bonds issued in 1914. This amounts to an outlay of 12.3 
per cent of the issue —  a large fee considering that this 
occurred four years after the original "high-risk" flotation
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Corporations that choose to raise capital in this manner do so 
because they prefer to receive a large block of capital in the 
present rather than rely on a more incremental strategy of profit 
retention.
Because of the nature of high-risk financing, determining 
the cost of raising capital in this manner is a difficult task. 
By accepting a common stock bonus instead of cash commissions, 
promoters like Max Aitken ensured that an enterprise received the 
maximum amount of cash possible, but the very heavy price exacted 
in common stock led to stock-watering. Moreover, by distributing 
too many of the corporation's bonds and preference shares in 
payment for the properties entering the consolidation promoters 
could create an even larger fixed debt load.
The dividend expectations of the common shareholders added 
to this debt. Although most owners of common shares accepted 
that they would receive very little in the way of dividends in 
the first year or two after a high-risk flotation, they did 
expect substantial repayments in the form of dividends once the
establishing the company and, therefore, was not burdened by 
considerable high-risk profits being extracted by the promotional 
syndicate.
3Although there is virtually no research comparing the costs 
of security financing over time, it is suggested that high-risk 
financing raised the costs of issues relative to both the pre­
gilded age period of security financing, when commission payments 
were in vogue, and the post-Crash period, when security financing 
became more regulated.
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corporation was on its feet. Naturally, the more earnings were 
distributed in this manner, the less could be made available for 
corporate expansion. In this sense, the expectations of common 
shareholders conflicted with the long-term needs of the 
corporation. During the age of high-risk financing, there were 
in fact many examples of corporations paying dividends to this 
class of shareholders in the first fragile period of their 
existence thus sacrificing the long-term needs of the corporation 
to the short-term desire to meet such expectations and thereby 
maintain the market price of the corporations' securities.4
Before examining the long-term performance of the three 
largest companies promoted by Aitken it is necessary to have some 
idea of their initial financial strengths or weaknesses. A 
framework can be devised which will reveal the direct and 
indirect price paid by Canada Cement, Canadian Car and Stelco for 
their initial security issues.
A perusal of the capitalisation, earnings and assets of 
Canadian merger flotations between 1899 and 1918 indicates that 
Aitken's industrial consolidations were in the mid-range of a
^he Monetary Times, for example, criticised the payment of 
dividends before the company had emerged out of this stage. The
i  most notorious examples were the Canadian Cycle and Motor and the
Amalgamated Asbestos companies which passed common dividends in 
their first two years of operation only to find themselves facing
bankruptcy immediately afterwards. MT, 13 December 1901, p. 752;
4 April 1902, p. 1296; 8 October 1910, p. 1524; 7 January 1911,
p. 150.
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spectrum that extended from the most conservatively financed
concerns to the most reckless and speculative flotations such as
5the Canadian Cycle flotation discussed m  Chapter Two. A closer 
exanimation of the very few mergers in which figures for past 
earnings and assets were disclosed in prospectuses reveals a 
remarkably similar pattern of overcapitalisation; that is, the 
par value of issued securities exceeded total assets by between 
65 per cent and 90 per cent.6 This "over-issue” was almost
7
entirely represented by common stock. If common stock is 
removed from the equation, then we find that the real and nominal 
value of the preference shares and bonds issued hovered around 
the real asset value of the properties forming the consolidation.
^The 1909 bond flotation of Moirs, Ltd, is one of the rare 
conservative financings of the era. The property of this 
integrated Nova Scotia candy manufacturer was worth several times 
the value of the bond flotation and the company's average past 
earning power was six times greater than the entire bond 
interest. Moreover, the company had no outstanding dividend 
payments and, except for the salaries of company officials, 
turned all of its profits back into its surplus account. MT, 17 
April 1909, p. 1874.
g
All cases without exception involved substantial "stock- 
watering" based on the ratio of assets to total issued capital. 
In the most conservative of these, almost all of the senior 
securities issue would be covered by assets and the annual 
average of the past earnings would more than cover the new fixed 
debt in the form of bond interest and preference dividends.
7This is based upon a comparison of the following mergers: 
Canadian Consolidated Rubber (1906), MT, 4 October 1901, pp. 438- 
39? Carriage Factories Limited (1909), JIT, 30 October 1909, p. 
1831; and F.N. Burt Company, Limited (1909), BBK, letter, with 
enclosures (including company prospectus), Ames to Aitken, 11 
September 19 09, A/30/Ames.
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This is, in fact, what investors and most industrialists
during the gilded age expected? everyone understood that common
stock was speculative paper of negligible present value but 
believed that preference stock and bonds should be fully 
supported by the company*s existing property. To insinuate that 
a promotional syndicate would issue senior securities in excess 
of this property value was to question the bona fides of a
consolidation. The attitude of the day is revealed in the 
following extract of a letter sent to Aitken by the general
manager of Belleville Portland Cement Company while trying to 
convince the shareholders of his company of the benefits of 
entering the Canada Cement consolidation:
One of our largest shareholders who is evidently well 
acquainted with the organization of companies, asked 
the very impertinent question, if I knew how much of 
the Preference stock of the Merger Company was water. 
I was of course astonished at the question, as from our 
interview with you both Mr. Forbes and I were fully 
satisfied that all of the water in the Merger concern 
was the Common stock, and that there was no water in 
the Preference stock, and that every share of 
Preference stock represented actual value in your 
concern.
^BK, letter, General Manager, Belleville Portland Cement 
Company, Limited, to Aitken, 11 September 1909, A/32/Canada 
Cement, Belleville Portland Cement Co.
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A company was not censured as long as its senior securities
Q , ,
reflected its real asset base. In addition, the issue of
promotional stock was kept within a reasonable limit according to 
the norms of the day —  in other words, an issue of promotional 
stock that in aggregate par value was less than the aggregate par 
value of senior securities. There were variations, however, 
among the Canada Cement, Canadian Car and Stelco mergers 
themselves and their capitalisation, earnings, and asset
structure provide a more solid basis for comparison. We can use
such a comparison to try and discover signs of potential 
financial weaknesses which may have acted to restrict unduly the
performance of these companies in their early years.
Table 7 below contains data on the capitalisation structure 
and asset values of Canada Cement, Canadian Car and Stelco in the 
first few months of their corporate existence. Total issued 
capital (TIC) represents the aggregate par value of equity and 
debt capital issued by the corporation in its first months while 
total senior securities (TSS) subtracts out the par value of the 
issued common stock, which in high-risk financing was not 
intended to represent existing asset value.
9One company so censured was the Dominion Canners merger of 
1910 which was alleged to have issued $4,200,000 worth of 
securities, one-half of which was common stock, on an actual 
asset value of $1,200,000. The company received adverse 
publicity in the press as well as a political attack in the 
Ontario Legislature. MT, 5 March 1910, p. 1040; 25 February
1911, p. 823.
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Table 7
ISSUED CAPITAL, ASSETS AND EARNINGS IN THE 
CANADA CEMENT, CANADIAN CAR AND STELCO MERGERS
($ millions)
Canada Canadian
Cement Car Stelco
Bonds 5.00 3.50 6.85
Preferred 10.50 5.00 6.50
Common 13.50 3.50 11.50
TIC (total issued capital) 29.00 12.50 24.85
TSS (total senior 15.50 8.50 13.35
securities)
TA (total assets) 17.00 7.50 13.35
PE (proven earnings) N/A 1.03 1.29
EE (estimated earnings) 1.90 1.55 N/A
AE (actual earnings) 1.18 0.83 1.09
Preferred Dividends 0.74 0.35 0.46
Bond Interest 0.30 0.21 0.41
FD (fixed debt burden) 1.04 0.56 0.87
PE-FD N/A 0.47 0.47
EE-FD 0.86 0.94 N/A
AE-FD 0.14 0.27 0.22
Note: N/A means not available.
SOURCES: BBK, company prospectuses, G/19/early financial
circulars? MT, 2 December 1911, p. 2313; Canada Cement 
Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1909; The Steel Company 
of Canada, Limited, Annual Report, 1910.
Given the mechanics of financial accounting during the 
gilded age, it is futile to use total asset value (TA), as 
provided in the first year's balance sheet of the companies, as a
81
proxy for the actual property value of the consolidation.10 In 
the first years of the consolidation's operation, this figure was 
invariably inflated to offset the stock and bond liabilities of 
the company —  particularly the common stock liabilities. Robert 
Meighen, the President of one of the largest and most successful 
flour milling companies in the country, was one of the few 
industrialists to criticise this new form of creative financial 
accounting:
The many companies of recent birth that have offered 
and are offering a bonus of common stock as a bait for 
the sale of preferred stock are starting business in an 
atmosphere of deceit... It would be interesting to get 
a list of the names of the fictitious accounts which 
they use to make the debits against the credits to 
capital stock account of this bonus issue, debits which 
the science of double entry bookkeeping requires.
The independent appraisals conducted during merger 
negotiations represent the only reasonably reliable assessment of 
asset value and even these must be treated with the greatest of 
care. Appraisal information was provided in the Stelco
For a general discussion of the difficulties associated 
with financial statements, see S. Marriner, "Company Financial 
Statements as Source Material for Business Historians", BH, vol. 
XXII, no. 2 (July 1980).
Robert Meighen, who had recently died, was quoted in MT,
16 September 1911, p. 1215, in a lead article devoted to 
financial accounting and the growth of the accounting profession 
in Canada.
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prospectus.32 Unfortunately, the only information revealed in 
the Canadian Car prospectus was a general statement by the 
company's President that the replacement value of the properties 
of the three consolidated companies was in excess of 
$7,500,000.33 This figure combines liquid assets with fixed 
assets but we cannot tell whether this sum is inclusive or 
exclusive of liabilities.14
The Canada Cement prospectus was even more uninformative? it 
provided no information whatsoever on asset value, an aspect of
. . . .  15the promotion that was attacked in the financial press. In 
fact, appraisals were not ordered before the merger. Aitken and
^ h e  American Appraisal and Canadian American Appraisal 
companies assessed the value of the assets of all five companies 
entering the merger. The combined fixed assets came to $10 
million, and the combined net liquid assets amounted to $3.35 
million. BBK, prospectus of Stelco, G/19/early financial 
circulars.
13BBK, preference stock and bond issue prospectuses of 
Canadian Car, November 1909 and February 1910, G/19/early 
financial circulars.
^Ion Hamilton Benn, the leading British underwriter of the 
Canadian Car issue complained to Aitken about the value of both 
fixed and liquid assets being lumped together: "I am...sorry
that we can get no authoritative statement with respect to the 
assets, because people here lay great stress upon this point. We 
are all rather surprised to learn that...the replacement value of 
$7,500,000 includes the $2,200,000 liquid assets? I did not 
understand this from the memorandum you gave me in New York, 
because replacement value is always understood here to refer to 
plant and fixed assets! However, we must do the best we can, and 
I am convinced that the business is intrinsically good.” BBK, 
letter, Benn to Aitken, 23 October 1909, A/39/Benn? G/19/early 
financial circulars.
3Sto, 18 September 1909, pp. 1210-11.
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the promotional syndicate used ad hoc sources of information upon 
which to base their estimates of what each company should ’'come 
in at.” His syndicate partner, E.R. Wood of Dominion Securities, 
said that his firm preferred not to be associated with the coming 
bond prospectus unless it included the results of independent 
appraisals."16
Originally, Aitken had been very negative about having 
appraisals done in the Canada Cement merger. If they turned out 
higher than his own estimates, the companies would demand more 
for their properties. If they turned out substantially less than 
his estimates, he was open to public attack on the ground of 
excessive capitalisation to cover the inflated amount paid for 
the merger assets. This was more of an issue in the Canada 
Cement merger because most of the controlling shareholders of the 
old companies were outside the promotional syndicate. When 
industry insiders were members of the syndicate, as in the cases 
of the Canadian Car and Stelco mergers, the objective evidence of 
appraisals served to curtail argument. In the Canada Cement
BBK, letter, Wood to Aitken, 29 October 1909, A/42/E.R.
Wood: "From the standpoint of the Dominion Securities
Corporation it is of vital importance that there should be an 
appraisal and valuation of the properties and a proper audit of 
accounts, as it has always been its policy to insist on having, 
for the purposes of its circulars, such independent information 
concerning the properties covered by the bonds as can only be 
secured by an independent audit and appraisal." Wood finally 
agreed to "work out a prospectus with such information as we have 
L that will be satisfactory to both your Company and mine, although 
; it seems to me this will be a fairly difficult job."
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merger, agreements were conducted separately because of each 
company's overly-generous perception of its own value and low 
opinion of the value of competitors. Negotiations invariably 
became more difficult when information concerning the price paid
T7
for one concern leaked to the others.
When Aitken finally ordered appraisals of the two cement 
companies which most disagreed with the promotional syndicate's 
assessment of their asset value, he was so pleased with the 
results that he ordered appraisals of all the other properties. 
The results indicated a total asset value of approximately $17
TO
million as indicated in Table 7.
As can be seen by the total issued capital to total assets 
ratio (TIC/TA) in Table 8 below, the asset base of Canadian Car 
and Stelco could not support the total issued securities nor were 
they expected to. In a classic example of ''acceptable" stock-
17 . . .For a vivid illustration of this, see BBK, letter, General 
Manager, Belleville Portland Cement Company, Limited, to Aitken, 
12 October 1909, A/32/Canada Cement, Belleville Portland Cement 
Co.: "I have...a number of communications from our shareholders
sending me a clipping from the Montreal Star, asking me as to why 
[International Portland Cement] got such a big price for their 
plant and property and we so very little, and everybody knows 
that we have a plant that has as large a manufacturing capacity 
as the International, and a much better location for the 
distribution of our product... This will make it very difficult 
for us to gather in all our stock certificates, as the 
shareholders who were sore enough at the first are now ten times 
worse."
TO
BBK, letter, Aitken to Wood, 10 December 1909, and 
telegram, Aitken to Wood, 15 December 1909, A/42/E.R. Wood.
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watering, the par value of the securities issued by all three 
companies ranged between 65 per cent and 90 per cent greater than 
total asset value. The most conservative of the three 
financings, Canadian Car, issued comparatively less common stock 
and therefore its ratio of total issued capital to total assets 
is at the lower end of the spectrum.
Table 8
FINANCIAL RATIOS IN THE CANADA CEMENT,
CANADIAN CAR AND STELCO MERGERS
Canada Canadian
Ratios Cement Car Stelco
TIC/TA 1.71 1.67 1.87
TSS/TA 0.91 1.13 1.00
PE/FD N/A 1.83 1.48
EE/FD 1.83 2.68 N/A
AE/FD 1.13 1.48 1.25
PE % left for com. div. N/A 13.43 3.65
EE % left for com. div. 6.37 26.86 N/A
AE % left for com. div. 1.04 7.71 1.91
SOURCE: Derived from Table 7.
A more accurate gauge of whether capitalisation exceeded an 
acceptable level is the ratio of the total par value of senior 
securities to total assets (TSS/TA). According to this measure, 
Stelco's issue was restricted to its asset base while Canadian 
Car issued senior securities of a value slightly in excess of its 
asset base. Canada Cement ostensibly issued less than its asset 
base but it should be noted that, unlike Canadian Car and Stelco
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securities, Canada Cement bonds and preference shares were 
accompanied by common stock bonuses. If this common stock is 
included as part of the senior securities issue at even one- 
quarter of its par value, then Canada Cement issued more stock 
that its asset base.
The fixed debt load (FD) immediately assumed by these 
companies is calculated by adding annual preference dividend 
payment obligations to the annual interest payable to 
bondholders. In order to calculate the amount left over for 
common stock dividends, the FD figures are subtracted from 
earnings, which in turn are calculated in three different ways. 
Proven earnings (PE) are based on the past earnings of the 
companies forming the merger. Estimated (or expected) earnings 
(EE) are the projections, if any, of the first year earnings made 
by Aitken and the promotional syndicate in the published text of 
the prospectuses. Actual earnings (AE) represent the
undistributed surplus of the respective corporations' first full 
year of operation as disclosed in their balance sheets. A 
measure of surplus in absolute terms —  the total funds available 
for profit plough back and common stock dividends after FD is 
subtracted —  is provided in the last three rows of Table 7. A 
relative measure of surplus is provided by the ratio of earnings 
to FD as displayed in Table 8 .
The proven earnings to fixed debt ratio (PE/FD) indicates
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the extent to which the debt obligations of the corporation are 
covered by the proven earning power of the firms which make up 
the amalgamation? ceterus paribus, the higher the ratio the more 
likely the corporation will be able to meet its obligations. The 
estimated earnings to fixed debt ratio (EE/FD) is a proxy for the 
safety margin "perceived" by the promoter at the time of the 
flotation. He calculates the earnings based on his estimate of 
the merger's gains from integration, monopolisation and 
rationalisation. He then assesses the amount of fixed debt that 
the consolidation is capable of carrying. Aitken was
considerably over-optimistic in his calculation of estimated 
earnings for Canada Cement and Canadian Car. Realising the gap 
between his expectations and reality in his first two promotions 
of 1909, Aitken refrained from making an estimate of earnings in 
the Stelco prospectus of 1910.
The actual earnings to fixed debt ratio (AE/FD) measures the 
realised margin of safety? the higher the ratio the more surplus 
is available to be partitioned between dividends for the common 
shareholders and corporate plough back. The last row of figures 
in Table 8 measures the maximum per cent dividend left to common 
shareholders after bond interest and preference dividends have 
been paid out of the first full year of actual earnings. This
!
j figure assumes that all profits are used for interest and
I dividend payments. After its first year of operations, CanadaIj.
| Cement had less surplus available for common stock dividends than
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Stelco while Canadian Car was in a significantly stronger 
position than both companies.
The preceding two rows of figures measure what the promoter 
originally expected would be left over for dividends and what 
should have been left over based on past earning power. Although 
past earning figures were not available in the Canada Cement 
case, the gap between expected performance and actual performance 
was largest for Canada Cement. Since it was largely capitalised 
on these overly-optimistic expectations, it is not surprising 
that Canada's Cement actual margin of safety measure by its 
actual earnings to fixed debt ratio (AE/FD) is the lowest of the 
group. In both absolute and relative terms, Canada Cement's 
subsequent performance was less satisfactory than that of 
Canadian Car and Stelco. Moreover, the company was financially 
structured in such a way as to have less margin for surplus in 
absolute (EE-FD) and relative (EE/FD) terms.
From this analysis, it appears that Canada Cement had the 
weakest financial structure of the three companies, something 
which is reflected in the fact that its common shares remained at
a lower value than the common shares of Canadian Car and Stelco
19until 1913. Stelco was only slightly stronger. Both companies.
19| Between 1910 and 1914, Canadian Car's common share prices
[ were at least double those of Canada Cement and Stelco. Stelco 
I common stock was, in turn, valued approximately 5 per cent more 
; than Canada Cement until the depression of 1913 when Stelco's 
common stock prices dipped below those of Canada Cement perhaps
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apparently suffered from enormous issues of common stock, a 
problem not faced by Canadian Car. Moreover, as described in 
Chapter Three, Stelco had to issue additional securities to cover 
an unexpected $1 million cash payment for the Montreal Rolling 
Mills plant.
Canadian Car also had the highest margin of safety as 
measured by its actual earnings to fixed debt ratio (AE/FD), 
although its earnings fell substantially below Aitken's 
expectations. Certainly, Canadian Car had the largest surplus in 
relative and absolute terms for distribution among common 
shareholders and for corporate plough back, and this meant it had 
the most flexibility concerning its future strategy and 
structure. On the contrary, Canada Cement was likely impeded in 
its first few years by its heavy debt load and the relatively 
small amount of capital it could draw upon for reinvestment. 
With these short-term strengths and weaknesses in mind we can now 
turn to the more long-term evolution of these companies.
because of that company's inability to rationalize production
in an industry which remained substantially competitive. By
March 1913, Stelco's high was 25.5 (TSE) compared to 28.25 (MSE) 
for Canada Cement, and 81 (MSE) for Canadian Car. Montreal and 
Toronto stock exchange prices for Canadian securities, AFR. vol. 
XI (April 1911) to vol. XV (May 1915). At any rate, the pattern
of share prices conforms to the above analysis demonstrating the
more stable character of Canadian Car's financing.
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4.2 The Canada Cement Company
The Canada Cement consolidation fundamentally transformed 
the Canadian portland cement industry. At the time of its 
incorporation, there were at least 23 active cement manufacturing 
firms in the country. The merger brought together the ten 
largest and technologically most advanced of these enterprises. 
Although Canada Cement would continue to face competition from 
some of the firms which remained outside the merger and from the 
entrance of foreign branch plants, it retained enormous control 
over the Canadian market in terms of potential capacity and 
actual output until the 19 60s. Protected from import competition 
by a tariff on cement (which served, however, to encourage 
foreign manufacturers to set up branch plants in Canada), it had 
sufficient power to impose a pricing policy on the Canadian
. . 3D . .market from the date of its formation. As Aitken publicly 
announced, Canada Cement controlled "all the rock cement plants
, , y\
[in Canada] east of the Rocky Mountains."
3DBBK, 19 09 correspondence, Aitken and the owners and 
managers of International Portland Cement, Lakefield Portland 
Cement, Lehigh Portland Cement, Vulcan Portland Cement, Canadian 
Portland Cement, and Belleville Portland Cement, A/32. A set of 
national prices drawn up by Aitken and the owners was in force by 
at least 8 September 1909. BBK, telegram, Aitken to Canadian 
Portland Cement enclosing agreed-upon price-fixing schedule, 6 
September 1909, and telegrams, Aitken and Allan, 9 September 
1909, A/32/Canada Cement, Canadian Portland Cement.
<y\ .
"Aitken quoted m  the JIT, 18 September 1909, p. 1213.
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Aitken, in fact, had cleverly tried to give British 
investors the impression that Canada Cement had eliminated all 
competitors to increase the perceived value of the company's 
securities. Although Canada Cement included the largest and most 
modern plants in the Dominion, more than a dozen medium to small 
cement companies remained outside the consolidation. When the 
British members of the promotional syndicate discovered that some
competition would remain in the Canadian cement industry they
22felt they had been deceived.
The cement industry had enjoyed considerable growth during 
the housing, factory, and public works construction boom of the 
first decade of the twentieth century.23 During this period, a 
large number of portland cement manufacturing plants were hastily 
constructed —  mainly in Ontario where demand was greatest and
22 .Some of the British underwriters were dismayed to discover
that some of the companies which remained outside the merger were 
considering forming "The Independent Cement Company" to defend 
themselves against Canada Cement. A member of the British 
investment house principally responsible for the London flotation 
complained to Aitken that it was "understood at the time that the 
merger formed by you included all the principal Companies in the 
Cement business, and that the object of the merger was to 
eliminate outside competition." BBK, letter, Samborne to Aitken,
23 October 1909, A/32/Canada Cement, Kilbourn.
23See Figure 3 m  Appendix A. The construction industry 
experienced its most rapid rate of real growth between 1908 and 
1912 although the period 1900-1907 also witnessed substantial 
growth.
raw materials most plentiful.34 None of the companies were
national in scope but some, like the International Portland 
Cement Company of Ottawa, with its plant across the Ottawa River 
at Hull, Quebec, employed large and modern factory systems which 
were among the most advanced in the world. As can be seen in 
Table 9 below, Canadian companies expanded output at a 
remarkable pace to meet the domestic demand for cement.
Imports were concentrated in the Western prairie region. 
Westerners paid considerably higher prices than the average 
Canadian prices displayed in Table 9, which explains their vocal 
opposition to the Canada Cement ‘'monopoly” and their desire to
Of*have the tariff on American cement eliminated. There is
certainly some evidence that, at least until the formation of 
Canada Cement, Canadian portland cement was relatively more 
expensive than the American product,and this price difference was 
amplified in the Canadian west because of transportation costs.^
21In 19 00, there were only two portland cement manufacturing 
plants in Ontario while there were approximately five natural 
rock cement works. Within a few years, however, dozens of new 
plants were established. MT, 12 October 1900, p. 472.
^MT, 10 April 1903, p. 1382; 22 September 1905, p. 389. 
The cost of erecting the Lehigh cement mill was almost $2 
million. Aside from the International's operation, this was
likely the most advanced portland cement factory in the country.
BBK, letter, Aitken to Wood, 10 December 1909, A/32/E.R. Wood.
See Chapter Five.
27For example, m  1905, after much acrimonious debate, the
Hamilton City Council gave a large portland cement contract to a
company from Ithaca, N.Y., instead of the Owen Sound Portland
Cement Co., one of the firms that eventually joined the Canada
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Table 9
THE CANADIAN PORTLAND CEMENT INDUSTRY, 1900-1914 
(quantity in thousands of barrels)
$
Year Consumption Production Imports p/barrel
1900 753 292 461 $1.92
1901 880 317 563 1.78
1902 1,257 595 662 1.73
1903 1,335 628 708 1.84
1904 1,833 910 922 1.41
1905 2,160 1,347 814 1.42
1906 2,582 2,139 443 1.48
1907 3,130 2,436 694 1.54
1908 3,082 2,665 417 1.39
1909 4,150 4,010 140 1.31
1910 5,121 4,754 367 1.34
1911 6,433 5,693 741 1.34
1912 8,550 7,133 1,417 1.28
1913 8,861 8,659 203 1.28
1914 7,255 7,172 82 1.23
SOURCE: A.E. Epp, "Cooperation Among Capitalists: The
Canadian Merger Movement", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The 
Johns Hopkins University, 1973, pp. 459, 462.
With the financial panic in 1907, however, industrial and 
infrastructure expansion suffered a temporary but savage downturn
Cement merger. The decision was based strictly on cost in that 
the Ithaca Company had put in the low bid in spite of the tariff. 
MT. 31 March 1905, p. 1334. Cheaper American cement was enough 
of an enticement that members in the House of Commons agreed that 
all future government projects should be restricted to using 
Canadian-made cement. Perhaps this is the main reason that one 
of the more efficient producers in the United States began 
constructing a branch plant at Belleville, Ontario, approximately 
two months after the announcement. MT, 23 June 1905, p. 1731;
| 22 September 1905, p. 389. As discussed below, however, Canada
Cement was competitive enough to begin exporting outside of 
Canada by 1918.
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2Bwhich had a very negative impact on the cement industry. By 
1908, consumption dropped for the first time and the price of 
cement plummeted. Canadian companies found themselves producing 
too much cement and selling below the price of production. Their 
plants were capable of producing 9,500,000 barrels a year which 
was over three times the consumption of the country in 1908.
Cement industrialists entered agreements attempting to 
restrict production and raise prices but these proved to be 
unenforceable and short-lived as individual owners broke rank to 
gain some short-term advantage at the expense of the other cartel
qn ,
members. Some companies sought to keep costs down through 
internal reorganisation. During the spring of 1909, Aitken was 
called upon by Sir Sandford Fleming, a majority shareholder in 
three Canadian cement enterprises, including the International 
Portland Cement Company. Fleming wanted his interests
consolidated into a more efficient organisation thereby lowering 
the costs of production and financing. Aitken responded by 
proposing his own far more ambitious scheme which Fleming and his 
associates, at least at this time, enthusiastically endorsed:
2R .See Figures 3 and 4 m  Appendix A.
^MT, 7 August 1909, p. 612.
^For an historical account of the long-term ineffectiveness 
of price-fixing agreements and the fragile nature of industry 
cartels in Canada, see M. Bliss, A Living Profit: Studies in the 
Social History of Canadian Business. 1883-1911 (Toronto, 1974).
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I reported that the amalgamation of the three mills was 
not a defensible financial proposition, but that the 
union of all the cement mills in Canada was. Moreover,
I contended that the formation of such a vast trust was 
practicable; that it could be floated successfully and 
produce an adequate and better return to the Investor 
than the existing system of separate ownership.
A merger of only three cement plants was not a "defensible 
proposition" because it would not have had the market power to 
effectively deal with over-capacity. Cement companies were 
anxious to enter the consolidation precisely because of the 
tremendous need for rationalisation of plants in central Canada 
where the industry was overbuilt. Such an organisation would 
also be capable of planning the construction of new cement plants 
to avoid the irrational pattern of overdevelopment of the last 
few years. The capacity of the ten companies making up Canada
. . . . .  32Cement was still double the existing requirements in 1909. An 
administrative entity which could distribute capacity in the most 
economical manner possible seemed the only rational solution.
The relationship between technological and organisational 
change, overcapacity and the formation of mergers has been well- 
documented by Naomi Lamoreaux who suggests that this was the 
major cause of the turn of the century merger wave in the United
31BBK, G/17/2, excerpt from Lord Beaverbrook's draft 
autobiography later published as Mv Early Years (Fredericton, 
N.B., 1964) .
32Statement to shareholders by C.C. Ballantyne, Vice- 
President, Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1909.
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States. Lamoreaux argues that the innovations in high through­
put production processes during the 1880s led to overproduction 
in many American industries. This coupled with a depression 
beginning in 1893 resulted in such severe price wars and ruthless 
competition that thousands of firms were driven into bankruptcy. 
Survival could no longer be guaranteed by price-fixing through 
cartels of independent producers —  a practice which had become 
quite prevalent in the decades before the turn of the century. 
Now tight combinations —  amalgamations which produced a single 
unified enterprise often with enough monopoly power to impose 
prices at least temporarily —  provided the only means of 
survival. Using as examples the steel and newsprint industries, 
Lamoreaux concludes that the Great Merger Wave was the product of
a defensive reaction by firms in industries employing new
33processes of high output production.
Overcapacity was also a prevalent theme in many rapidly 
changing industries in Canada by the end of the nineteenth 
century. The simultaneous introduction of high through-put 
processes in a number of competing plants produced a desperate 
situation. The enormous fixed-costs that were sunk into the new 
mass-production processes and the new factories in which they 
were housed prevented firms from simply easing back when supply 
suddenly outstripped demand and pushed selling prices beneath the
Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American 
Business. 1895-1904 (Cambridge, 1985).
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cost of production. Paradoxically, many firms had no realistic 
alternative, in the face of slumping prices caused by 
overcapacity, than to continue producing. Most of the cost of 
production remained even if the plant was temporarily shut down 
and in the absence of effective and enforceable cartel 
agreements, any unilateral decision to quit producing would only 
exacerbate the situation for the individual firm. There was no 
graceful exit from the industry; high-fixed costs even made 
voluntary winding-up, always an option in the past, painfully 
difficult.
The desire to regulate output and keep "prices firm" was the 
principal motive behind consolidations in industries such as 
fruit and vegetable canning as well as salmon packing where high 
through-put technology had the most dramatic impact on the output
34capacity of individual firms. It was apparent to contemporary
31 . .For the relationship between technological change and 
overcapacity in the salmon canning industry, see: P.W. O'Bannon,
"Waves of Change: Mechanization in the Pacific Coast Canned-
Salmon Industry, 1864-1914", Technology and Culture, vol. 28, no. 
3 (July 1987) ; D.J. Reid, "Company Mergers in the Fraser River 
Salmon Canning Industry, 1885-1902", CHR, vol. LVI, no. 3 
(September 1975); D.A. Stacey, Sockeve and Tinplate:
Technological Change in the Fraser River Canning Industry. 1871- 
1912. (Victoria, B.C., 1982). The introduction of mechanised,
high-speed canning lines caused overproduction in the fruit and 
vegetable canning industry. This produced a number of cartel 
associations and finally two spectacular consolidations: The
Canadian Canners Consolidated merger of 22 companies in 1903 and 
the Dominion Canners merger of this company plus 17 other 
independent companies in 1910. See L. Elder, The History of 
Canadian Canners Limited 1903-1986. company publication (1986).
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observers that "[i]n this present age of rapid machinery...there 
is a very general disposition towards over-production by 
manufacturers."25 The issue of whether overcapacity was the 
major motive behind mergers before or during the first Canadian 
merger wave cannot, however, be answered by referring to a few 
case examples.36 It can only be tested by a rigorous examination 
of the technological state of every manufacturing industry in 
which merger activity is prominent —  an examination which is 
beyond the scope of this work.
It is clear, however, that even after the formation of
Canada Cement, the industry continued to be plagued by
overcapacity, a situation that did not dissipate until after the 
Second World War. By 1920, Canada Cement was trying to turn this 
liability into a virtue by arguing that the corporation's long­
term interests were better served by keeping production capacity 
well ahead of existing demand in Canada. In this way, the
company would always be ready for a surge in demand thus
. 8 November 1889, p. 553.
■^Moreover, it was likely long-term industrial decline, 
rather than the introduction of high through-put technology, 
which caused overcapacity in the Canadian textile industry. The 
Dominion Cotton Mill amalgamation of nine existing textile mills 
in 1890, the first major Canadian merger, was motivated by 
overproduction and idle plants. The industry continued to slide 
into slow decline after this, however, and further mergers became 
necessary to regulate output. MT, 13 February 1991, p. 1005; 4 
March 1992, p. 1054; B.J. Austin, "Life Cycles and Strategy of a 
Canadian Company: Dominion Textile, 1873-1973", unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Concordia University, 1985.
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preventing the potential negative effects of import competition 
at such a time. Although never enough to keep all of Canada 
Cement's plants busy, demand increased steadily during the 
1920s.37 The strategy would have eventually succeeded if the
1930s had not reversed this increase in domestic consumption. 
Previously tolerable under conditions of growth, the high-fixed 
costs of idle plants and equipment almost sunk Canada Cement
during the Great Depression. The company immediately stopped 
paying common stock dividends. In 1932, preference dividends 
were suspended and not resumed for five years. Canada Cement was 
barely recovering when the Second World War interceded to 
increase the demand for cement.
Very early on, overcapacity prodded Canada Cement into 
developing an export business. Beginning in 1918, Canada Cement
relied on low price and most importantly on the quality of its
product to develop a foreign clientele and, by the first part of 
the 1920s, its foreign business compensated for temporary slumps 
in Canadian sales. After 1925, however, European competitors 
began to cut increasingly into Canada Cement's foreign sales and
37In the good years of the 1920s Canada Cement's production 
hovered around one-half and slightly more of its total capacity. 
Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 1920-1929.
3BCanada Cement's plants were operating at 32 per cent of 
capacity in 1932, the worse year of the Great Depression, but 
even in the peak year of 192 9, its cement plants were not running 
at anything more than 70 per cent capacity. Canada Cement 
Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 1909-194 0.
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this, combined with the onset of the Depression, resulted in a 
very weak export business. At the same time, it appears that 
Canada Cement never complemented its exports with foreign branch 
plant operations even during the 1920s when such a strategy would 
have been financially feasible. In 1926, it did purchase an 
American gypsum company to guarantee a supply of raw material but 
this was not part of an effort to compete in the American 
market.30
Through a policy of steadily decreasing the price of cement 
to the customer, however, Canada Cement continued to supply 
almost all of the Canadian demand throughout the interwar period. 
Its Canadian competitors were forced to drop their prices in 
response to Canada Cement's policy or go out of business. 
Although portland cement enjoyed tariff protection, Canada Cement 
proudly announced in 192 0 that Canadian consumers were now paying 
less for cement than American or British consumers.40 The 
company achieved this level of efficiency through an extensive 
program of capital reinvestment which took the form of 
technological improvements, research and development, backward 
integration to guarantee the supply and transportation of raw 
materials, forward integration to ensure adequate and economical 
distribution of its product, and diversification to stabilise
30Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 1909-1940.
40Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1920.
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income.
Within two years of its formation, every Canada Cement plant 
was equipped with a modern industrial laboratory and trained 
chemists to test more systematically raw materials and finished 
product.41 Research and development projects were undertaken 
such as Canada Cement's experiments on the recovery of potash 
byproducts in its kilns.42 Even in the depths of the depression, 
when capital expenditures were cut to the bone, equipment was 
still being updated to ensure that it kept up with the most 
recent developments in the industry.43 Such technological 
improvements were accompanied by profound organisational changes. 
Canada Cement moved immediately to redress the imbalance of 
having numerous plants in central Canada, particularly Ontario, 
and an absence of producing units in Western Canada and the 
Maritimes, and thereby reduce transportation costs, always a 
major factor for a bulky product like cement. By 1913, it 
purchased an existing operation at Exshaw, Alberta, established a 
new plant at Medicine Hat, Alberta, transformed a plant in 
Winnipeg, and began the search for a suitable Maritime site for a
Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1911.
42Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1918.
43Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1938.
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cement plant to serve the eastern seaboard.44 It then reduced 
the price for Western cement, which was still selling 
considerably above the central Canadian price. Ten years later 
the capacity of the plants in the prairie provinces substantially 
exceeded the consumption of the region but this only anticipated 
the pattern of growth over the next seven years when the rate of 
cement consumption in the west grew faster relative to the rate 
of consumption of central and eastern Canada.
In 1912, a wholly-owned subsidiary, Canada Cement Transport 
Company, was incorporated and two steamships were purchased to 
transport coal to Canada Cement's plants to avoid the expense and 
unreliability of existing rail and steamship services. By the 
end of the 192 0s, Canada Cement had constructed a series of 
storage and shipping plants at St. John, Halifax, Quebec City, 
Toronto and Windsor and two self-discharging ships, one to 
service the eastern seaboard and the other to service the Great 
Lakes, were put into operation to carry cement and gypsum between 
these storage and shipping points. Backward integration was 
achieved when Canada Cement purchased gypsum quarries in Nova 
Scotia as through the purchase of the Pennsylvania Gypsum Company
AA
After years of searching, the company eventually found a 
suitable Maritime site for a cement plant at Havelock, New 
Brunswick, which it purchased in 1921. It did not build on this 
site until 1950, however, because of continuing overcapacity in 
the Canadian industry. Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual 
Reports, 1923, 1950.
45Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1928.
103
in 1926.46
The earnings from cement fluctuated considerably with the 
business cycle. To broaden its earning base, Canada Cement 
established a wholly-owned real-estate subsidiary, the St. 
Lawrence Land Company, in 1922. By this time, Canada Cement had 
also begun to invest in the shares of other companies to obtain a 
balanced corporate portfolio. It was in fact these investments 
outside of cement which, according to the company, allowed it to 
carry its excess capacity while still cutting the retail price of 
cement. Whether or not this is correct, it is clear that these 
outside investments likely saved Canada Cement during the Great
47
Depression.
In spite of beginning life with a financial handicap and the 
industry-wide impediment of substantial overcapacity, Canada 
Cement's performance between 1909 and 1939 was relatively good. 
This can be attributed to a structure which produced 
technological and organisational efficiency, ensured safety and 
economy of supply and distribution, and allowed the company to 
thrive in the geographically immense but (for the most part)
Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 1912, 
1926-1930. In 1928, Canada Cement sold its shares in this 
company to the Atlantic Gypsum Products Corporation of 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a company which agreed to supply its 
eastern plants with raw gypsum rock. Canada Cement then held its 
own deposits of gypsum in reserve for the future.
^Canada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 1922-1939.
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sparsely populated national market. The corporate strategies of 
diversification, constant investment in technological 
improvement, and leadership in price-cutting worked to the 
company's long-term advantage.
On the negative side, Canada Cement's relatively meagre 
surplus in its first two years of operation limited its 
rationalisation program and its investment in transportation 
facilities. More importantly, as earnings quickly negated this 
disadvantage, the Company's relatively relaxed attitude to export 
markets and its failure to adopt a policy of foreign direct 
investment were shortcomings which eventually resulted in the 
company losing competitive ground to a French multinational, 
Lafarge Corporation, during the 1960s. This led ultimately to 
the corporate reorganisation of the cement industry with the 
merger between the French company and Canada Cement in 19 69-7 0.
4.3 The Canadian Car and Foundry Company
Unlike the cement industry, overcapacity did not play a role 
in the merger of the largest rolling stock manufacturers in 
Canada. If anything, the firms which made up Canadian Car were
4BCanada Cement Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 1965-1969? 
Lafarge Canada, Limited, Annual Report, 19 69.
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straining to keep up with domestic demand.49 One of the oldest 
industries established in Canada, rolling stock manufacturing 
sprang up in the 1850s during the first Canadian spurt of railway 
building. Freight and passenger cars were produced by both, 
railway companies and specialised rolling stock manufacturers, 
thus joining the textile and farm implement industries as the 
major manufacturing sectors during Canada*s first industrial 
revolution.33
The Laurier boom brought in the last and most extensive 
phase of railway building in Canada. Their own shops now 
incapable of meeting the increase in demand, the older railway 
companies began to purchase more cars from independent 
manufacturers. Certainly, the Canadian Pacific Railway, which' 
had the largest shops in Canada, was unable to meet its own 
demand by the early 1900s. Preferring to put all their
investment into building track, the newer railway companies
49 . . .The real growth in the railway services industry is 
depicted in Figure 2 of Appendix A. The growth of the rolling 
stock industry during the Laurier boom is captured in Figure 15 
of Appendix A which depicts real output in transportation 
equipment manufacturing, a category largely made up of railway 
car manufacturing.
P. Craven and T. Traves, "Canadian Railways as 
Manufacturers, 1850-1880", Perspectives on Canadian Economic 
History. ed. D. McCalla (Toronto, 1987) .
^For example, by 1906, the Canadian Pacific Railway 
; workshop at Maisonneuve (Montreal) could not meet that company*s 
! requirements and it was forced to place an order with the 
| Dominion Car Company for 200 coal-transporting steel cars at a 
cost of $1.5 million. MT, 9 February 1906, p. 1061.
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bought all of their cars from the rolling stock manufacturers. 
The Canadian Northern, the Grand Trunk Pacific and the National 
Transcontinental railways, expanding so rapidly between 1900 and 
1915, ordered almost all of their rolling stock from the 
specialist firms.2  This encouraged considerable growth in the 
rolling stock companies and by 1906 three large independents were
. i . 5 3producing the majority of the rolling stock m  Canada.
Rhodes Curry was an old Maritime establishment which had 
grown steadily since its formation in 1893. Dominion Car and 
Foundry and the Canada Car Company were newcomers that had just
settled in Canada before the 1909 merger. Canada Car was
established in Montreal in 1905 by interests associated with the
Pressed Steel Car Company of the United States in conjunction
with some Canadian capital. Like Rhodes Curry, it manufactured 
wooden passenger and freight cars. In 1905, Rhodes Curry
s  . . .G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. 1 (Toronto,
1960); W.K. Lamb, History of the Canadian Pacific Railway (New
York, 1977); J.A. Eagle, The Canadian Pacific Railway and the
Development of Western Canada. 1896-1914 (Montreal, 1989); T.D.
Regehr, The Canadian Northern Railway: Pioneer Road of the
Northern Prairies. 1895-1915 (Toronto, 1976);
53 . . .A. E . Epp, "Cooperation Among Capitalists: The Canadian
Merger Movement 1909-13", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Johns 
Hopkins University, 1973, pp. 532-35.
^^Rhodes Curry was the product of an 1893 merger between an 
Amherst manufacturer and the New Brunswick Foundry, Rolling Mills 
and Car Works. The two companies combined their capital to build 
a modern rolling stock plant at Amherst. MT, 21 April 1893, p. 
1258; T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the
Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910", Acadiensis. vol. 
1 no. 2 (Spring 1972), p. 73.
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purchased a manufacturing plant and property at Sydney, Nova 
Scotia, in order to begin manufacturing pressed steel cars, 
increasingly in demand by the railways. The project did not get 
off the ground because of the inability of the Dominion Iron and 
Steel Company to roll suitable plates. Instead, in 1906 the 
Dominion Car and Foundry Company was established in Montreal by 
the Kelley rolling stock interests of Chicago to build the first 
"Canadian11 steel car manufacturing plant.
Industry growth had put such a strain on Rhodes Curry that 
in 1909 it had to increase its issued capital from $346,000 to $3 
million. Aitken handled the reorganisation. Immediately
afterwards, he discussed the possibility of an industry-wide 
merger with Canada Car and Dominion Car and Foundry. Secret 
negotiations followed and, before there was even a chance to 
float the securities of the reorganised Rhodes Curry, the new 
deal was announced in October, 1909. Aitken's role was central 
in the merger but it is clear that the President and chief 
stockholder of Rhodes Curry, Nathaniel Curry, played a 
significant role in the merger negotiations and was instrumental 
in determining the basis of valuation and the new management of
^JT, 7 July 1905, p. 14? 21 July 1905, p. 74.
®BBK, prospectus of Canadian Car, G/19/early financial 
circulars; extract from the St. John Sun, no date (1909),
A/39/Rhodes Curry & Co. A. E. Epp, o p . cit.. p. 544.
^MT, 3 July 1909, p. 136.
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the consolidation.95 Naturally, Curry was made President of the 
new consolidation. He, along with the other major shareholders 
of Rhodes Curry and Dominion Car, had a long-term stake in the 
future profitability of Canadian Car. All had accepted 
securities in the new consolidation instead of cash for their 
holdings and it is conceivable that they insisted on a 
conservative capitalisation for the new company thus restricting 
the issue of common stock.
Canadian Car's preference share and bond issues were one of 
the most conspicuous financial successes of the Canadian merger 
wave. Unusual for industrial issues of the day, Canadian Car's 
preference shares sold without the added incentive of bonus 
common stock. To the amazement of the financial press, the 
subsequent issue of bonds sold at a premium. Subscription lists 
in the United States and Canada were hardly opened when the list 
in London was already over-subscribed. The bonds were purchased 
at 2.5 per cent above par in London and within one week the price 
had advanced to 6 per cent above par.
03
BBK, correspondence, Aitken to Wood, 29 June 1909, 25
September 1909, A/42/J.E. Wood; letter, Aitken to Stavert, 12 
July 1909, A/40/misc S; letter, Aitken to William, 9 August 
1909, A/42/misc W; telegrams, Aitken and W.V. Kelley, President, 
American Steel Foundries, and Aitken and Curry, September and 
October 1909, A/36/misc K; letter, Curry to Aitken, 23 October 
1909, A/39/Rhodes Curry & Co.
®MT, 30 October 1909, p. 1812.
®MT, 5 February 1910, p. 514; 12 February 1910, p. 716.
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Investors were particularly keen because they had been 
assured of Canadian Car’s monopoly of the rolling stock industry 
protected from outside competition by the tariff, as this excerpt 
from the original prospectus indicates:
The combined capacity of all other car companies in 
Canada is probably not over 10 freight cars per day, as 
compared with this Company's present capacity of 75 
cars per day. Car builders in Canada are protected 
from Foreign competition by a 4yty of 30 per cent on 
rolling stock and parts thereof.
In fact, this impression of monopoly was very misleading. 
The prospectus omitted mention of the manufacturing capacity of 
the railway companies themselves; the extensive car manufacturing 
shops of the Canadian Pacific Railway alone could provide
effective competition. Moreover, the tariff did not protect the 
company from foreign direct investment and new Canadian
investment. Competition from these sources emerged almost 
immediately after the merger. As can be seen in Table 10 below, 
the tremendous demand for rolling stock between 1909 and the
Great War acted like a magnet for new investment.
In 1910, a group of Maritime financiers injected new money 
and reorganised one of the smaller rolling stock manufacturers 
into the Nova Scotia Car Works which issued $1,743,000 of
^BBK, President's statement of company's position dated 19 
January 1910, and prospectus of Canadian Car, G/19/early 
financial circulars.
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Table 10
ROLLING STOCK IN OPERATION IN CANADA. SELECTED YEARS
Passenger Freight
Cars per cent Cars per cent
Years (number) increase (number) increase
1905* 3,130 — 87,574 —
1907 3,642 (6%) 107,407 (23%)
1908 4,026 11% 115,709 8%
1909 4,192 4% 117,779 2%
1910 4,320 3% 119,713 2%
1911 4,513 5% 127,518 7%
1912 4,946 10% 140,918 11%
1913 5,696 15% 182,221 29%
1915* 6,326 (11%) 201,790 (1 1 %)
SOURCE : 1907-1913 derived from MT, 22 January 1915, p.
2 2 ; * 1905 and 1915 derived from A. E. Epp, "Cooperation
Among Capitalists; The Canadian Merger Movement 1909-
1913", unpublished Ph .D. thesis, The Johns Hopkins
University, 1973, p. 534.
capital. Additions and extensive improvements were made and 
within a few months the plant was producing 12 cars a day, had 
secured an order from the Canadian Northern Railway for 1,000 
freight cars and was rapidly expanding its plant to boost its 
daily capacity.® In July, 1912, the National Steel Car Company 
was incorporated by American interests and its plant, with a 
capacity of 3 0 cars a day, was erected in Hamilton, fast becoming 
the centre of primary and secondary steel production in Canada.® 
At the same time the Nova Scotia Steel & Coal Company established
®MT, 29 October 1910, p. 1821; 22 April 1911, p. 1617; 4
November 1911, p. 1952.
®AFR. vol. XIII (May 1913), p. 257; vol. XIV (May 1914), p.
254.
a car manufacturing subsidiary. With an issued capital of over 
$2.5 million and the support of a fully integrated steel company, 
Scotia*s subsidiary, the Eastern Car Works, was poised to compete 
directly with Canadian Car.6* These new competitors, employing 
the most modern techniques of production and corporate 
organisation, quickly began to snatch orders for rolling stock 
away from Canadian Car. The industry would remain highly
/ j r
competitive in the decades following the Great War.
Canadian Car survived and even prospered in this environment 
because of its vigorous strategy of vertical integration to 
secure its inputs and more efficiently distribute its output. 
At the time of the merger, a very large proportion of the 
materials used in assembling railway cars were not manufactured 
in Canada. Canadian Car replaced these high-cost imports by 
manufacturing the equipment itself, which implied major 
modifications and extensions to its existing plants and the
^AFR, vol. XIII (May 1913), p. 262.
®The industry reached a peak in total output and value in 
1929. Historical Statistics of Canada, ed. F.H. Leacy (Ottawa, 
2nd ed., 1983), Quantity and value of railway car shipments,
1917-1975, series R725 and R726. Nevertheless, it appears that 
its fastest growth rate was experienced in the years immediately 
preceding the Great War.
In 1912, for example, Canadian Car received the largest 
single order for rolling stock ever given in Canada: a $6 million 
order for freight cars from the Canadian Pacific Railway. MT, 24 
August 1912, p. 332.
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67erection of new plants including an axle plant in Montreal. In 
addition, Canadian Car bought out its existing Canadian 
suppliers. In 1911, the largest producer of steel castings in 
Canada, the Montreal Steel Works, as well as the steel foundry 
and rolling mills of the Ontario Iron and Steel Company, were 
purchased by Canadian Car and amalgamated into a subsidiary, 
Canadian Steel Foundries, which then proceeded to construct the 
company*s largest plant.
In July, 1912, Canadian Car purchased the Pratt & Letchworth 
company of Brantford, Ontario, the largest malleable iron 
manufacturer in Canada. This firm, a subsidiary of an American 
company, manufactured a number of its parent's specialised 
equipment under license. The patents on these "specialties", 
many of which were required as inputs in the building of rolling 
stock, came with the buy-out and Canadian Car continued to 
manufacture them under the Pratt & Letchworth name thereby 
widening its sources of income. With its new and acquired
^MT, 4 May 1912, p. 1835; 2 November 1912, p. 674.
ffiCanadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited, Annual Report, 
1911. Canadian Car was the largest of the Montreal Steel Work's 
customers before the merger. Nathaniel Curry was made the 
President of Canadian Steel Foundries which then proceeded to 
issue $3 million of bonds on the London capital market. MT, 3 
December 1910, p. 2726? 14 January 1911, p. 217? 11 February
1911, p. 648.
Pratt & Letchworth originally intended to join a 
consolidation of the entire Canadian malleable iron industry. 
When negotiations broke down in July, 1912, Canadian Car 
purchased the option on Pratt & Letchworth "to avoid the danger 
of being unable to secure a sufficient supply" of the special
113
plants in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia, 
Canadian Car was assured of a continuous, timely and relatively 
inexpensive supply of all the basic steel inputs required in 
rolling stock manufacturing. In the 1912 Annual Report, the 
President, Nathaniel Curry, claimed that Canadian Car was 
"probably the most self-contained car building company in the 
world, manufacturing as it does, nearly everything that enters 
into the construction of railway cars.”
The construction, contracting and lumber business previously 
conducted by the Rhodes Curry company was hived off into a third 
subsidiary while the car manufacturing plant at Amherst was 
integrated into the two Montreal plants as well as a new $1 
million plant being built at the western end of Lake Superior. 
Built between 1912 and 1914, the Fort William works were intended 
to supply the immense rail network in Western Canada servicing 
the movements of grain from the prairies to the Great Lakes and 
the west coast. At the opening of the Great War, Canadian Car 
owned eight plants which were strategically distributed along an
equipment manufactured by the company. The President of Pratt & 
Letchworth, J.C. Bradley, of Buffalo, New York, was made a 
director of Canadian Car. Canadian Car and Foundry Company, 
Limited, Annual Report, 1912.
D Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited, Annual Report,
1912.
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east-west expanse of 3,000 kilometres.
Like Canada Cement and Stelco, Canadian Car survived the 
downturn in demand for capital goods during the Great War by 
manufacturing armaments. Canadian Car went further than these 
companies, however, in seeking new business, and within two years 
after the opening of hostilities, had secured multi-million 
dollar contracts and advances from the Imperial Russian and 
French governments. Rather than passively wait for British and 
Canadian armament contracts —  the strategy of most Canadian 
industrials including Canada Cement and Stelco —  Canadian Car 
sent representatives to Europe to make new deals, constructed a 
shipbuilding works at Fort William and erected an armaments 
factory in New Jersey to handle some of the new business flooding 
in. In addition to an order for 2,000 steel tank cars, Canadian 
Car agreed to supply the Imperial Russian government with $52 
million worth of shrapnel and high explosive shells. Canadian 
Car manufactured thousands of freight cars ordered by the French 
government in 1916. After the American entry into the War, it 
obtained a $10.5 million contract to supply the United States 
navy with ships. This was followed by a contract for 12 mine
Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited, Annual Report, 
1914. The Fort William works were substantially completed by 
August, 1914, but Canadafs entry into the War as well as the 
business depression commencing in the latter half of 1913, 
prevented the company from putting the new plant into immediate 
action.
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72sweepers.
The transition back to civilian production in 1918 was a 
difficult one as Canadian Car had become very dependent on war-
. . . .  73related business for its growth and profitability. Although 
Canadian Car managed the move back into rolling stock 
manufacturing, the company showed little of the dynamism that it 
had exhibited before the Great War and during the conflict 
itself. Because of the long-run decline in the demand for 
rolling stock the company established some subsidiaries and began 
to diversify. During the serious slumps of 1922, 1925-26 and
1928 these outside investments proved their importance. When the 
bottom fell out of the rolling stock industry between 1931 and 
193 6 , Canadian Car's diversification literally paid dividends 
(and bond interest). In the depth of the Great Depression, 
Canadian Car established an aircraft division to offset its 
sparse earnings from rolling stock. The company set up the most 
modern aircraft factory in Canada at Fort William. In spite of 
these many attempts at diversification, however, nothing could 
change the basic fact that railway car manufacturing was a
^IT. 14 May 1915, p. 14; 14 January 1916, p. 20; 24 March
1916, p. 7; 19 January 1917, p. 14; 1 February 1918, p. 34; 15
February 1918, p. 16.
73Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 
1914-1919. Gross profits had risen from a low of §322,000 in 
1915 to §1,292,000 in 1916, and §2,573,000 in 1917. Net profits 
rose similarly: §258,000 in 1915, §353,000 in 1916, and
§1,413,000 in 1917. MT, 26 April 1918, p. 38.
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declining industry, weakening Canadian Car in the process. In 
1955, Hawker Siddeley, a British multinational, purchased control 
of Canadian Car paying $30 a share for common stock that had been 
worth double that value in 1909.74
4.4 The Steel Company of Canada
The Stelco merger had no immediate impact on the structure 
of the Canadian primary steel industry. This was a consolidation 
of four secondary steel producers with one of the smaller 
Canadian primary manufacturers —  the Hamilton Steel and Iron 
Company. Impressed by the United States Steel Corporation merger 
completed eight years before, Aitken initially set out in 1909 to 
create a merger of all the major primary steel producers in the 
country. In particular, he wanted to meld together the three 
largest companies of the day: the Algoma Steel Corporation (then 
known as the Lake Superior Corporation) , the Dominion Iron and 
Steel Company (DISCO) and the Nova Scotia Steel & Coal Company 
(Scotia). Hamilton Steel and Iron was, in terms of size,
Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited, Annual Reports, 
1919-1939? Historical Statistics of Canada, ed. F.H. Leacy, op. 
cit.. Information concerning Hawker Siddeley was given to me by 
Larry McNally, Archivist, Economic/Scientific Archives, National 
Archives of Canada.
• jc
Algoma's history is well-covered in D. McDowall, Steel at 
the Sault: Francis H. Clergue. Sir James Dunn, and the Algoma
Steel Corporation. 1901-1956 (Toronto, 1984). Some information 
on DISCO and Scotia can be found in W.J.A. Donald, The Canadian 
Iron and Steel Industry (Boston, 1915)? D. Frank, "The Cape 
Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British Empire 
Steel Corporation", Acadiensis, vol. 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1977); and
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hardly a member of this club. Although Aitken wanted it in the 
amalgamation, presumably because of the strategic location of its 
plant and the quality of its management, he had no intention of 
making Hamilton Steel the core of an integrated steel merger."*5 
This was an accidental consequence of the failure of his 
negotiations with the big three Canadian steel producers.
In 1909, Aitken, along with Toronto financier E.R. Wood, 
formed a syndicate to effect a merger between DISCO and the 
Dominion Iron Corporation, the largest coal producer in Canada. 
The terms of the giant merger were hammered out in November and
December of 1909 and, after all the stock had been exchanged, the
. . . . 7 7Dominion Steel Corporation was eventually formed in 1910. This
was the first move on Aitken's part to consolidate the entire 
industry. His second step was to get control of Scotia. Since 
his strained personal relationship with the President of Scotia, 
Robert E. Harris, precluded direct negotiations, Aitken
K. Inwood, "Local Control, Resources and the Nova Scotia Steel 
and Coal Company", Canadian Historical Association, Historical 
Papers (1986). Hamilton Iron and Steel is briefly discussed in 
W. Kilbourn's The Elements Combined: A History of The Steel
Company of Canada (Toronto, 1960).
"^ BBK, telegram, Aitken to Cahan, 9 March 1910, G/3/Cahan. 
In this telegram, Aitken says that he "will likely consolidate 
with Soo [Algoma Steel Corporation], which is favored by 
President Drummond".
77BBK, letter, Aitken to F. Taylor, 18 November 1909, 
A/41/misc T; letter, Aitken to Cahan, 26 November 1909, 
G/3/Cahan; letter, A.J. Brown to Aitken, 24 December 1909, 
A/30/misc Bo-Bu. MT, 21 November 1909, p. 2112-13? 5 November
1910, p. 1928.
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approached Scotia through a neutral party, E.R. Wood. Harris saw 
through the ploy and, as commented on in the Wall Street Journal 
of 2 December, 1909, the '‘leading interests behind the Nova 
Scotia Steel & Coal Co.” remain "opposed to the company being 
included" in the big steel merger sought by Aitken.
Shifting ground, Aitken decided to purchase control of 
Scotia in what was the first significant hostile takeover bid in 
the history of modern Canadian business. Discovering that a 
"raid" on the company was being launched from Montreal, Harris 
and his fellow directors took defensive action by passing a 20 
per cent stock bonus to Scotia's shareholders. By February, 
1910, Aitken's forces thought they controlled a bare majority of 
Scotia's voting shares and waited confidently for the annual 
shareholders meeting scheduled for the 31st of March to replace 
Harris and some of his fellow directors with their own people. 
Harris, in a brilliant piece of financial manoeuvreing, began 
anonymously buying back shares held by brokers for the Aitken 
group placing many of these with disinterested and out-of-reach
, . , *T5 ,
investors in Britain. By the time Aitken realised what had
"^The Aitken group could not afford to buy all at once a 
majority of Scotia shares, therefore, they asked various friendly 
brokers to purchase shares on their behalf promising that they 
would eventually acquire them at a set minimum price (a few 
percentage points above the price at which they were originally 
purchased by the brokers) or at the market price, whichever was 
higher. This got the stock out of the possession of the Harris 
group but not firmly in the possession of the Aitken group as 
nothing could prevent the brokers from trading in Scotia stock 
while waiting for the Aitken group to raise further cash.
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taken place it was too late; although he did some very heavy 
buying in the last days of March the majority had been lost by
TQ ,
the date set for the annual shareholders meeting. This was to 
be Aitken's bitterest defeat in his Canadian business career but 
he continued his steel merger plans without Scotia.
At the very same time that he was fighting for control of 
Scotia, Aitken purchased a steel finishing company called the 
Montreal Rolling Mills for $4.2 million after a quick but expert
on §
evaluation of the property. This was to be the bait to entice 
Dominion Steel, Algoma and Hamilton Steel into a merger. 
Immediately after the purchase, Aitken opened negotiations with a 
number of smaller secondary steel producers while trying to 
convince the primary producers of the benefits which would flow
. . cn ,from one big integrated steel company. Even after negotiations
73 •^Surprisingly, there is virtually no record of Aitken's 
attempted takeover of Scotia in the BBK collection, but there is 
a very good record of it in the Hon. Robert E. Harris Papers, 
PANS, MG 1, vol. 398, no. 4 —  Harris's personal scrapbook 
containing numerous articles on the attempted takeover of Scotia 
entitled "The Raid on the Nova Scotia Steel & Coal Company, 
Limited, by the Forget, Osier contingent, Montreal, Headed by W. 
Maximilian [sic] Aitken, Esq, Beginning at New Glasgow, N.S., 
March 30th 1910" —  and no. 5 —  folder containing various
newsclippings from the daily press and the financial press. The 
takeover bid is also described in the Thomas Cantley Papers, 
PANS, MG, vol. 170, Cantley letter book. See also K. Inwood, op. 
cit., pp. 259-63. Some question remains as to what Aitken 
ultimately intended with the Scotia takeover —  it is possible 
that a merger with Canadian Car would have been the result.
® w .  Kilbourn, o p .cit.. pp. 61-62.
®3BK, letter, Aitken to Holt, 12 March 1910, A/47/Holt.
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with Algoma were abruptly discontinued for reasons never made 
public, Aitken convinced Robert Hobson, the President of Hamilton 
Steel, of the desirability of a merger. Aitken and Hobson now 
worked together to try to convince J.H. Plummer, the President of 
Dominion Steel, of the need for at least one of the "big three”
to be in the consolidation and, failing this, of the benefits
82 .that would flow from a cartel-type agreement. Plummer liked 
neither idea, possibly because of the refusal of Scotia and 
Algoma to participate, but he remained worried about the control 
that Aitken's new merger might have over Canadian wire and nail
• . 83production as well as other finished steel products. He
countered with the suggestion that Dominion Steel and Aitken's 
new consolidation divide up the secondary steel industry to 
prevent too much competition:
I have given a good deal of consideration to the 
matter discussed with you and Mr. Hobson on Tuesday.
While I would not say positively that an alliance 
could not be made which would work satisfactorily, and 
be effective for the purpose in view, I have grave 
doubts of its possibility.
On the other hand we certainly could not sit still 
and see a strong concern formed to take up practically 
the whole wire and nail business of Canada, with the 
ultimate power of excluding us and our product if they 
saw fit. The course which your negotiations have taken 
forces on us the immediate adoption of a policy which 
will protect our interests, and the only policy which
82Evidence of negotiations between Aitken and Dominion Steel 
are found in BBK, 1910 correspondence, Aitken and J.H. Plummer, 
A/50/Plummer.
®The companies which formed Stelco controlled over 50 per 
cent of the hardware lines of the steel finishing business in 
Canada. W. Kilbourn, op.cit.. p. 83.
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will be effective, it seems to me, is to own or control 
large well-equipped plants at two points such as 
Montreal and Fort William. If for this purpose we
could get your options on the Dominion Wire Company and 
the [Montreal Rolling Mills] that would give us what we 
require without any increase in competition.
Aitken refused to sell either the Montreal Rolling Mills or 
his option on Dominion Wire to Dominion Steel and a new steel 
merger was consummated on 9 June, 1910, without Algoma, Dominion
per
Steel or Scotia being included. Aitken concluded that the 
combination of a smaller but geographically well-located primary 
producer —  Hamilton had recently emerged as the centre of the 
steel products industry in Canada —  together with some of the 
largest secondary steel producers in the country was a good long­
term financial gamble even if it did not have a short-term
monopoly position similar to Canada Cement nor the appearance of
monopoly which he used to great advantage on the Canadian Car 
prospectus. Ultimately, this company turned out to be Aitken's 
most successful merger and likely the most profitable to him
personally, when he sold most of his holdings in the late 1920s.
Stelco's contact with Aitken, particularly as a consequence 
of the $1 million cash payout, was hurtful to the company in the
BBK, letter (marked *pnvate*), Plummer to Aitken, 1 June 
1910, A/50/Plummer.
per
^Aitken did promise, however, that some kind of 
"arrangement" could be worked out with Dominion Steel to quell 
Plummer*s fears about an "outbreak" of competition. BBK,
telegrams, Plummer and Aitken, 8 June 1910, A/50/Plummer.
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short-term.85 The company was overcapitalised relative to 
Canadian Car and this served to depress share prices and caused 
great hardship during the 1913 financial depression. By the end 
of the Great War, however, Stelco had become a financially strong 
company reliant more on retained earnings than on security
87 .issues. A combination of good management, technological
innovation, organisational adaptation, and increasing vertical 
integration provided the endogenous reasons for Stelco's success 
during its first years. According to the company's historian, 
the union of varied secondary steel producers with an efficient 
and well-located primary producer made economic sense from the 
very beginning:
Although still a small steel business by American
standards, Stelco was one of the most complex and
varied horizontal mergers yet made in the steel-
finishing industry anywhere in the world. It was also
advanced as a vertical integration of the steps in the 
steel-making process. As such, it was well started on 
the road to technological progress and efficiency in 
the twentieth-century steel industry.
85See Chapter Three, p. 71.
87 . .The amount raised in the first preference stock and bond
flotations did not provide Stelco with adequate working capital 
and within a year another $500,000 worth of bonds had to be 
issued for the construction of two additional 50-ton open hearth 
furnaces, new machinery as well as a new blooming mill, billet 
mill, and a rod and bar mill at Hamilton. Two years later Stelco 
made a further issue of $850,000 worth of bonds for working 
capital. The Steel Company of Canada, Limited, Annual Reports, 
1911 and 1913.
®W. Kilbourn, o p .cit.. p. 84.
123
Within two years of its birth, Stelco was producing 
everything from basic pig iron to steel bars, angles, bands, 
billets, blooms, wire, nuts, bolts, wrought pipe, railway axles 
and fastenings, white lead, putty, shot, nails, spikes, fencing, 
tacks, screws, rivets, as well as iron, brass and copper wire,
eg
rivets and burrs. By 1914, Stelco's 14 plants were
geographically spread out from Montreal and Lachine in the east 
to the central Canadian plants in Hamilton, Brantford, Toronto, 
Belleville and Gananoque, and finally to Fort William at the
cn
western end of Lake Superior.
Stelco's long-term success was a product of internal 
dynamism and the nature of the evolution of the Canadian steel 
industry during the twentieth century. Stelco's biggest 
competitors, Algoma and Dominion Steel, were heavily dependent on 
the production of one main product, steel rails, and after the 
demand for this product peaked in 1913, both companies had great 
difficulty adjusting. On the other hand, as illustrated in Table 
11 below, the demand for semi-finished and finished steel 
products grew considerably after 1913 in large part because of 
the increasing demand for new consumer durables such as 
automobiles, stoves, washing machines, which incorporated a large 
amount of steel.
60The Steel Company of Canada, Limited, Annual Report, 1912. 
^ h e  Steel Company of Canada, Limited, Annual Report, 1914.
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Table 11
CANADIAN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STEEL PRODUCTION, 1900-1940
(thousands of short tons)
ingots & steel pipes
Year castincrs rails shapes bars tubes
1900 26 1
1905 452 200 - - -
1910 822 410 - - -
1915 1,021 235 - - -
1920 1,233 255 - 387 -
1925 843 217 - 244 -
1930 1,131 261 36 184 Ill
1935 1,055 122 43 244 70
1940 2,254 200 184 454 143
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of Canada. eds. M.C.
Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley (Toronto, 1965), Physical 
output of manufactured steel products, series Q283-Q287.
In the 1920s, Stelco found itself located in the heart of 
the Canadian consumer durable and electrical equipment industries 
concentrated as they were in southern Ontario. Stelco's market 
share of secondary steel output, always high, steadily grew but 
its increasing market share of primary steel output better 
reflects the company's great success. By 1918, Stelco controlled 
18 per cent of Canadian steel ingot production compared to 10 
percent in 1910? this would rise to 50 per cent by the 1950s. 
Stelco quickly became the largest producer of primary and
. . <31secondary steel m  Canada and remains in that position today.
^W. Kilbourn, o p .cit.. pp. 83, 112 and 128.
125
4.5 The impact of mergers on relative performance and industrial 
organisation
The most peculiar aspect of these case studies is the extent 
to which the initial financial condition of the companies had so 
little bearing on their ultimate performance. Canada Cement was 
the most disadvantaged of the three yet its subsequent 
performance proved strong. Overcapitalised almost as much as 
Canada Cement, Stelco was, in addition, burdened by an 
insufficiency of capital in its first two years. Nevertheless, 
it ultimately became the best performer in the group. The most 
conservatively capitalised and possessing the most working 
capital, Canadian Car fared extremely well in the first decade of 
its existence but its performance began to decline thereafter.
Without a comprehensive examination of the structure and 
strategies of all three companies, which is beyond the scope of 
the present work, it is impossible to explain with any precision
. . CDthe reasons for their ultimate performance. It does appear, 
however, that exogenous factors such as the long-term trajectory 
of the industry itself had much more of a bearing on the 
performance of companies than their initial financial structure.
CD
*In fact, given the sparseness of the information available 
on each company, it is doubtful that an accurate picture of their 
strategies, structures and performance can be presented.
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The fact that the rolling stock industry went into terminal 
decline by the 1920s while the cement and steel industries 
continued to grow gave Canada Cement and Stelco an obvious 
advantage. Stelco benefitted immensely from the tremendous
growth of the automobile and appliance industries during the 
1920s.
To the extent that endogenous factors affected their
ultimate performance, however, the strategies of all three 
companies were remarkably similar. Unlike the branch plants 
established in Canada by the large American industrials, 
companies such as Canada Cement, Canadian Car and Stelco could 
not depend on parent companies for their technical advances. 
They were thrown on their own resources for research and 
development. All three were innovators as well as imitators in a 
technological sense. In terms of firm organisation, they all
appear to have quickly adopted the structure of the modern 
industrial enterprise that had been pioneered in the United
Q5
States and Germany. In these respects, all three companies
were "world-class" or close to it.
93 . . .I am employing the A. Chandler*s characterisation of 
modern business enterprise contained in The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 
1977), pp. 6-11, and in "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism", 
BHR, vol. LVIII, no. 4 (Winter 1984).
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On the negative side, all three companies adopted a more 
conservative national policy of meeting domestic demand rather 
than a global strategy of increasing market share beyond Canada. 
With the exception of Canadian Car's activities during the Great 
War, none of the companies were successful in developing a 
significant export market. For reasons not yet clear, none of 
the companies embarked upon a strategy of foreign direct 
investment preferring the safety and greater certainty of a 
protected domestic market.94 This choice eventually resulted in 
the acquisition of Canadian Car by a British conglomerate and the 
merger of Canada Cement with a vigorous French multinational. 
Paradoxically, Stelco continues to thrive under the same 
conservative strategy.
In terms of the degree of competitiveness or monopolisation, 
the industrial organisation of each industry was fundamentally 
altered by only one of the three mergers. The steel and rolling 
stock industries were at best robustly competitive and at worst
91In this, the companies do not appear to have been unique 
among Canadian companies. This "failing" of Canadian business 
has been commented on often. Various reasons, from the negative 
impact of the protective tariff which encouraged American direct 
investment to a lack of entrepreneurial ambition and the innate 
conservatism of Canadian industrial elite, have been used to 
explain this phenomenon. See J.H. Dales, The Protective Tariff 
in Canada's Development (Toronto, 1966)? G. Williams, Not for 
Export: Towards a Political Economy of Canada's Arrested
Industrialization (Toronto, 198 3) ; T. Traves, The State and 
Enterprise: Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government
(Toronto, 1979) ; M. Bliss, op. cit.; R.T. Naylor, The History 
of Canadian Business. 1867-1914. 2 vols. (Toronto, 1975).
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oligopolistic both before and after the Stelco and Canadian Car 
consolidations. The cement industry was characterised by a 
dominant firm with a competitive fringe that included the 
constant threat of export competition and, more importantly, the 
menace of direct competition from American or European branch 
plants.® The threat of competition was likely the motive force 
behind Canada Cement*s low-pricing strategy as well as a key 
factor in prodding it to innovate in the cement production 
process and to create new forms of portland cement.
Certainly, none of the companies, not even Canada Cement, 
had the kind of monopoly power desired by their creators and 
shareholders. Canadian Car was faced with new entrants 
immediately after its formation. Stelco was forced to compete 
from the beginning because of the failure to involve the three 
largest primary producers in the consolidation. It was difficult 
to create a monopoly for not only economic reasons. During the 
gilded age, there was significant popular opposition to the 
creation of monopolies and this was translated into political 
opposition to the mergers? particularly the mergers created by 
Max Aitken.
^For a theoretical description of dominant firm analysis, 
see F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (Boston, 2nd ed., 1980), pp. 232-264.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANTITRUST AND THE POLITICS OF MERGER
5.1 From combines to mergers: the illusion of legislation
The cement merger set off alarms throughout Canada. For 
over twenty years, the Canadian public had been unhappy about the 
uncompetitive practices of a business community that insisted on 
suppressing market forces by fixing prices and restricting output 
by agreement.1 This popular discontent had occasionally erupted 
forcing a political response by Canadian legislators who were, in 
general, more sympathetic to such collusive practices than the 
general public. The only politicians that were hostile in 
principle to such anticompetitive behaviour were a small faction 
of ideological free-traders within the Liberal Party. Viewing 
free trade as a panacea for all evils including price-fixing, 
however, they were more interested in getting tariffs reduced 
than in antitrust legislation. This group was a minority, 
however, and successive Conservative and Liberal administrations 
from the 1880s to the 1900s, while giving the appearance of 
action, refused to enact tough antitrust legislation to reduce 
anticompetitive practices.
In A Living Profit: Studies in the Social History of 
Canadian Business. 1883-1911 (Toronto, 1974), M. Bliss dissects 
the source of the attitude which resulted in this behavior which 
he refers to as the "flight from competition."
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The first anti-cartel legislation came on the crest of
public pressure led by farm organisations, after a Parliamentary
investigation of cartels revealed pervasive price-fixing
2practices at every level of the Canadian economy. The new
••anti-combines" law was passed in 1889 without the necessary
administrative machinery for it to be properly enforced. The law
. . 3was laughable in its ineffectiveness. No one even bothered to 
test the legislation until 1897 when the American Tobacco Company 
of Canada was acquitted on a charge of price-fixing through tied- 
dealer contracts.4
See the Select Committee Report on Alleged Combinations in 
Manufactures. Trade and Insurance in Canada (Ottawa, 1888), 
submitted to the House of Commons on 16 May 1888. The report 
fueled the demand for the removal of protectionist tariffs which 
were popularly believed to be the "cause" of price-fixing. The 
Macdonald Conservatives, committed as they were to the National 
Policy of tariff protection, passed the anti-combines legislation 
to cure the abuses of price-fixing without affecting tariffs.
3In particular, see M. Bliss, "Another Anti-Trust Tradition: 
Canadian Anti-Combines Policy, 1889-1910", BHR. vol. XLVII, no. 2 
(Summer 1973), and R.T. Naylor, The History of Canadian Business. 
1867-1914 (Toronto, 1975), vol. II, pp. 162-194. For general 
information on first anti-combines legislation, see P.K. Gorecki 
and W.T. Stanbury, The Objectives of Canadian Competition Policy. 
1888-1983 (Montreal, 1984); A. Ball, Canadian Anti-Trust 
Legislation (Baltimore, 1934); L.G. Reynolds, The Control of 
Competition in Canada (Cambridge, Mass., 1940); O.J. McDiarmid, 
Commercial Policy in the Canadian Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 
1946), pp. 189-207; M. Cohen, "The Canadian Antitrust Laws: 
Doctrinal and Legislative Beginnings", Canadian Bar Review, vol. 
16, no. 3 (September 1938).
^he Queen v. American Tobacco Company of Canada (1897) 3
Revue de Jurisprudence (Quebec), pp. 453-64.
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That same year, the new Liberal government under Wilfred 
Laurier, amended the Tariff Act to placate the farm and free- 
trade. vote which had recently put it into office. This law 
permitted the removal of tariff protection for any industry 
engaging in cartel activity. According to the committed free­
traders within the Liberal Party, this was going to be a far more 
effective weapon against collusive agreements than any antitrust 
law. The Canadian Press Association, a group of Canadian 
newspaper owners that felt it had been held hostage by the high 
fixed prices of newsprint manufacturers, took advantage of the 
legislation. They ultimately won their case —  duties on some 
types of paper were reduced by 40 per cent —  but the costs they 
incurred in the process were so prohibitive that this "anti-
5combine” provision was never again used.
Although the Canadian anti-combines law was too weak to 
attack existing price-fixing agreements, the ability of the 
cartels to keep up prices was overrated by the public. New 
cartel agreements were constantly being set up because they were 
continually falling apart. When opportunity knocked, cartel 
members bolted from agreements to obtain additional business. 
Restrictions on price and quantity meant that everyone had 
surplus inventory which they were willing to dump at cut-rate 
prices. Owners tried to conceal these breaches of agreement from
%CD, 12 April 1910, pp. 6843-45.
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fellow cartel members but, of course, they were discovered sooner 
or later. The perception of pervasive anti-competitive behavior, 
sustained by the public nature of such arrangements in an 
environment permissive of cartel behaviour, must accordingly be 
balanced by the less publicised failings of industry associations 
to enforce price and quantity agreements.6 Nevertheless, it was 
this perception that fueled the populist outcry against the 
"combines" —  the contemporary term for any firm or association 
of firms that engaged in price-fixing.
One of the reasons that many members in the Liberal 
government only paid lip service to supporting free trade was the 
apparent impossibility of obtaining a tariff agreement with the 
United States, just then becoming Canada's largest trading 
partner. Taking a sharp turn towards increased protection in the 
years after the Civil War, the government of the United States 
refused to negotiate the lowering of tariffs. Laurier and his 
Liberal Party arrived in office only to be greeted by the passage 
of the Dingley Tariff of 1897 raising American tariffs even 
higher. Thrown on the defensive, Laurier's government responded 
by increasing tariffs on American products while granting a 
preference to British goods. Aside from the "anti-combine" 
provision in the Tariff Act, Laurier did nothing more about 
strengthening Canadian antitrust law. Instead, he waited for an
4^. Bliss, A Living Profit: Studies in the Social History of 
Canadian Business. 1883-1911. o p .cit; R.T. Naylor, o p .cit.
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opportunity to lower tariffs in a reciprocal agreement with the 
United States —  an opportunity that would not arrive until 
1910.7
The agitation against the combines died down in the 
prosperity of the Laurier boom and did not re-emerge until rising 
prices during the merger wave of 1909-1912 restored vigour to the 
campaign. By this time the public was facing a different kind of 
combine. In fact, mergers provided a sharper focus of attention 
for the "anti-tariff and anti-combine" coalition than cartels. 
In 1909, a group of representatives from various agrarian 
organisations met with Prime Minister Laurier to air their 
grievances and demand legislative redress. They claimed that the 
"combines" —  a term which was now used to cover both cartels and 
mergers —  were collecting millions of dollars in unearned
p . . .
profit. When the Canada Cement consolidation became public 
knowledge a few months later, farm organs such as the Grain 
Growers Guide launched a virulent attack on the cement monopoly. 
The farm groups selected Canada Cement as the most infamous 
example of the danger posed by this new form of monopoly alleging 
that it had increased the price of cement and acted as a conduit 
funnelling millions of dollars of monopoly profits into the
7 . . .L.E. Ellis, Reciprocity 1911: A Study m  Canadian-Amencan 
Relations (New Haven, Conn., 1939), pp. 2-10; O.J. McDiarmid, 
o p .cit.. pp. 203-229.
8HCD, 12 April 1910, p. 6828; O.J. McDiarmid, op.cit.. pp. 
203-254.
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pockets of promoters. Aitken, in particular, was singled out for 
attack.9
Aitken realized that the sheer size of his industrial 
mergers made them vulnerable but underestimated the impact of 
such public attacks.10 He had only to look at the example of the 
United States Steel Corporation merger which had been under 
constant criticism by a similar coalition of American farm 
organisations since its formation in 1901-02. J.P. Morgan Jr. 
had been singled out for personal attack for allegedly reaping 
millions of dollars of promotional stock as profit.
When the criticism began, Aitken defended his mergers by 
conducting a press campaign intended to shape public opinion and 
minimize the damage of such attacks. In newspapers that printed 
his point of view without alteration, Aitken argued that the 
consolidation and rationalisation of Canada*s major cement 
companies lowered the costs of production and therefore would
9E.C. Drury, Farmer Premier (Toronto, 1966), p. 53. In 
1909-10, Drury was the informal leader of the coalition of farm 
organisations which attacked tariffs in general and the cement 
merger and Aitken in particular.
30 .On 15 September, 1909, Aitken wrote the following to his
lawyer and principal confidant, Charles Cahan: '’Owing to the
importance of the [Canada Cement Company], I think we are liable
to attack." It was to be a prescient comment. BBK, G/3/9.
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eventually lead to lower cement prices for the consumer.11 
Aitken was correct in a long-term sense but this did not change 
the fact that, in its first year of operations, Canada Cement 
kept prices firm and may even have raised prices in regions like 
the Maritimes and Western Canada thus supporting the allegations 
in the press.12
While Aitken could point to the existence of a number of 
independent Canadian cement companies and the eventual decline of 
cement prices to counter the allegation of monopoly, he could not 
defend the merger against the charge of stock-watering as it was
^In a letter dated 10 January 1910, Aitken wrote the 
following to The Times upon their request for information on the 
cement merger: "If you want a defence of the consolidation of 
Cement Companies, I will be very glad to write you a defence 
providing you agree to publish it as I have written it, or not 
publish it at all." He then peevishly added: "On the other hand, 
if you want a condemnation of the Canada Cement Company, I would 
be pleased to refer you to some of my esteemed friends who are so 
anxious to protect the long-suffering consumers." BBK, A/51/misc 
T.
^ h i s  was even admitted by a Liberal member of Parliament 
who wrote a confidential letter to Prime Minister Laurier 
defending Canada Cement: "Two or three years ago the price of
cement was so low in Canada that most of the factories were 
operated at a loss. After the merger was effected the prices 
were raised but not unreasonably and not more than to allow a 
reasonable profit... Prices were lowered toward the latter part 
of last summer and are now lower than the prices fixed after the 
forming of the merger. There is yet a strong competition between 
the merger and the many non-merger companies, and this 
competition will ensure a continuance of reasonable prices to the 
consumer." Laurier Papers, NAC, MB 26, G, Reel C900, letter, 
Miller to Laurier, 16 December 1910. Based on allegations 
contained in the Grain Growers Guide. R.T. Naylor, op.cit.. p. 
190, states that "[t]he merger coincided with a great building 
boom in Canada, and as a result the average price of cement in 
Winnipeg rose immediately from $1.80 to $2.40 per barrel."
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popularly understood. Advising one of his RSC managers that it 
was "useless to argue that the present capitalisation of the
Canada Cement Company is justified”, Aitken admitted that the 
common stock issue had "discounted Canada's future growth and 
development" —  like every other high-risk flotation of the day, 
he might have added. The controlling shareholders of the 
companies then being consolidated by Aitken became increasingly 
concerned and they appealed to him to keep a lower profile. By 
the end of October, 1909, Aitken felt obliged to drop other 
consolidation schemes that had been in the works for months:
I do not believe I can take any interest in any more 
consolidations at the present time. My friends have 
asked me not to make any further consolidations,
because it is thought that any further developments
along other lines by me will tend to interfere with the 
consolidations already accomplished... I do not think 
further consolidations would be favorably received, and 
would result in considerable outcry.
By late 1910, the merger movement that had commenced with 
the Amalgamated Asbestos and Canada Cement consolidations had 
turned into a flood, and the Laurier government came under 
increasing pressure to do something about the situation. In
November of that year, the cement merger began to be criticised 
in the House of Commons by the opposition. The Laurier
33BBK, letter, Aitken to Killam, 20 November 1909, 
A/36/Killam.
^BBK, letter, Aitken to A.W. MacArthur of the Standard 
Ideal Company, Ltd., 30 October 1909, A/37/misc Mc-Mac.
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government responded by promising remedial measures in the
current Parliamentary session.25 Aitken*s business colleagues
became nervous about the possibility that this new legislation
would directly attack Canada Cement and Canadian Car and they
reminded Aitken, who at times appeared infuriatingly oblivious to
the political dangers involved, to keep himself out of the public 
36eye.
The following month, a deputation of nearly 1,000 farmers
representing the major farm organisations of Canada arrived in
Ottawa, virtually storming the House of Commons, to place their
17petitions before the Laurier government. The following day, 
Laurier reassured one of his Members of Parliament that he
intended to keep the tariff on cement despite the immense
political pressure for its removal but told his political ally 
*'to gauge public sentiment very closely in your section of the 
community. The matter is not free from some danger, though I 
think we may be able to overcome it." He then reflected that 
"[t]he resolutions presented by the farmers yesterday are so 
exaggerated that I believe they would rather defeat
25HCDI 16 November 1909, pp. 106-07.
^^BBK, letters, Aitken and H.C. Blair, 22 November 1909 and 
24 November 1909, A/30/misc Ba-Bl; letters, Thomson and Butler,
26 November 1909 and 27 November 1909, and Butler to Aitken, 27 
November 1909, A/3 0/misc Bo-Bu.
^Canadian Annual Review. 1910, pp. 328-335.
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themselves.1,38 Nevertheless, Laurier recognised the political
danger of his government not taking some action and in a dramatic
reversal a few months later decided that the tariff on cement
39would have to be reduced after all.
In January, 1910, Laurier's new Minister of Labour, 
Mackenzie King, presented a novel piece of antitrust legislation 
in the House of Commons entitled the Combines Investigation Act 
which was ostensibly intended to deal with all forms of 
monopoly. The opposition continued to clamour for Canada
Cement's prosecution under the old anti-combines law but King
21 , refused to commit the government. Instead, during the second
reading of the new legislation, he held up Canada Cement as an
example of the benefits which could flow from big business. The
opposition countered by using Canada Cement as the chief
18 . .Laurier Papers, NAC, MG 26, G, Reel C900, letter, Laurier
to Miller, 17 December 1910.
19By January, 1911, a tariff agreement had been reached 
between Canada and the United States in which a majority of 
natural products would be admitted free (Schedule A) and the 
remainder, admitted at lower or identical duties (Schedule B). A 
very few manufactured products from Canada were to be allowed 
into the United States at a lower rate (Schedule C) while duties 
on a few American manufactures, most notably cement, were to be 
significantly reduced (Schedule D). The agreement and the 
reduction in the cement tariff were never implemented as a 
consequence of the Liberal's election defeat in September 1911. 
Canadian Annual Review. 1911, pp. 28-30? M.B. Percy, K.H. Norrie 
and R.G. Johnston, "Reciprocity and the Canadian General Election 
of 1911", EEH, vol. XIX, no. 4 (October 1982).
2DHCD, 18 January 1910, pp. 2057-2060.
^HCD. 24 January 1910, pp. 2296-2297.
139
illustration of the evils produced by mergers.22
The legislation passed into law but was not used against 
Canada Cement nor any of the other numerous amalgamations which 
sprang into existence during the merger wave. Nor was there any 
indication that Laurier wanted the legislation used against such 
companies. His minister, Mackenzie King, although he appeared to 
be interested in the issue of combines and had worked hard 
producing a very complex and subtle piece of legislation, was not 
a trust buster. On the contrary, he greatly admired big 
business. He had become familiar with the organisation and 
operation of modern industrial enterprises while studying 
political economy at Harvard University before his entrance into
. 23Canadian politics. In the process, Mackenzie King became an 
advocate of large organisations in general and big business in 
particular and he had no intention of drafting a law that would 
impede what he saw as a natural and progressive development. He 
viewed American antitrust law as basically mistaken in that it 
attacked all large organisations destroying the good "monopolies" 
along with the bad, as he explained to his colleagues in 
Parliament:
^HCD. 12 April 1910, pp.6802-6934.
.M. Dawson, William Lvon Mackenzie King: A Political
Biography (London, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 198-205. F.A. McGregor,
The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King: 1911-1919 (Toronto, 1962), 
p. 40.
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The legislation differs...from legislation of a like nature 
which has been introduced in other countries in that it is 
not aimed against combines or mergers as such, but rather 
against the exercise...of the powers which they get from 
that form of organization. This is an age of organization 
and not merely of local or national competition but of 
world-wide competition and any industry or any nation which 
wishes to hold its own in the field of competition must do 
much in the way of perfecting organization. A highly 
organized industry should, from the facilities it has of 
improving production, lead to greater efficiency and 
economies of one kind and another, which should...benefit 
the consuming public.
Relying mainly on investigation and publicity rather than 
punitive measures, the Combines Investigation Act required a 
complaint alleging an abuse of monopoly power to be laid by at 
least six persons. This would be followed by a judicial review 
determining if orima facie grounds existed for the allegation, 
and, if there were such grounds, a Board would then be organised 
to investigate and report. By not providing any administrative 
machinery, Mackenzie King ensured that the costs of the complex 
procedure rested on the applicants thus safeguarding companies 
against frivolous complaints. In fact, the legislation was only 
used once in nine years because of its complexity and expense. 
This did not disturb King or the Conservatives who were swept 
into office the following year. The majority of politicians of 
both parties simply had no commitment to the objectives of
24HCD, 18 January 1910, p. 2057.
141
antitrust policy.
The merger movement continued unabated during 1910 and 1911 
and Laurier was increasingly pestered about Canada Cement, stock- 
watering and promoters' profiteering. By this time, however, 
Laurier was absorbed in finding a more universal solution to the 
political problem of calming agrarian dissent while at the same 
time retaining the support of manufacturers in central and 
eastern Canada. Political circumstances in the United States had 
finally shifted enough to make trade reciprocity with Canada not 
only acceptable but desirable. On the Canadian side, the 
explosion of agrarian dissent in 1910 seemed to make free trade 
with the United States, at least in natural products, farm 
implements and cement, a political necessity. A prospective 
agreement was presented in Parliament in January, 1911. To keep 
the manufacturers happy, the agreement was limited to natural 
products with two exceptions intended to keep the agricultural 
interests satisfied; the tariff on agricultural machinery and
nc
See M. Bliss, "Another Anti-Trust Tradition; Canadian 
Anti-Combines Policy, 1889-1910", op.cit.? P.K Gorecki and W.T. 
Stanbury, o p .cit.; and R.T. Naylor, op.cit.
^ p o n  being asked again why his government was refusing to 
remove the duty on cement, Laurier petulantly sent one Western 
farmer a copy of the Combines Investigation Act asking the man 
why he along with others who had apparently suffered so much from 
the cement combine had not taken advantage of the legislation. 
Laurier Papers, NAC, MG 26, Reel C900, letters, J.R. Dutton of 
Riverside Farms, Manitoba, and Laurier, 8 February 1911 and 14 
February 1911.
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27Portland cement would be removed.
Laurier had hoped that the Combines Investigation Act would 
temporarily protect his government against attacks for inaction 
on the "combines" and stock-watering until the tariff agreement 
was ratified by both governments. The strategy was not entirely 
successful. In February, 1911, demands were made for a Royal 
Commission of investigation into the connection between mergers
and inflation as well as into the damage caused by high-risk
. 28methods of flotation. Robert Borden, the leader of the
Conservative opposition, attacked government inaction on the 
merger question. He pointed out two types of consolidation that 
were, in his opinion, prima facie injurious: "those which are
created for the purpose of excluding competition and raising 
prices, and those the capitalization of which is very
29exaggerated.”
HCD, 26 January 1911, pp. 2440-2476? L. E. Ellis, 
op.cit.. pp. 11-70; C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: 
A History of Canadian External Policies. 1861-1921 (Toronto, 
1977), pp. 122-149; R.C. Brown and R. Cook, Canada. 1896-1921: A 
Nation Transformed (Toronto, 1974), pp. 162-187.
2BHCD, 2 February 1911, pp. 2927-2940. It was popularly 
believed that the inflation of the period was directly related to 
the higher commodity prices imposed by mergers. This was given 
scholarly acceptance with the appearance of a popular yet 
"scholarly" book by J.J. Harpell entitled Canadian National 
Economy, the Causes of High Prices and Their Effect Upon the 
Country. MT. 25 March 1911, p. 1232.
29HCD. 2 February 1911, p. 2956. Borden only wanted to 
embarrass the government. He was a personal friend of Max Aitken 
and an accomplished corporate lawyer familiar with high-risk
finance and sympathetic to its methods.
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Although King claimed that the Combines Investigation Act 
was sufficient to deal with all the abuses of monopoly power, the 
opposition increasingly shifted focus, urging the government to 
pass securities legislation to deal with the abuses of promoters. 
To “avoid the evils of high finance" as exemplified in the United
States, Canada should, they argued, "regulate the issue of
. . . 30securities by all public companies." Questions then began to
31focus on the Stelco merger. On 25 May 1911, the bombshell fell 
directly on Max Aitken when a senior officer and major 
shareholder of Canada Cement went public with his allegations of 
profiteering. The matter immediately became a sensation in the
32 . . .press. Editorials viciously attacking Canada Cement and Aitken 
began to appear throughout the country. The Toronto Globe 
asserted that Canadians in all parts of the nation were up in 
arms against the Canada Cement merger and that the feelings of 
the people warranted "drastic action by the Government."33
5.2 The Fleming assault: the reality of business and politics
Mackenzie King and the Combines Investigation Act turned out
33HCD. 2 February 1911, pp. 2950-2951.
^HCD, 19 July 1911, p. 9690.
^BBK, Montreal Star. 12 May 1911, G/19/Borden
correspondence
33BBK, H/81/newspaper cuttings, various newspapers.
Quotation is from a comment on the Toronto Globe attack in the
Montreal Star, dated 26 May 1911.
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to be far less of a threat to Aitken than dissatisfied business 
colleagues. The danger emanated from the hard-nosed nature of 
the merger negotiations themselves. Aitken was successful 
because of his ability to make generous promises to prospective 
merger companies and then pay the lowest prices possible for 
their properties. Initial figures were invariably deflated as 
more careful assessments were made of asset value and additional 
amounts were deducted for depreciation. Moreover, in the later 
stages, Aitken pressured controlling shareholders to accept
securities in the new company rather than cash as initially
31 .agreed-upon. Aitken became more forceful as the vendors became 
increasingly committed to the merger and could only with the 
greatest of difficulty and expense quit the negotiations. Aitken 
played the game harder and shrewder than any promoter of his day. 
This was bound to create disagreements and mistrust particularly 
when the amounts and the terms that some of the rival firms were 
"coming in at" were purposely concealed from the other firms.25
In the cement merger, the opening offers, made contingent on 
adjustments for depreciation, were so generous that one company
31 . . .In the Canada Cement merger, Aitken decided that, while
cash would be offered for the initial properties, the promotional
syndicate would pay no more than $4.5 million in cash. Any
further expenses for properties had to be paid in Canada Cement
stock rather than cash. BBK, letter, Aitken to Thorn, 27 August
1909, A/32/ Canada Cement.
•^BBK, G/3/examinations for discovery of J.S. Irvin and Hugh 
Fleming, 23 November 1912, 8 October 1913, and 24 October 1913.
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official referred to Aitken and the promotional syndicate as the 
"gold wagon” .36 Upon investigation of the value of inventories 
as well as the condition of the plant, downward adjustments were 
made by Aitken.37 The initial euphoria quickly gave way to 
suspicion, envy and mutual recriminations as some owners felt 
that they were being taken in at an unfair value relative to the 
generous remuneration their rivals were thought to be 
receiving. And then there were the inducements —  the "secret” 
payments of common stock that were made by the promotional 
syndicate to certain officers of certain companies for convincing 
their fellow directors and shareholders of the advisability of 
giving up their corporate autonomy in favour of a
TO
consolidation. The officers and controlling shareholders left
^BBK, letter, R. Richards of the Canadian Portland Cement 
Company to Aitken, 19 August 1909, A/32/Canada Cement, Canadian 
Portland Cement: "Hope you are going along successfully and that
no one is letting the gold wagon pass without taking their 
share."
77 , ,
BBK, letters, Aitken to Canadian Portland Cement and 
Lehigh Portland Cement, 4 October 1909, A/32/Canada Cement;
letters, Cahan to Aitken, 10 October 1909, 23 November 1909,
A/31/Cahan.
TO
BBK, letter, General Manager, Belleville Portland Cement 
Company, to Aitken, 12 October 1909, A/32/Canada Cement,
Belleville Portland Cement Co.
39 .J.S. Irvin, the managing director of International 
Portland Cement and the industry "insider" working on behalf of 
the promotional syndicate, wrote the following to Aitken after 
his meeting in New York with Mr. Kelly, the President of Vulcan 
Portland Cement: "Mr. Kelly I find to be a gentleman, a shrewd 
business man, but I fancy, not above looking for a little inside 
profit." BBK, letter, Irvin to Aitken, 5 June 1909, A/32/Canada 
Cement, J.S. Irvin.
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out of such arrangements understandably felt betrayed upon 
discovering the existence of such payments.
The ownership interests of Sir Sandford Fleming, Canada*s 
most famous railway surveyor and engineer and a director in the 
Canadian Pacific Railway, were at the core of the cement merger. 
An old man by 1909, Sir Sandford was the nominal president of the 
International Portland Cement, Western Canada Cement and Coal, 
and Eastern Portland Cement companies, while his ownership 
interests were represented by his son, Hugh Fleming. The cement 
companies themselves were being run by one of the most talented 
cement managers in Canada, Joseph S. Irvin. The International 
cement factory was one of the most modern and technically 
advanced cement plants in Canada. The Eastern Portland Cement 
plant was just being constructed in 1909 with the most modern 
cement manufacturing equipment available and other firms were 
apprehensive about the competition they would soon be facing from
41the newest plant m  the Dominion.
But not was all well with the Fleming interests. Western 
Canada Cement, known as the Exshaw company because of its
^MT, 17 February 1905, p. 1092; International Portland 
Cement Co.,Limited, Souvenir of the History. Development and 
Future of Portland Cement (Ottawa, 1909).
^BBK, letter, J.M. Kilbourn, President of the Lakefield 
Portland Cement Co. to Aitken, 15 July 1909, A/32/Canada Cement, 
Kilbourn.
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location at Exshaw, Alberta, had never recovered from a series of 
strikes during 1907-08. It was now overly burdened with interest 
payments to its British bondholders and outstanding loans to the 
Bank of Montreal. In 1909, Exshaw was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The fact that Exshaw, like the International 
company, was technologically one of the foremost cement plants in 
Canada, made it that much more desirable to rescue.42 Irvin 
decided that an amalgamation with the other Fleming cement 
enterprises was necessary to save Exshaw. In this way, Exshaw 
could draw on the financial strength of International and Eastern 
until it was back on its feet and could take advantage of its 
industrial capacity.
Irvin called upon Exshaw's largest creditor, the Bank of 
Montreal, to elicit its opinion concerning the merger rescue 
scheme. The Bank supported Irvin's proposal seeing in it the 
possibility of salvaging its own investment. Sir Edward 
Clouston, the Bank of Montreal's general manager, suggested, 
however, that Irvin seek the assistance of a professional 
financial promoter to put together the merger. He recommended 
Max Aitken.43 Clouston, in association with Sir William van
42MT, 10 August 1906, p. 195.
43 . . .BBK, G/3/exammations for discovery. This is Irvin's 
evidence in his examination for discovery in a law suit launched 
by the Bank of Montreal against Irvin, Sir Sandford Fleming and 
Hugh Fleming on their personal guarantees for the Exshaw 
company's indebtedness. Aitken claimed that he was approached by 
Irvin before the Bank of Montreal was involved. This is unlikely 
given the Bank of Montreal's interest in the Exshaw company and
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Horne, the one-time general manager of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, had previously dealt with Aitken in ventures such as the 
Demerara Electric Company, and had come to the conclusion that he 
was the nation’s most able financier despite his young age.
Aitken took control of the merger and turned it into a far 
more ambitious project. Moving Irvin to the sidelines, Aitken 
invited further companies to join the merger. Everything went 
relatively smoothly until Aitken refused to go along with the 
valuation placed on the Exshaw company by Irvin and the Flemings 
thereby revealing their conflicting objectives. Aitken wanted 
the outcome of the merger to be the strongest cement company 
possible and any property that entered at a value substantially 
above its real worth would weaken the whole. On the other hand, 
Irvin and the Flemings only wanted a merger because they saw it 
as a way of saving the Exshaw company. They refused to accept 
Aitken's agenda. With all the other agreements in place, Hugh 
Fleming and Irvin held up agreement on the International and 
Eastern companies to force Aitken into immediately accepting the 
virtually bankrupt Exshaw company into the merger at a generous 
price. Aitken refused. Instead, he pressured International's 
shareholders into accepting a securities-only payout even though 
some cash had originally been promised. In addition, Aitken 
forced Irvin and Fleming to accept less for the Eastern
its close relationship with Aitken during the course of the 
merger. BBK, letter, Aitken to Doble, 29 January 1913, G/3/7.
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properties. He then delayed the date on which the Exshaw company 
was to enter the merger thus further weakening its already 
fragile position.
This infuriated Irvin and Hugh Fleming who then called upon 
the assistance of Fleming*s aged father, Sir Sandford, a man 
whose reputation the promotional syndicate had already used in 
making him the Honorary President of Canada Cement. Irvin and 
the younger Fleming urged Sir Sandford to use all his political 
and financial connections to pressure Aitken and the promotional
. . .  45syndicate into buying Exshaw. In February, 1910, Sir Sandford
began to approach his fellow Canada Cement directors about the 
situation. To his surprise, he found that they implicitly 
supported the actions of the promotional syndicate? Canada Cement 
was in no hurry to purchase the bankrupt Exshaw plant at an 
inflated price. Realising this, Sir Sandford changed his tactics 
and tried to embarrass his fellow directors into immediately 
purchasing the Exshaw plant by alleging that the organisation of 
the company itself was based on a fraud.
As Sir Sandford began to make inquiries about the actions of
^BBK, letter, Aitken to A.R. Doble, 29 January 1913, 
G/3/Fleming suit.
^BBK, G/3/examinations for discovery, evidence of Hugh 
Fleming dated 8 October 1913, and evidence of J.S. Irvin dated 23 
November 1912.
46Sandford Fleming Papers, AONT, MU 1051, Envelope 49.
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the promotional syndicate, Canada Cement*s executive directors 
and general manager took defensive action and refused to divulge 
further information. In a fury, Sir Sandford sent formal letters
to the President and the Vice-President of Canada Cement
protesting against the hiding of information from a fellow
director. He demanded an immediate investigation of the manner 
in which the company had been organised by the Bond and Share Co. 
—  the enterprise incorporated and managed by Aitken to organise 
the Canada Cement merger. Before the general shareholders 
meeting in March, 1910, Sir Sandford refused to accept the Report 
of the Board of Directors. He argued that the first line of the 
company*s balance sheet, stating that the cost of the properties 
entering the company was $27 million, was patently false and 
should be amended. His fellow directors overruled his objection 
and the Report was adopted and presented to the shareholders. As 
news of the dispute began to leak to the press along with Sir 
Sandford*s determination to continue asking questions, the 
company finally agreed to the appointment of two lawyers to
investigate Aitken*s handling of the merger.47
In one respect, the inquiry could hardly have been 
perceived as impartial by Sir Sandford, Hugh Fleming and Joseph 
Irvin. The two lawyers appointed to conduct the investigation 
were H. Almon Lovett and John W. Orde. Lovett was an old and 
close associate of Aitken as well as Canada Cement*s solicitor. 
Orde had acted for Irvin, Fleming and International Portland 
Cement during the protracted merger negotiations but was 
subsequently retained by the Bank of Montreal in its suit against 
Sir Sandford, J.S. Irvin, Hugh Fleming and the Exshaw company for 
the recovery of money owed to the Bank by Exshaw and its personal 
guarantors. Sandford Fleming Papers, AONT, MU 1051, Envelope 49, 
printed material contained in “letter from Sir Sandford Fleming 
with his resignation as Honorary President". BBK,
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At the conclusion of the internal inquiry in the summer of 
1910, Canada Cement was advised that no basis existed for a legal 
action by Canada Cement against the Bond and Share Co. Aitken 
and the promotional syndicate had received just over $21 million 
par value in securities; this was worth, in real terms, 
approximately $13 million. Out of this amount, the Bond and 
Share Co. had paid $7 million in cash for the properties entering 
the merger, and transferred another $1.77 million in cash to 
Canada Cement for working capital. This Sir Sandford recognised 
but what he refused to accept was that much of the common stock 
did not remain in the hands of the Bond and Share Co. —  it had 
been shot through to the many members of the underwriting 
syndicates who, in turn, passed on a large percentage to brokers 
and finally to investors who received a 25 per cent bonus of
AO
common stock for every preference share purchased. Sir
Sandford either did not understand the principles of high-risk 
finance or found it convenient to feign ignorance. At any rate, 
he insisted that the Bond and Share Co., in particular Aitken, 
had misappropriated all of the common shares.
G/3/examinations for discovery, evidence of J.S. Irvin dated 23 
November 1912, and evidence of Hugh Fleming dated 8 October 1913.
48Sandford Fleming Papers, AONT, MU 1051, Envelope 49, 
letter, Sir Sandford to W.C. Edwards, President, Canada Cement 
Company, 13 February 1911.
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In reality, the profit was considerably less. It appears 
that the Bond and Share Co. itself may have realised no more than 
$25,000 profit on the promotion.49 Other evidence indicates that 
the RSC received $2 million par value worth of common stock, 
approximately $400,000 in real terms after Canada Cement*s stock 
was listed on the exchanges, for guaranteeing the sale of $4 
million of bonds. In addition, Aitken received $378,500 par 
value in common stock for acting as an underwriter in his 
personal capacity as well as $600,000 par value common stock in 
his capacity as a trustee for other underwriters who preferred 
not to be identified by other members of the promotional 
syndicate.33 Few in the financial world, particularly Aitken,
considered this a generous remuneration given the substantial 
risk undertaken by the organisational and distributional 
syndicates. All the other Canada Cement directors refused to 
accept Sir Sandford's contention that Aitken and the Bond and
^BBK, letter, Aitken to V.M. Drury, 1 April 1912, 
G/3/Fleming suit.
^ S E ,  MS 18,000/153B/335, application to grant a quotation 
for $19 million ordinary shares of Canada Cement Company, Limited 
dated 24 May 1911, list of common shareholders dated 1 February 
1911.
^BBK, letters, Aitken to V.M. Drury, 1 April 1912, and 
Aitken to A.R. Doble, 1 April 1912, G/3/Fleming suit.
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Share Co. had fraudulently misappropriated over $12 million.
As anger mounted over Sir Sandford's incessant attacks on 
Canada Cement, the directors then decided to circumvent Irvin and 
the Flemings and obtain the Exshaw property in another manner 
thus escalating the conflict. Most of Exshaw's debentures were 
actually held in Britain. Since 1908-09, when Exshaw first 
encountered serious financial problems, an English Bondholders' 
Committee had been established to protect the interests of 
British investors. Canada Cement began to negotiate directly 
with the Committee proposing that they exchange their debentures 
at somewhat less than par for Canada Cement bonds. Upon 
discovering these negotiations, Sir Sandford made a counter­
proposal. A new company would be incorporated to take over the 
British-held debentures at par and, with money derived from a new 
issue of securities, Exshaw would slowly dispose of its 
indebtedness and become profitable. The English Bondholders' 
Committee rejected Sir Sandford's proposal in favour of Canada 
Cement's offer. The deal was completed in early 1911 at which 
time the Exshaw company was liquidated and the Flemings and Irvin 
were left owing money to the secured creditors, in particular the
5> .Sir Sandford later lowered this figure to $2,878 million 
after taking into consideration the existing market value of the 
securities and the amount paid out in cash by the promotional 
syndicate. Sandford Fleming Papers, AONT, MU 1051, Envelope 49, 
letter, Sir Sandford Fleming to W.C. Edwards, President, Canada 
Cement Company, 5 January 1911.
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Bank of Montreal.53 During liquidation, the Exshaw cement plant 
was sold by the Sheriff to Canada Cement for the bargain price of 
$1 million.51
Sir Sandford blamed Aitken for everything that had 
transpired. He turned to the political arena in a last desperate 
effort to force some kind of settlement and to seek revenge. 
Sending his booklet of allegations to Prime Minister Laurier, Sir 
Sandford stated that: ”1 have under advice omitted the name of 
the person who has pocketed so many millions wrongfully (viz.
CK
William Maxwell Aitken)." Spotting a potential problem and out 
of respect for the old man, Laurier immediately agreed to see Sir
eg ,
Sandford but could not assuage him. When his request failed, 
Sir Sandford demanded that Laurier order a public investigation
LSE 18000/153B/3 35, 1910-11 correspondence of the Trustees 
for the English Bondholders of the Western Canada Cement and Coal 
Company, Limited, in application to grant a quotation for $19 
million ordinary shares of Canada Cement Company, Limited dated 
24 May 1911; Sandford Fleming Papers, AONT, MU 1051, Envelope 
49. Aitken acted as Canada Cement's representative in the 
negotiations with the Trustees of the English Bondholders' 
Committee? BBK, 1910 correspondence, Aitken and Dunsford, 
H/85/Western Canada Cement controversy. Aitken used the services 
of lawyer and friend R.B. Bennett to keep him posted on Exshaw 
from Alberta. Bennett Papers, NAC, MG 26, K, Reel M3174, 
telegram, Aitken to Bennett, 23 June 1910? letter, Aitken to 
Bennett, 31 August 1910.
^MT, 11 February 1911, p. 648.
®Laurier Papers, NAC, M.G. 26, G, Reel C902, letter, Sir 
Sandford Fleming to Laurier, 5 April 1910.
^Laurier Papers, NAC, M.G. 26, G, Reel C902, letter, 
Laurier to Fleming, 7 April 1911.
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into the organisation of Canada Cement by laying his allegations 
of fraud before the Parliamentary Private Bills Committee on 12 
May 1911.57 At first, the government announced that it was going 
to order the inquiry, but reversed itself soon after. Many 
prominent Liberals had supported Aitken in his struggle with Sir 
Sandford and it is possible that Laurier was afraid of where an 
investigation might end if there was even a drop of truth to the 
allegations.
Laurier also had more pressing problems that summer. He was 
fighting an election on the issue of implementing his reciprocal 
trade agreement with the United States. Most of the opposition 
to the agreement, and hence to his Party's re-election, came from 
the powerful manufacturers and financiers of central Canada, 
people like Aitken and his business associates. Aitken was 
particularly dangerous. He had poured his own money into a 
periodical he created specifically to fight the reciprocity 
agreement with the United States. Aitken and his financial and 
industrial associates were at one on the issue of tariffs. They 
wanted substantial protection against American imports for 
private and, in some cases, for ideological reasons. Endorsing 
the ideas of Joseph Chamberlain, they argued for an Imperial 
zollverein. Aitken and his colleagues were dubious of Laurier's
^BBK, article from the Montreal Star. 12 May 1911, 
G/19/Borden.
®BBK, telegram, Doble to Aitken, 18 May 1911, H/80/Doble.
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commitment to the Empire and his proposed trade agreement with 
the United States only served to confirm their suspicions.
Aitken, himself, believed that Canada was an integral and 
permanent part of the Empire and he drew no distinction between 
being a citizen of Canada or a citizen of Britain —  they were 
one and the same. Following the Stelco merger in July, 1910, 
Aitken travelled to Britain on business. His British associates, 
such as Ian Hamilton Benn and Bonar Law, were members of the 
Unionist Party with seats in the House of Commons. The men had 
enough respect for Aitken that they encouraged him to find a 
suitable seat and run for the Unionist Party. This he did and 
before the year was out, Aitken became the elected member for 
Ashton-under-Lyne and one of a small group of colonials who had
, , TO
succeeded m  entering the House of Commons. He viewed this as 
a way to gain some political experience before entering the rough 
and tumble of Canadian politics.
Aitken and the leader of the Conservative opposition, Robert 
Borden, kept in touch in the months preceding the Canadian 
election. Borden assumed that Aitken would immediately give up 
his seat in Britain and come to Canada to fight the election on 
behalf of the Conservatives and become the leader of the Maritime
59 . .Aitken*s election is covered admirably by A.J.P. Taylor in 
Beaverbrook (London, 1972), pp.43-68.
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wing of the Party.® Aitken and his Canada Cement associates 
were worried about the bad publicity the company was receiving as 
a consequence of Sir Sandford*s campaign and Laurier was 
concerned about Aitken being directly involved in the coming 
election fight. A deal was struck as disclosed in this letter to 
Aitken:
...Brierly is to go to Ottawa and assure Sir Wilfred 
[Laurier] and his ministers that you have absolutely 
given up any idea of entering Canadian politics and 
have decided to accept a very responsible position in 
the Unionist party in England. This he thinks will get 
at the root of the whole evil as he states they have 
been very much frightened at Ottawa that you were 
coming out to take charge of New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia on behalf of the Conservative party. He further 
states the Government do not want an investigation in 
the Canada Cement Co. as they do not know where these 
investigations would end. In fact they are afraid of 
an investigation and as soon as they know that there is 
no possibility of your entering Canadian politics they 
will do everything to prevent an investigation.
Aitken had previously attempted to defend himself and the 
promotional syndicate publicly during the Fleming attack but had 
repeatedly been warned not to do so. Now, he would be required 
to keep permanently silent. Reluctantly he followed the advice 
of his Canadian colleagues and accepted their statements that the
®BBK, letters, Borden to Aitken, 9 May 1911, 24 May 1911,
G/19/Borden.
®3BK, letter, Drury to Aitken, 13 July 1911, G/19/Canada 
Cement.
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6 2whole controversy would disappear within weeks. All
miscalculated the long term consequences of Sir Sandford's
campaign, however, and the repercussion that would flow from 
Aitken not answering Sir Sandford*s charges. The Conservatives 
went on to win the election without Aitken*s assistance and no 
investigation was ever ordered. Although Canada Cement soon
recovered from the bad publicity, Aitken*s reputation would 
remain permanently tarnished. He could never enter Canadian 
politics as his name was now synonymous with fraudulent
profiteering. He decided to permanently reside in Britain where 
the rumours of his Canadian "misdeeds" were of lesser
consequence.
S BBK, letter, Drury to Aitken, 13 July 1911, G/19/Canada 
Cement; letter, Aitken to Doble, 20 June 1911, H/80/Doble.
CHAPTER SIX
THE PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF A NEW SERIES OF 
MERGER STATISTICS FOR CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY,
1885-1918
6.1 Mergers in comparative economic history
Mergers appear to be an integral part of the transformation 
of the most advanced industrial nations taking place at the turn 
of the century —  a metamorphosis referred to as the "second 
industrial revolution." This phrase, as argued in the previous 
Chapters, encompasses abrupt technological, organisational and 
financial changes. Mergers were in fact a product of all three 
factors. High through-put technology required larger plants and 
more sophisticated organisations —  a need which could be 
immediately satisfied through rapid external growth. Immediate 
demands for large amounts of capital to meet the high fixed costs 
imposed by new technology produced a demand for security 
financing and resulted in the separation of ownership from 
control. While some acquisitions and mergers were a response to 
the technological and organisational needs of the day, as they 
continue to be today, the majority of the great multi-firm 
consolidations of the gilded age were often rooted in the 
impatient desire to be immediately large and noticeable and 
thereby grab the attention of the average investor.
Some scholars have concluded that the sudden bursts of
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external corporate growth we call merger waves accelerated the 
development of the modern industrial economy. According to Ralph 
Nelson, mergers were a "basic force" in moulding the industrial 
structure of twentieth century America. Nelson generated a new 
series of merger statistics for American companies covering the 
period, 1895-1920, specifically to analyse the impact of the 
turn of the century spurt of consolidations —  the Great Merger 
Wave —  on the existing structure of the corporate economy of the 
United States. Nelson concluded that the Great Merger Wave was 
the turning point in the evolution of the American economy. It 
transformed "many industries, formerly characterized by many 
small and medium-sized firms, into those in which one or a few 
very large enterprises occupied leading positions" and laid "the 
foundations for the industrial structure that has characterized 
most of American industry" ever since.1
On the other hand, Alfred Chandler has singled out vertical 
integration rather than mergers as the operative factor in this 
fundamental transformation. The inference is that mergers played 
a relatively neutral role in the emergence of the American 
corporate economy. Most mergers involved horizontal integration 
but those that survived were found to have adopted a strategy of 
vertical integration after their brief burst of external growth. 
This integration, in a backward direction to secure inputs and in
R^. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry. 1895-1956 
(Princeton, N.J., 1959), p. 5.
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a forward direction into distribution and marketing, was more 
often achieved through more gradual, internal expansion. 
Although accelerating this process for some firms and at certain 
times, mergers were not essential to the emergence of the modern 
business enterprise.2
Both Chandler and Nelson paint too black and white a picture 
of the consequences of the Great Merger Wave. Certainly, as 
Chandler states, most of the mergers involved mainly horizontal
3as opposed to vertical integration. Nevertheless, varying 
degrees of vertical integration were achieved in most mergers 
even while they can be characterised as predominately horizontal. 
Even in cases where a negligible amount of vertical integration 
was produced, the consequent scale of the new enterprises 
necessitated such profound organisational and technological 
changes that they were pushed into a strategy of vertical 
integration in order to survive. Moreover, this aspect of 
mergers was often predicted by the organisers themselves.4
2 . .A.D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution
in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 331-39.
■^ This applies as much to Canada as to the United States. 
Over 80 per cent of all mergers between 1885 and 1918 were 
horizontal in nature. See Table 24 in Appendix D.
^.P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers.
1854-1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); H.O. O ’Hagan, Leaves from Mv 
Life. 2 vols. (London, 1929). Max Aitken foresaw the 
organisational difficulties posed by the 11 firm Canada Cement 
merger and procured the most able "outside” professional manager 
he could find for the company. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
Canada Cement immediately embarked upon a strategy of backward 
and forward integration. BBK, 1909 correspondence, Aitken and
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Although firms that remained horizontal consolidations were 
quickly smothered by new competitors, the striking fact remains 
that most mergers evolved into successful enterprises that shaped 
the modern American corporate landscape. In Nelson*s survey of 
the 100 largest American corporations of 1955, 63 had gone
through "important" mergers at some time in their history. Of 
these, 38 had their major merger before 1916, 20 of which could 
be traced directly back to the Great Merger Wave of 1898-1902. 
This contrasts with a mere 11 companies which trace their origins 
to the merger wave of the 1920s —  which, in quantitative terms, 
was larger than the Great Merger Wave. This also compares 
favorably with the fact that only 37 of the 100 largest
corporations of 1955 did not have a demonstrably important merger 
in their history. According to Nelson's definition, an important 
merger includes only those that give a company a leading position
in its industry. This definition rejects all mergers of
indeterminate importance; Nelson thus ensures that he does not
overestimate the impact that mergers likely had on the growth of 
industrial corporations.5
While statistically correct, Nelson may be overstating his 
case by suggesting that the rapid external growth of the Great
F.P. Jones, G/19/Canada Cement.
5R. Nelson, o p .cit. . p. 4. Also see S. Livermore, "The 
Success of Industrial Mergers", QJE. vol. 4, no. 4 (November 
1935).
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Merger Wave 11 laid the foundation” for the industrial structure of 
twentieth century America. Mergers were merely one link in an 
intricate process. Based on the evidence of the Canadian 
experience already presented, it is submitted that the great 
multi-firm consolidations of the gilded age were a response to 
the demands of investors for the securities of large 
manufacturing enterprises —  particularly those perceived to be 
capable of wielding market power. Promoters catapulted a 
proposition into a shape acceptable to investors by melding 
together several similar enterprises, none individually of 
interest to these same investors. The chain of causation ran 
from technology to organisation to finance, with mergers to a 
lesser or greater degree being symptomatic of all three stages 
but with multi-firm consolidations most closely related to the 
factor of financial change.
By virtue of a wealth of American merger statistics, 
gathered mainly in response to antitrust laws, conclusions "about 
mergers and structural change have tended, faute de mieux. to be 
derived from the American experience.”6 The poor quality and 
inconsistent nature of empirical data on merger activity in other 
advanced industrial nations had previously precluded fruitful 
comparisons with the American experience. However, recent
Hannah, "Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 
1880-1918", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1974), 
p. 1.
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empirical studies on early merger activity in Britain and Germany 
now permit some point of comparison.
Leslie Hannah has generated a relatively comprehensive
. . .  . 7series of merger statistics for Britain during the gilded age. 
The results indicate a close correspondence with the American 
evidence in some important respects. Britain experienced a 
dramatic increase in merger activity at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the peak years of which were 1898-1902. Multi-firm 
consolidations comprised the bulk of this activity. This burst 
of activity corresponded with higher than average stock prices. 
There was one crucial difference, however. The Great Merger Wave 
in America "produced" a fundamental change in the nation's 
industrial structure whereas the majority of British mergers 
tended to preserve the existing structure. Multi-firm
consolidations in Britain more resembled the cartel associations 
they evolved out of than the centrally directed, multidivisional 
industrial enterprises then emerging out of the American merger 
wave. It was not until the interwar period, particularly the
merger wave of 1925-1929, that the modern industrial enterprise
8 . . became entrenched m  Britain. Using the 100 largest British
7Ibid..
®L. Hannah, "Visible and Invisible Hands in Great Britain", 
Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of
the Modern Industrial Enterprise, eds. A.D. Chandler and H. Daems 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1980), and The Rise of the Corporate Economy 
(London, 2nd ed., 1983), pp. 22-40.
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companies of 1948 as the standard, Hannah found that the majority 
of the chief mergers in British manufacturing industry occurred 
after, the First World War. Of the 51 companies for which a major 
merger could be clearly identified, 19 were concentrated in the
Q
decade of the 1920s.
In 1982, a sample of the larger industrial mergers in 
Germany during the gilded age was published for the first time in 
English by Richard Tilly. Although the small-scale sampling 
technique used by Tilly clearly delineated it from the more 
comprehensive techniques employed by Nelson and Hannah, the 
timing of merger activity in the three most important industrial 
nations was almost identical. Tilly also concluded that, in 
absolute terms, the German merger wave was smaller than those 
which occurred at the same time in Britain and the United States. 
On the other hand, at least based on Tilly*s rather disparate 
sample, the average German merger was twice as large as the 
average British merger while the average American consolidation 
was several times larger than either.30
9 .L. Hannah, "The Political Economy of Mergers in British 
Manufacturing Industry between the Wars", unpublished D.Phil. 
thesis, Oxford University, 1974, pp. 143-145 and Appendix D.
Tilly, "Mergers, External Growth, and Finance in the 
Development of Large-Scale Enterprise in Germany, 1880-1913", 
JEH, vol. XLII, no. 3 (September 1982).
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In qualitative terms, it appears that the impact of mergers 
in the German case was very similar to the American although 
fewer German companies were propelled into “commanding market 
positions” through merger.^- Such market position was available 
to German firms —  and to British and Canadian firms for that 
matter —  through cartels, an activity penalised in the United 
States by a vigorous antitrust policy. The German cartels 
differed significantly from the British or Canadian variety, 
however, in that their activities extended beyond price-fixing 
into shared control of resources and the establishment of selling 
agencies and “head offices” that coordinated the decision-making
■n
of all the cartel members. The end result was often the same 
kind of vertical integration and multidivisional organisational 
framework beginning to dominate the American corporate economy. 
Moreover, the combinations produced in the German cartel system 
were often “tighter” than the loose affiliations of British firms 
that banded together within the legal framework of a corporation 
but continued to be a disparate collection of family firms
^R. Tilly, o p .cit.
12 . . .R. A. Brady, The Rationalization Movement in German
Industry (Berkeley, 1933)? E. Maschke, "Outline of the History
of German Cartels from 1873 to 1914", Essays in European Economic
History 1709-1914. eds. F. Crouzet, W.H. Chaloner and W.M. Stern
(London, 1969) ; F. Voigt, "German Experience with Cartels and
their Control during Pre-War and Post-War Periods", Competition.
Cartels and their Regulation, ed. J.P. Miller (Amsterdam, 1962)?
J. Kocka, “The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise in
Germany", and L. Hannah, "Mergers, Cartels and Concentration:
Legal Factors in the U.S. and European Experience", Law and the
Formation of the Bio Enterprises in the 19th and Earlv 20th
Centuries. eds. N. Horn and J. Kocka (Gottingen, 1979).
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without central authority and little planning. Many multi-unit 
British consolidations, such as the Calico Printers* Association 
and the Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Company, at 
least initially, did not put in place effective managerial or 
organisational structures unlike their German, American and 
Canadian counterparts.
It may be significant, however, that in Germany*s leading 
industry, merger rather than cartel produced the winning 
combination of vertical integration, organisational structure, 
managerial hierarchy, technological innovation and capital 
availability.34 Tilly concludes that mergers in German heavy 
electrical engineering were "an important part of the recipe" for 
the success of that industry. In fact, one-half of all German 
mergers were concentrated in the heavy industry group, a sector 
in which Germany was a world leader. Thus, mergers, although not 
playing a leading role as illustrated by the impact of the 
cartels on industrial structure, appear to have played more than 
a neutral role in Germany's industrial success. In Britain, 
mergers before 1914 have at best a neutral impact, and at worse a
13 . .L. Hannah, "Visible and Invisible Hands in Great Britain", 
op.cit.. and The Rise of the Corporate Economy, op. cit.. pp. 21- 
26.
14J. Kocka, "Family and Bureaucracy m  German Industrial 
Management, 1850-1914: Siemens in Comparative Perspective", BHR. 
vol. XLV, no. 2 (Summer 1971).
Tilly, op.cit. . p. 642.
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negative effect, on industrial structure.
The preceding comparisons must be heavily qualified by the 
incompatible structure of the merger series generated by Nelson, 
Hannah and Tilly. The German series in particular is different 
in kind from the British and American series and the comments 
concerning the quantitative and qualitative nature of German 
mergers relative to British and American mergers are highly 
tentative. While the basic structure of the Nelson and Hannah 
series is compatible, thus permitting more confidence in Anglo- 
American comparisons, significant variations do exist and these 
must be constantly borne in mind. Previous merger studies for 
Canada covering the same period do exist but they were found too 
sketchy and inadequate to provide a basis of comparison with the 
Nelson and Hannah studies.
6.2 The limitations of previous Canadian studies
The first large-scale empirical study of Canadian merger 
activity was conducted by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS) 
in 1934-35. Their report was published in 1935 as part of the 
Royal Commission on Price Spreads.36 To protect the interests of
Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads (Ottawa, 
1935). Some background to the Bennett government's decision to 
launch the Price Spreads Inquiry of 1934 and to place the 
maverick Conservative H.H. Stevens as its chief investigator can 
be found in J.R.H. Wilbur, "H.H. Stevens and R.B. Bennett, 1930- 
34", CHR, vol. XLIII, no. 1 (March 1962).
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the companies providing information to the DBS, only the 
scantiest of information was included in the Royal Commission 
Report. The annual number of mergers and firm disappearances 
were tabulated for the period 1900-1933. Value was based on 
issued capital until 1920 and net assets after that date but no 
indication of the calculation procedure was provided. No attempt 
was made to calculate a value for firm disappearances. For the 
years before 1920 we have no idea whether issued capital includes 
or excludes bonded debt in addition to equity capital.17 
Moreover, to protect the confidentiality of the firms submitting 
information to the DBS, the Royal Commission Report did not 
identify the firms nor did it indicate the type of firms that 
were included or not included in the sample.
Fortunately, the confidential background report used by the 
Price Spreads Inquiry Commissioners was located. It discloses 
the classes of "industry” included as well as the name of each 
firm along with its "issued capital."38 Quite naturally, the 
Commission's industrial classification scheme differs in some 
respects from the Canadian Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) scheme first introduced m  1948. More significant in
^Ibid.. pp. 28, 331.
^ . H .  Stevens Papers, NAC, MG 27, III, B9, vol. 94, 
"Consolidations in Canadian Industry and Commerce, January 1, 
1900 to December 31, 1933 (Confidential Report)”.
^Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Standard Industrial 
Classification Manual (Ottawa, 1948).
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terms of this study, some of the Commission's classes of industry 
would not fall within the general category of manufacturing 
industry as defined in the 1948 SIC or the most recent Canadian 
SIC.^° These include some mining, quarrying, wholesale and 
retail trade industries. Thus, the DBS series varies from the 
Nelson sample of manufacturing and mining industry and the Hannah 
merger series restricted to manufacturing industry as defined 
under the relevant American and British SIC schemes. The term 
"issued capital" is never defined in the Royal Commission Report 
or in the Commissioners1 confidential background report. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of the "issued capital" of individual 
corporations disclosed in the confidential background report with 
the issued capital figures for the new series presented in
Chapter Seven indicates that "issued capital" included bonded
. . .  . . .  22debt in addition to equity capital in most cases.
Statistics Canada, Standard Industrial Classification 1980 
(Ottawa, 1980) . Figures 5 to 21 in Appendix A refer to the 17 
major manufacturing industry groups under the 1948 SIC.
21 . . ."Consolidations in Canadian Industry and Commerce, January
1, 1900 to December 31, 1933 (Confidential Report)", o p . cit..
In particular, the DBS series includes service sectors such as 
grain-handling, amusements, and a third "miscellaneous" catch-all 
trade category that includes retail operations such as those of 
the United Cigar Stores Ltd. of Canada.
^ h e r e  were a few inconsistencies such as the 1902 Nova
Scotia Steel & Coal merger where bonded debt was not included. 
In addition, the figures were often slightly higher than my own 
figures indicating that the compiler examined the level of issued 
capital a year or two after the merger while my procedure was to 
determine the amount of issued capital within the first six
months of merger or less. "Consolidations in Canadian Industry 
and Commerce, January 1, 1900 to December 31, 1933 (Confidential
Report)", o p . cit.. pp. 11-16.
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J.C. Weldon’s series of mergers in Canadian industry for the 
period 1900-1948, first published in 1966, reworked the DBS 
figures.23 This sample, like the DBS sample, was limited to 
those mergers covered in the leading American and Canadian 
financial manuals and therefore excluded closely-held companies 
as well as smaller publicly-owned companies. While excluding 
some types of service industries such as financial enterprises, 
Weldon’s series includes firms classified as public utilities 
(telephone, shipping lines, together with light, water and power 
companies) and trade and service companies such as movie 
theatres, food and clothing stores as well as other retailers. 
On the other hand, Weldon’s series excludes one manufacturing 
industry —  petroleum refining. This results in a divergence in 
the number of mergers and firm disappearances between the DBS and 
the Weldon series.
The other factor differentiating the DBS and Weldon series 
is the manner in which the value of mergers was estimated. 
Weldon uses "gross assets (less depreciation) of the enterprises 
absorbed in the consolidations" but offers the reader little 
indication of the exact manner in which these "net" asset figures 
were calculated. Where this could not be calculated, Weldon used 
"nominal weights". Again, the formula or method used to
29 . . . .J.C. Weldon, "Consolidations in Canadian Industry, 1900-
1948", Restrictive Trade Practices in Canada: Selected Readings.
ed. L.A. Skeoch (Toronto, 1966).
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calculate these weights is not disclosed, although this procedure 
was "required for less than one-fifth of all mergers*', mainly 
concentrated in the early years.
The DBS and Weldon series do not attempt to cover mergers 
before 1900. This is unfortunate as this represents the mid­
point of the first large merger wave experienced in the United 
States and Britain and the beginning of the German merger wave. 
The reason lies more in the inherit limitations of their sources 
rather than the perceived unimportance of the period. For the 
pre-1921 period, the DBS relied entirely on the statistics 
gathered by H.G. Stapells presented in the form of a M.A. thesis
or
in 1922. Although some of the mergers in the Stapells series 
were excluded by Weldon because of their industrial 
classification and a few mergers not contained in the Stapells 
thesis were added, the Weldon series depended almost as heavily 
on Stapells* work as the DBS series. Stapells' list of mergers 
does not go back before 1900, therefore, the DBS and Weldon 
series are similarly limited. It appears that Stapells relied 
mainly on the Annual Financial Review, a Canadian financial 
manual which only began to be published in 1900.
^Ibid.. p. 233.
.G• Stapells, "The Recent Consolidation Movement in 
Canadian Industry", unpublished M.A. thesis, University of 
Toronto, 1922. Stapells's series of mergers, 1900-1920, are 
listed by year on pp. 16-34.
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In another thesis by A.E. Epp, some data can be found on 
Canadian industrial mergers before 1900 although the information 
provided is sparse.25 The number of mergers is tabulated for the 
years 1890-1913, but the number of firm disappearances is only 
provided for 1909-1913. Epp limits his estimates of merger value 
to the latter period as well, thus restricting its usefulness for 
our purposes. Rather than using issued capital or net assets, 
Epp uses authorised capitalisation to estimate the value of 
mergers consummated after 1908 but it is not clear whether debt 
capital is included as a part of the capitalisation figures.
Even more problematic, Epp's industrial classification 
varies considerably from the British, American and the other 
Canadian studies. Epp creates four new broad non-SIC categories 
of industry; primary, production supply, infrastructure supply, 
and consumer supply. Some transportation and retailing firms are 
included in the latter two categories thus moving us beyond the 
realm of manufacturing industry but still without definitional 
delimitation. What is included or excluded in these non­
manufacturing categories appears to be quite flexible. Epp based 
his series on the financial press of the day, the only existing 
source of merger data before 1900, as will be discussed below.
26A.E. Epp, "Cooperation Among Capitalists: The Canadian
Merger Movement 1909-13", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Johns 
Hopkins University, 1973.
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6 .3 The structure of the new series
From the above discussion it should be self-evident that it 
was necessary to generate a new series of merger statistics for 
Canadian manufacturing industry to permit a reasonable comparison 
of Canadafs experience with that of other nations, in particular 
Britain and the United States. The information upon which this 
series was based came from a variety of sources that included 
public and private archives in Britain and Canada, financial 
manuals, government reports, industry histories, individual 
business histories, theses, and most significant of all, the 
Monetary Times, the largest and the most "national” financial 
periodical of the age in Canada. The range of sources was 
necessarily much wider than that used by Hannah and Nelson to 
generate their series although, as in this study, both of them 
relied on one major source of information.
Nelson depended mainly on the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle. a financial periodical not dissimilar from the 
Monetary Times but aimed more at the professional investor than 
the wider business audience targeted by the Canadian publication. 
Hannah relied on published business histories for the period, 
1880-1918, a source that would have produced few results in the
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. 27Canadian context due to the paucity of such material. The 
sources determine the bias of each sample. Nelson's merger 
series is heavily weighted towards larger public companies with 
listings on the major stock exchanges. Given that only survivors 
commission business histories, Hannah's series is slanted towards 
the more successful firms but is less biased towards publicly 
quoted companies. The present series is biased towards the large 
companies deemed newsworthy by the Monetary Times but is less 
slanted towards publicly quoted companies unlike the Nelson 
series. For this reason, however, the Canadian series will be 
more comprehensive than the American and British series as it 
includes a larger number of smaller firms. This can be corrected 
in any comparison by eliminating those Canadian mergers falling 
beneath a given critical size or, alternatively, by temporarily 
excluding those companies not issuing shares or bonds to the 
public. This is more important in comparisons with the Nelson 
series where a cut-off limit exists than in the Hannah series 
where all mergers, irrespective of size, were included.
The new merger index arrayed in Appendix D was restricted to 
Canadian manufacturing enterprises. These are defined as 
companies incorporated under the federal or provincial laws of
27 .I arrived at this judgment after a careful perusal of P.
Craven, A. Forrest and T. Traves's relatively comprehensive 
"Canadian Company Histories: A Checklist" in Communique'" (Spring. 
1981), and after examining a number of company histories both on 
and off this checklist to determine their usefulness. The 
results were less than encouraging.
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Canada and whose operations are conducted predominantly in 
Canada.28 An exception was made only in the case of few "free- 
standing" enterprises which, although organized in accordance 
with the laws of a jurisdiction other than Canada, had their 
administrative head offices and operations based entirely in 
Canada.29 Merger activity involving Canadian firms, if it 
occurred outside Canada, was excluded. Acquisitions of Canadian 
enterprises in Canada by foreign firms were similarly excluded.
A minimum of four pieces of data was required for a merger 
to be included in the new series: the name of the new entity in
28 •Although Canadian incorporated subsidiaries of American
industrial enterprises are included in this definition, it is 
interesting to note that few of the numerous branch plants 
established in Canada during the period of the Laurier boom 
engaged in merger activity. These subsidiaries relied largely on 
a strategy of internal growth funded by profit retention and the 
occasional security flotation, rather than on the strategies of 
external growth of their American parent companies. M Wilkins, 
The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business
Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); 
H.G.J. Aitken, American Capital and Canadian Resources 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1961); H. Marshall, F. Southard and K.W. 
Taylor, Canadian-American Industry; A Study in International 
Investment (Toronto, 1936) ; D.G. Paterson, British Direct 
Investment in Canada. 1890-1914 (Toronto, 1976). Also see MT, 13 
November 1909, pp. 2012-2025 for a list of American branch plants 
in Canada. At this time, Montreal had 18 branch plants while 
Toronto, the magnet for such activity in Canada, already had 52 
branch companies.
29There were only three of these free-standing companies 
involved in merger activity which were included in the series: 
the British Columbia Canning Company merger of 1889, the Anglo- 
British Columbia Packing merger of 1890, and the North American 
Pulp and Paper Companies Trust merger of 1915. For a discussion 
of "free-standing" companies see M. Wilkins, "The Free-standing 
Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct 
Investment", EHR, 2nd ser., vol. XLI, no. 2 (May 1988).
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a merger-by-consolidation or the name of the corporate acquirer 
in a merger-by-acquisition; the number of firm disappearances in 
any single merger; the calendar year in which the merger was 
completed; and the standard industrial classification of the 
merger and the firm disappearances. Mergers that did not meet 
these four requirements were excluded from the series. It was 
felt that these were the minimum requirements to generate a 
sample useful in comparisons with the British and American merger 
statistics. As it is a small-sample study, the German series is 
too dissimilar to be used as a reference point and will not be 
referred to except in discussions concerning very general trends.
A multiplicity of information was sought for each individual 
merger that clearly went beyond what was needed for comparative 
purposes with the Nelson and Hannah series. This additional data 
was collected to provide a macro counterpart to the micro study 
of promotion, finance and mergers contained in the previous 
Chapters. In Chapter Eight, this macro data will be of aid in 
determining the general causes of merger waves. For example, the 
connection between buoyant security prices and mergers has long 
been recognised by scholars. Nelson found that mergers were more 
strongly correlated with merger activity than with so-called 
•’economic" variables such as the level of industrial
. X) . . .production. Hannah came to the same conclusion for Britain
^R. Nelson, o p .cit.. pp. 117-119.
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both in the period 1880-1918 and for the interwar period.31 
Weldon also noted that the pattern of merger movements in Canada 
generally followed the same pattern as common stock prices 
although no test other than a visual inspection of peaks and
rn
troughs was performed.
This additional data included whether a merger was organised 
by existing company owners or whether an outside promoter was 
involved. If the latter was the case, an attempt was made to 
determine if this promoter initiated the merger or if he was 
simply called in to arrange new financing after the controlling 
shareholders had made a final decision to consolidate. The name 
of the promoters involved were recorded along with their 
institutional affiliation. Note was made of public flotations 
immediately following mergers, the location of the flotations, 
the type and amount of securities involved and the percentage of 
the total issue thus being sold, the market price of the 
securities, and the percentage of bonus stock, if any, included 
in the sale. If the securities were subsequently listed, the 
names of the stock exchanges and the date of quotation were 
recorded.
31L. Hannah, ”The Political Economy of Mergers in British 
Manufacturing Industry between the Wars”, o p .cit.. and "Mergers 
in British Manufacturing Industry, 1880-1918”, o p .cit.
“T>
J.C. Weldon, o p .cit.. pp. 230-31.
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It was impossible to collect all of the above financial 
information for the vast majority of mergers? indeed, few of the 
mergers had even one-half of the financial data searched for. As 
patchy as the information came out, however, it does provide a 
substantial data base enriching the case study material discussed 
in previous Chapters. Moreover, the data illustrates the nature 
of the connection between mergers, capital markets and the 
evolution of corporate finance during a period of rapid economic 
change. The Canadian data also indicates the evolution from 
local funding of manufacturing to the internationalisation of 
corporate finance, a process repeated in every industrial nation.
In this study, mergers were defined to include both 
consolidations and acquisitions hence the use of the phrases 
mergers-by-consolidation and mergers-by-acquisition. Acquisition 
involves the purchase of one or more firms by a company which 
retains its corporate identity. Consolidation implies the
combining of two or more firms which submerge their identity into 
a new corporate entity. The category of consolidation embraces 
the large number of multi-firm amalgamations so typical of 
mergers during the gilded age in Canada as well as Britain and 
the United States. The definition of consolidation used in this 
study is identical to that used by Hannah, but varies slightly 
from Nelson’s definition of consolidation which involves a 
minimum of three firms. To accommodate this difference, the 
Canadian sample can be manipulated in order to reclassify such
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two-firm consolidations as acquisitions to make the series 
compatible with the Nelson series.33
To ensure "equality of treatment" between acquisitions and 
consolidations, one firm disappearance was subtracted from the 
total number of firm disappearances for each consolidation. 
There was generally little difficulty in discovering the number 
of firm disappearances as well as the names of the individual 
firms entering the mergers. In rare cases, however, the 
source(s) simply indicated that an unspecified number of firms 
had merged. In such cases, the following procedure, consistent 
with the approaches used by Nelson and Hannah, was adopted: one 
firm disappearance is assumed where words like "few" or "some" 
were used to describe the number of companies involved in a 
merger; two firm disappearances were allocated where the words 
"several", "a number" and "various" were used? three firm 
disappearances were assumed if the words "many", "a large number" 
or "a lot" were used.
Mergers were dated as precisely as possible to create a 
quarterly series of merger data in addition to the annual series. 
The date of consummation was deemed to be the date the merger was 
substantially completed, defined as the date of effective
. . .  . .Although consolidation is not precisely defined by Nelson,
his examples imply the "three-firm" definition. R. Nelson, 
op.cit.. p. 2 1 .
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transfer of control. Where that information was not available,
proxies such as the date of incorporation, corporate applications
for changes in capitalisation, date of issue of first prospectus,
date of first flotation, or similar data was used. The most
consistent source for dating was the Monetary Times in which case
the following procedure was adopted. If the completion of the
merger was announced after the tenth day of the month, that month
would be used as the effective date of the transfer of control.
If before, then the preceding month was used and in this manner
the merger was placed within the appropriate quarter. This is
consistent with Nelson*s approach in creating his quarterly 
34series.
As much information as possible was gathered on the business 
activities of the mergers in the new series. This was necessary 
in order to utilise the SIC system as the demarcation for 
inclusion in the series. The predominant business of the firms 
entering mergers were also identified to permit some analysis of 
the degree of vertical and horizontal integration involved in 
each merger. Past analyses concerning this issue have floundered 
because of the absence of a rigorous definition of such terms 
which the use of a SIC system can provide. I have assumed 
vertical integration where the predominant business conducted by 
at least one of the major firms (defined as any firm or
Nelson, op.cit. . p. 21. The British series for 1880- 
1918 is restricted to annual data.
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combination of firms that make up a minimum of one-quarter of the 
value of the new enterprise calculated either in terms of 
capitalisation or total assets) entering the merger has a 
different three-digit SIC classification than the new entity as 
defined under the 1948 SIC.35
In addition, the SIC permits identification of the 
industries most affected by merger activity thus yielding a 
comparison with Britain and the United States. To facilitate 
such comparisons, the Canadian mergers were reclassified 
according to the British and American SIC systems which differ in 
some important respects from the Canadian one. Hannah used the 
British SIC of 1958 ranking the number of firm disappearances by
*vr
decade according to 17 major manufacturing industry groups. 
Nelson used the United States Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual for 1945 for manufacturing industry as amended in 1949 for 
mining industry.
Contrary to the Nelson series, mining mergers have been 
excluded from the Canadian series because of the difficulty of 
obtaining adequate information for most mergers falling within 
this category. Any comparisons with the Nelson series must be
^ y  convention, scholars studying Canadian economic history 
use the 1948 SIC to ensure compatibility of work. All mergers 
are alternatively classified under the four-digit 1980 SIC.
^L. Hannah, "Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 
1880-1918", op.cit.. p. 18.
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qualified by this difference in the two samples. It should be 
noted, however, that the difference between the American series 
and the new Canadian series is not that significant. The 
Canadian series, like the British series, included "mining" 
operations if a requisite degree of processing or smelting was
involved. Nelson also included such operations in his sample
but, since both manufacturing and mining industries were 
included, he consolidated them under one activity in the 
following manner: Coke products (manufacturing) and bituminous
coal (mining) were both classified under the one mining 
classification; granite product (manufacturing) and granite 
quarries (mining) were classified under the granite mining
category; cement manufacturing and cement quarrying were both 
designated the latter category; lime manufacturing and lime 
quarrying were classified as mining; talc refining
(manufacturing) and talc mining were categorised under the 
latter; iron and steel production and iron ore mining were both 
classified under the manufacturing category; salt refining
(manufacturing) and salt mining were jointly classified under the
37 . . .manufacturing SIC category. The Canadian series, consistent
with the British series, classifies many of these difficult cases
as manufacturing if some secondary refining, processing or
manufacturing beyond the extraction stage is involved. Thus,
many of the enterprises classified as mining by Nelson would come
37R. Nelson, op.cit.. p. 17.
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under the general manufacturing category in the Hannah sample and 
in the present series.38 In other words, in terms of the SIC, 
the three series are much more compatible than it appears at 
first glance.
Theoretically, the value or "volume" of mergers and firm 
disappearances rather than the total number of mergers and firm 
disappearances in any given unit of time is a superior indicator 
of actual merger activity. Unfortunately, this tends to be the 
most difficult piece of data to obtain and, even once obtained, 
is subject to the greatest difficulties. In fact, in all the 
series discussed above, including the new Canadian series, value 
estimates could not be made for a significant percentage of 
mergers. Moreover, every one of these series uses a different 
proxy to estimate the value of mergers and firm disappearances 
thereby seriously limiting meaningful comparisons. As a 
consequence, the number of mergers and firm disappearances is, at 
present, a much safer basis of comparison than the corresponding 
value series. The valuations methods used by Nelson and Hannah 
are briefly summarised to demonstrate that a number of different 
indices for value had to be employed in the new series to permit
Hannah admits that in constructing the British series 11 it 
was sometimes difficult to distinguish ironstone mining from iron 
manufacture and gypsum mines from the manufacture of plaster, so 
that some mining mergers may in fact have been included in the 
series and classified to their related manufacturing industry.” 
L. Hannah, "Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 1880- 
1918”, op.cit.. p. 20.
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useful comparisons.
Nelson used the authorised equity capitalisation of each 
merger as his only estimate of value. He admitted that issued 
capital (either including or excluding bonded debt) would have 
been preferable as an estimate -of actual value but this data was 
not available in enough cases. Moreover, other superior measures 
of value such as total assets or sales "were found for only
. . . 59 . .relatively few consolidations.” Most mergers-by-consolidation 
provided figures for authorised equity capital but many mergers- 
by-acquisition did not. Where authorised equity capital was 
unavailable, Nelson used gross assets or purchase prices, 
whichever was available, on the assumption that they are "roughly 
equivalent."40 If these figures were not available then Nelson 
assigned a value equal to the average of the authorised equity 
capitalisation of the pertinent three-digit SIC group. In rare 
cases, where the relevant SIC group had no more than one 
observation, the average value for the general two-digit SIC 
group was utilised.4^
Unlike Nelson, Hannah assigned a value to firm 
disappearances rather than mergers, using a very different
•^ R. Nelson, op.cit.. pp. 17-18.
^ h e  results of the Canadian series indicate that this is 
not a reliable assumption.
41
R. Nelson, op. cit.. pp. 18-19.
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estimate of value. As in Nelson*s mergers-by-acquisition, Hannah 
found value data for less than 50 per cent of British firm 
disappearances.42 Using the market value of firm disappearances, 
particularly the purchase price paid for companies, Hannah*s 
problems with valuation relate more to consolidations than 
acquisitions. In the latter, Hannah could use the actual price 
paid for a company. Where shares were exchanged in place of a 
cash settlement, then the market value of the shares was used. 
Where such data was not available, Hannah employed any one of the 
following: the nominal value of the shares disappearing, an
appropriate fraction of the total share capital of the ‘'acquirer11 
or the values listed for the newly purchased company in the 
balance sheet of the acquiring company. Although, as he admits, 
"this procedure is not formally satisfying because it mixes data 
which are, in principle, incompatible", the unavailability of 
actual purchase prices or the market value of shares required 
such methods. In situations where less than 100 per cent (but 
more than 50 per cent) of the capital was purchased, Hannah 
restricted the value to the capital actually purchased.43
The present series uses the valuation methods of both Nelson 
and Hannah and abides by the procedures outlined above. In
42Ibid., p. 9? L. Hannah, "Mergers in British Manufacturing 
Industry, 1880-1918", op.cit.. p. 19.
^L. Hannah, "Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 
1880-1918", OP.cit.. p. 28.
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addition, a number of alternative methods of valuations are also 
provided which can be used to check the strengths and weaknesses 
of the •*authorised capital” and "purchase price” techniques. To 
remain consistent with these studies, consolidations and 
acquisitions are standardised by categorising the largest company 
in a consolidation as the acquirer. No one method could be 
relied upon in determining the largest firm but various indices, 
such as the value of the shares transferred to the companies 
entering the consolidation or the size of the authorised or
. . . 44issued capital of the companies, were employed. The total 
assets figure was based on an appraisal of the individual 
properties entering a merger rather than the total asset figure 
indicated in the first year's balance sheet of the merged 
company. Where purchase price information was lacking, as it was 
in most cases, an estimate of the value of firm disappearances 
was obtained by subtracting out the value of the properties of 
the largest firm from the total asset figure when this was 
available. The capitalisation figures are disaggregated into 
bonded debt (bonds and debentures), preference shares and common 
shares.
Wherever possible, the market value of shares was used but 
in many cases it was necessary to rely on nominal value.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MERGERS IN CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1885-1918
7.1 The number and value of Canadian mergers
The annual results of the new series in terms of the number 
of mergers and firm disappearances and the percentage of 
consolidations and acquisitions are summarised in Table 12 below. 
Measured in terms of both the number of mergers and the number of 
firm disappearances, the years from 1909 to 1912 constitute the 
most sustained period of merger activity during the gilded age. 
This merger wave was preceded by smaller bursts of merger 
activity in 1889-1893, 1899-1903 and 1905-1907, as illustrated in 
Figure 22.1 The first two sub-periods are roughly coincident 
with increased merger activity in Britain and the United States 
but these bursts, characterized by a tiny number of large 
consolidations, were substantially smaller in Canada. The 
Dominion Cotton Company merger of 1891 resulted in 8 firm 
disappearances while the British Columbia Packers consolidation 
of 1902 and the Canadian Canners' merger of 1903 were responsible 
for 44 and 22 firm disappearances, respectively. This pattern 
contrasts with the numerous British and American mergers during 
these years, and with the first Canadian merger wave itself, when 
a significant number of multi-firm consolidations were
^Appendix D, p. 273.
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consummated with no single merger dominating in any one year.
Table 12
NUMBER OF MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, ACQUISITIONS 
AND FIRM DISAPPEARANCES (FD) IN 
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1885-1918
Year Meraers Cons {%) Acq (%) FD
1885 3 2 1 3
1886 0 0 0 0
1887 1 0 1 1
1888 1 1 0 1
1889 6 2 4 9
1890 3 2 1 14
1891 7 4 3 14
1892 6 4 2 10
1893 6 4 2 8
1894 0 0 0 0
1895 4 2 2 4
1896 0 0 0 0
1897 0 0 0 0
1898 2 1 1 6
1899 4 4 0 11
1900 7 3 4 10
1901 7 4 3 25
1902 3 2 1 51
1903 3 1 2 24
1904 4 1 3 5
1905 10 7 3 26
1906 8 5 3 14
1907 6 1 5 11
1908 3 3 0 7
1909 12 10 (83%) 2 (17%) 52
1910 22 20 (91%) 2 ( 9%) 69
1911 16 12 (75%) 4 (25%) 37
1912 13 8 (62%) 5 (38%) 20
1913 8 5 3 17
1914 1 0 1 2
1915 3 2 1 4
1916 1 0 1 1
1917 3 2 1 5
1918 1 1 0 3
TOTAL 174 113 (65%) 61 (35%) 464
SOURCE: Appendix D.
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By removing the largest merger (as measured by the number of 
firm disappearances) from every year, we can "smooth out" the 
series.and reveal the underlying pattern. This amended series is 
illustrated in Figure 23.2 The three increases in merger 
activity before 1909 are now revealed as relatively small bursts 
while the merger movement of 1909-1912 retains the same contours 
and intensity of the unadjusted series displayed in Figure 22. 
By revealing the relative absence of merger activity before 1909, 
Figure 2 3 better depicts the trend of Canadian merger activity 
between 1885 and 1918.
In absolute terms the Canadian merger wave was substantially 
smaller than the British and American merger waves at the turn of 
the century. Relative to its size, however, Canada's merger 
movement was quite remarkable in its intensity. Canada had a GNP 
approximately one-sixteenth and one-tenth the size of the 
respective GNPs of the United States and Britain as of 1900. In 
addition, Canada's per capita level of industrialisation, as 
defined by manufacturing production, was between one-half and
3one-third of those same nations in 1913.
2^Appendix D, p. 274.
3 •GNP estimates were based on P. Bairoch's estimates for the 
United Kingdom in 1960 U.S. dollars; "Europe's Gross National 
Product: 1800-1975", JEEH, vol. 5, no. 2 (Fall 1976). Estimates 
for the per capita level of industrialisation (as measured by the 
volume of manufacturing production) for the United Kingdom and 
the United States as well as Canada are found in P. Bairoch, 
"International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980", JEEH. 
vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall 1982).
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Approximately 65 per cent of Canadian mergers over the 
period 1885-1918 took the form of consolidations rather than 
acquisitions, a trend that was particularly pronounced during the 
peak years of the merger movement from 1909 to 1912. Similar to 
the experience in the United States and Britain, mergers-by- 
consolidation played a much more significant role than mergers-by 
acquisition during the merger waves of the gilded age than they 
would in subsequent years. This is a reflection of the unique 
financial demands of the era as opposed to the technological or 
organisational rationale for such mergers. Figure 244 portrays 
the cyclical and relatively stable pattern of mergers-by- 
acquisition over time. This contrasts with the more unique 
configuration of consolidations, clustered in the years 1909- 
1912.
Value data is much less reliable than number data due to the 
absence of accurate information on capitalisation of 
consolidations, purchase price of acquisitions and asset value of 
properties entering mergers. Only 59 percent of mergers produced 
some information concerning capitalisation, often in the form of 
a vague statement concerning "total capital" without any 
indication as to whether this referred to authorised or issued 
capital or whether it included bonded debt in addition to equity 
capital. A total of 42 per cent of mergers provided sufficient
4Appendix D, p. 27 5.
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information to disaggregate capital into separate categories of 
securities —  common shares, preference shares, bonds and 
debentures.
5 . . .Table 13 below and Figure 25 summarise this information as 
well as other proxies for value. Total authorised capital (TAC) 
includes bonded debt in addition to equity capital while 
authorised capital (AC) excludes authorised bond and debenture 
issues. Total issued capital (TIC) consists of all issued 
capital including debt capital. This later amount is omitted 
under the category of issued capital (IC). In cases where the 
so-called “total capital” was mentioned but was not 
disaggregated, this amount was used for all four categories of 
TAC, AC, TIC and IC.
Despite the deficiencies in the capitalisation data, the 
results obtained reinforce the trends observed in Table 12. The 
merger movement should perhaps be extended to embrace the year 
1913 according to capitalisation values, but there is little 
question that 1909 marks the beginning of the first Canadian 
merger wave. The capitalisation data also supports the existence 
of minor bursts of merger activity in the first years of the 
1890s as well as at the turn of the century. This data reflects 
the increase in merger activity in 1905 corresponding with a
5Appendix D, p. 276.
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Table 13
VALUE OF MERGERS IN CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY,
1885-1918 
(in $ millions)
Year TAC AC TIC IC NO. AIC
1885 — — — — —
1886 - - - - - -
1887 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1 1.0
1888 - - - - - -
1889 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5
1890 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5
1891 10.0 10.0 6.5 6.5 2 3.3
1892 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 0.3
1893 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2 1.5
1894 - - - - - -
1895 - - - - - -
1896 - - - - - -
1897 - - - - - -
1898 - - - - - -
1899 8.8 8.8 7.8 7.8 4 2.0
1900 18.7 16.2 15.3 12.8 6 2.1
1901 4.7 4.7 4.0 4.0 3 1.3
1902 4.1 4.1 2.8 2.8 2 1.4
1903 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1 2.5
1904 - - - - - -
1905 13.6 10.2 10.1 7.1 3 2.4
1906 23.6 19.8 21.0 17.3 6 2.9
1907 25.0 10.0 17.5 10.0 1 10.0
1908 40.5 38.0 39.3 36.8 2 18.4
1909 132.5 98.5 103.3 81.8 10 8.2
1910 163.1 131.9 131.7 108.6 17 6.4
1911 94.4 73.6 71.0 56.0 14 4.0
1912 66.2 52.5 48.2 36.4 12 3.0
1913 92.2 61.5 76.6 51.1 7 7.3
1914 5.0 4.0 4.6 3.6 1 3.6
1915 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.6 2 1.8
1916 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1 1.3
1917 32.6 22.6 26.9 20.3 3 6.8
1918 — — — — — —
TAC: total authorized capital AC: authorized capital
TIC: total issued capital IC: issued capital
NO: number of mergers withl AIC: annual average issuec
value data available capital
SOURCE: Appendix D.
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substantial increase in national income which eventually provides 
the lift-off into sustained external growth after 1908 despite 
the temporary economic downturn of 1907.
Obtaining information on the purchase price of acquisitions 
was considerably more difficult. Only 20 of a total of 61 
acquisitions disclosed this data. Moreover, since this purchase 
price data relates only to acquisitions, it is not reliable as an 
indication of merger activity given that 65 per cent of total 
merger activity from 1885 until 1918 took the form of 
consolidations. Estimates of asset value are even less 
dependable as an index of merger activity than estimates of 
acquisition value. Merely 20 per cent of all mergers produced 
sufficient information upon which to base an estimate of the 
market value of the properties entering a consolidation or the 
properties purchased in a merger-by-acquisition. Although 
purchase price and asset data are broadly consistent with trends 
revealed in the number and capitalisation series, the 
dependability of this information is seriously open to question. 
Capitalisation estimates afford a superior value index for 
Canadian merger activity but even these are so deficient, 
certainly for the years before 1905, that international 
comparisons should be restricted to the number series.
7.2 Industrial grouping of merger activity
Table 14 classifies merger activity by decade according to
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the 17 major industrial groups as defined under the 1948 SIC. 
Using both mergers and firm disappearances as an index of merger 
activity, the three most prominent manufacturing industries are 
food and beverages, iron and steel, and textiles. Although 
rankings vary depending on whether the merger or firm 
disappearances index is used, the two measures are roughly 
consistent for the eight most active industries.
Table 14
MERGERS AND FIRM DISAPPEARANCES (FD) BY INDUSTRY, 1885-1918
(industry rank in brackets)
Industry Group Meraers FD
Food and beverages 34 (2 ) 163 (1)
Tobacco and tobacco products 3 5
Rubber products 4 10
Leather products 4 5
Textile products 17 (3) 42 (3)
Clothing 1 3
Wood products 9 (8 ) 32 (6)
Paper products 10 (7) 12
Printing and publishing 1 3
Iron and steel products 43 (1 ) 65 (2 )
Transportation equipment 11 (4) 21 (7)
Non-ferrous metal products 7 13 (8 )
Electrical apparatus and supplies 3 3
Non-metallic mineral products 10 (6) 39 (4)
Petroleum refining and coal products 3 8
Chemical products 11 (5) 33 (5)
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 3
174
7
464
SOURCE: Appendix D.
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The following analysis will be restricted to the use of the 
firm disappearances index for comparisons with Britain and the 
United States, as this was the index used by Hannah and Nelson 
for their industry grouping results.
Table 15 below illustrates merger activity by industry 
according to sub-periods thus providing an indication of changes 
over time. During the decade 1885-1894, merger activity was 
most pronounced in the textile industry, the key sector of the 
first industrial revolution in Canada. External growth in the 
textile industry decreased substantially during the subsequent 
two decades due mainly to depressed conditions in the industry 
and long-term decline relative to the new industries of the 
second industrial revolution —  including the steel products 
sector, an industry that consistently exhibited a large amount of 
merger activity.
We can better appreciate the nature of Canadian merger 
activity by industry and its implications by using the merger 
series generated by Nelson and Hannah as points of comparison. 
The Canadian data was reclassified according to the 21 two- 
digit manufacturing industry groups of the United States Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual for 1945 and the 17 major
According to Figure 9 in Appendix A, the textile industry 
began to stagnate after 1898. See Figure 14 in Appendix A for 
real growth in the iron and steel industry.
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Table 15
INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN MERGER ACTIVITY
BY PERIOD 
(industry rank in brackets)
Firm Disappearances
Industrv Group 1885-■1894 1895- 1904 1905- 1918
Food and beverage 17 (2 ) 72 (1 ) 74 (1 )
Tobacco and products 0 1 4
Rubber products 0 0 10
Leather products 1 (5) 2 2
Textile products 26 (1 ) 4 12
Clothing 0 0 3
Wood products 1 18 (2 ) 13
Paper products 0 1 11
Printing and publishing 0 0 0
Iron and steel products 11 (3) 16 (3) 38 (3)
Transportation equipment 1 (5) 6 (5) 14 (5)
Non-ferrous minerals 0 5 8
Electrical apparatus 0 1 2
Non-metallic minerals 0 0 39 (2 )
Petroleum and coal prod 0 8 (4) 0
Chemicals 2 (4) 0 31 (4)
Misc manufacturing 1 2 4
60 136 268
SOURCE: Appendix D.
manufacturing industry groups of the United Kingdom Central 
Statistical Office's Standard Industrial Classification of 1959.7 
In Tables 16 and 17 below the top ten industries —  as defined by 
the British and American SICs —  are ranked in descending order 
according to their degree of merger activity. The periods of 
comparison —  limited by the periods chosen by Hannah (1880-1918) 
and Nelson (1895-1920) —  are not identical but roughly
equivalent.
7See Table 24 m  Appendix D.
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Table 16
CANADA-UK COMPARISON OF MERGER ACTIVITY 
BY INDUSTRY GROUP 
(using UK SIC)
Rank
Industry Group Canada UK
Food 1 4
Metal manufacture 2 5
Chemicals 3 3
Textiles 4 1
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement 5 6
Timber and furniture, etc. 6 15
Vehicles 7 10
Paper, printing and publishing 8 8
Drink 9 2
Metal goods not elsewhere specified 
Non-electrical engineering
10 9
7
SOURCE: Appendix D.
The ranking results in Table 16 illustrate the remarkable 
similarity between Canada and Britain in terms of the industries 
which experienced the most intense merger activity during the 
gilded age. Merger activity in the textile industry is most 
pronounced in Britain where large textile consolidations 
dominated the turn of the century merger wave. The Bradford 
Dyers, British Cotton and Wool Dyers, Calico Printers, and 
Bleachers’ Association alone accounted for 164 firm 
disappearances. Many of these mergers did little to alter the 
industrial structure of the industry and were motivated mainly by
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a desire to protect market share.8 Much the same scenario was 
being played out in the Canadian textile sector —  an industry 
that was experiencing relatively stagnant growth during the 
Laurier boom. Although this industry produced the first large
Canadian mergers, such external growth did little to alter the
• . 9basic organisational structure of the textile companies.
The two industry rankings which diverge —  timber and 
furniture, and drink —  can be explained by the difference in the 
nature of the national economies. A frontier society with 
immense reserves of timber lands, the forest products industry 
has for almost two centuries been an important sector in the 
Canadian economy. The most industrialised nation in the world 
before the First World War, Britain had insignificant forest 
reserves and, in fact, imported most of its lumber and wood 
products from nations such as Canada. The Canadian Furniture 
Manufacturers' 16 firm consolidation of 1900, involving an issued 
capital of $2.3 million, was motivated by a desire to augment the
8L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 2nd 
ed., 1983), p. 21.
9 .B.J. Austin, "Life Cycles and Strategy of a Canadian 
Company: Dominion Textile, 1873-1973", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Concordia University, 1985, pp. 1-112. After examining the major 
consolidations in the Canadian textile industry from the 
Hochelaga Cotton merger of 1885 to the Dominion Textile merger of 
1905, Austin concludes they were mainly defensive in origin, 
intended to protect markets and secure stability. Austin 
concludes that Canadian textile companies did not become modern 
industrial enterprises within the Chandlerian meaning of the 
phrase until after the Second World War.
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already large percentage of Canadian furniture exports to 
Britain.30 On the other hand, the Canadian brewing industry was 
substantially less built-up than the British industry and one 
immense multi-firm consolidation, the National Breweries merger 
of 1909 involving 14 firms and a total issued capital of $7.0 
million, was responsible for almost one-half of all the external 
growth in this industry between 1885 and 1918.31
The fact that the first and second industrial revolutions in 
Canada were compressed into the latter half of the nineteenth 
century explains the relative unimportance of the non-electrical 
engineering industry, a sector in which the steam and coal- 
powered technology of the first industrial revolution played a 
large role. This perhaps accounts for the insignificant degree
of external growth experienced in this industry during the gilded
arfQ 32 age.
A Canadian-American comparison of merger activity by 
industry, as displayed in Table 17, also reveals a similarity of 
pattern again with a couple of differences. External growth in 
the American textile industry is far less significant in relative 
terms to the Canadian experience. This may be due to the Nelson
^AFR, vol. I (July 1901), pp. 79-81.
33MT, 3 April 1909, p. 1774.
T2See Table 24 in Appendix D. Only 4 mergers and 4 firm 
disappearances are recorded for this industry.
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Table 17
CANADA-US COMPARISON OF MERGER ACTIVITY 
BY INDUSTRY GROUP 
(using US SIC)
Rank
Industry Group Canada US
Food and kindred products 
Textiles
Stone, clay, glass, cement products
Primary metals
Chemicals
Metal products
Transportation equipment
Furniture, fixtures
Lumber, wood products
Paper and allied products
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
1
10
7
2
3
5
4 
16
6 
11
Tobacco products 
Petroleum products
8
9
SOURCE: Appendix D.
merger series not covering the years before 1895 when most of the 
merger activity in the American textile industry likely took 
place.
Both Canada and the United States experienced the largest 
amount of merger activity m  the food industry. This is one 
industry that experienced less external growth in Britain 
relative to North America. The reason likely can be found in the 
more gradual adoption of refrigerated facilities by the
^ h e  high value and steady growth of the Canadian food 
processing industry, by far the most important sector within the 
food and beverage major industry group, is depicted in Figure 5 
in Appendix A.
202
processors of perishable food products, such as meat and fish 
packers, as well as the less rapid employment of continuous- 
process machinery, particularly in the fruit and vegetable 
canning industry, in Britain. American firms such as Swift & 
Company and Armour & Company pioneered integrated meat packing 
operations using refrigeration while Heinz, Bordenfs and Libby 
mastered the use of high through-put, continuous-process canning 
assembly lines. Mergers play a prominent role in the growth of 
these companies and in the emerging modern food industry 
generally in the United States.14 In the Canadian industry, 
there was a similar fusing of rapid external growth, 
technological change and organisational integration. The most 
prominent example was the Dominion Canners Company of Canada 
(later known as Canadian Canners') which grew out of a 
consolidation of Canadian Consolidated Canners and 17 other 
vegetable and fruit canning companies. Canadian Consolidated was 
itself the creature of a 23 firm amalgamation of central Canadian
. 15 .canning companies in 1903. The process was repeated m  the 
British Columbia salmon canning industry and to a lesser extent 
in the Atlantic coast fish packing industry.36
^A.D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution 
in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 300-02, 348-50 
and Appendix A.
^L. Elder, The History of Canadian Canners Limited 1903- 
1986. company publication (1986).
C. Lyons, Salmon: Our Heritage: The Story of a Province
and an Industry. British Columbia Packers Limited, company 
publication (1969) ; D.A. Stacey, Sockeve and Tinplate:
Technological Change in the Fraser River Canning Industry. 1871-
203
It is interesting to note that external growth was more 
pronounced in the Canadian iron and steel industry than in the 
British industry. As can be seen in Appendix D, the vast 
majority of this merger activity was in the steel and steel 
products sectors rather than in the older iron industry thus 
supporting the contention that mergers aided in directing large 
amounts of capital to a leading-edge sector of the second 
industrial revolution. Nevertheless, after the iron and steel 
category is disaggregated into primary metals, metal products.and 
machinery according to the Standard Industrial Classification of 
the United States as displayed in Table 17, we can see that 
mergers were comparatively more concentrated in the American 
primary and secondary steel as well as machinery industries. 
This is, no doubt, a reflection of the United States' 
technological leadership (to some extent shared with Germany) in 
these industries during the second industrial revolution. The 
Canadian steel industry did not get off the ground until the very 
beginning of the twentieth century and manufacturers in Canada 
were heavily dependent on American machinery imports throughout 
the gilded age and, indeed, remain so to the present.
The relatively high ranking of the Canadian stone, clay,
1912, (Victoria, B.C., 1982). Although little research exists on 
technological and organisational changes in the Canadian Atlantic 
fish industry, the vertical nature of the Atlantic Fish Company 
and the Maritime Fish Corporation mergers of 1907 and 1910 
supports this contention. &T, 29 June 1907, p. 2088? 14 May
1910, p. 2619.
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glass and cement (non-metallic minerals) category can be traced 
to a handful of multi-firm consolidations in the asbestos and 
Portland cement industries of 1909. The Amalgamated Asbestos and 
Canada Cement consolidations were, in fact, the first great 
mergers of the 1909-1912 wave. In one year, they along with the 
Black Lake Asbestos and Independent Portland Cement mergers of 
1909 were responsible for the bulk of merger activity in this 
industry.
7.3 Security financing and merger promotion
As can be seen in Appendix D, the vast majority of mergers- 
by-consolidation involved a new capital issue. Financial data 
concerning public security issues and stock exchange listings is 
so sparse before 1909, however, that little reliance should be 
placed on the few results available. Out of a total of 18 
mergers-by-consolidation with sufficient disaggregated issued 
capital data, only five reveal information concerning the
. . . . . .  *17proportion of issued capital that was sold via a public issue. 
In part, this is due to poorer reporting on consolidations by the 
financial press before the merger wave. It is also due, however, 
to the fact that a larger proportion of consolidations at this 
time involved closely-held companies that did not have any
Canadian Cycle and Motor (1900), Canadian Flour Mills 
(1900), United Factories (1901), Beaver Oil & Gas (1901) and 
Brandrum-Henderson (1906). See Appendix D.
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intention of opening their ownership to the general public. 
Stock in the new entity was transferred to the controlling 
shareholders of the companies entering the consolidation as 
payment for their assets. Further securities would then be 
issued pari passu to these same individuals to raise working
TO
capital for the company.
Information concerning the proportion of issued capital 
distributed publicly as well as subsequent stock market listings 
improves substantially during the years of the Canadian merger 
wave. Out of a total of 39 consolidations with disaggregated 
issued capital data, 24 disclose the following data concerning 
public issues: the place and date of the public flotation, the 
amount of the issue, whether the securities were sold at par, or 
at a premium or a discount, and whether any stock bonus was 
included in the sale. Out of this group, 14 consolidations 
disclose the date and location of subsequent stock exchange
, TQ , ,
quotations. These mergers thus provide a sample population 
from which certain general trends can be observed. Although the
^The Massey-Harris consolidation of 1891 illustrates this 
form of closely-held industrial finance. $2.7 million par value 
of ordinary shares in the new company were distributed to the 
Massey and Harris interests for the properties entering the 
merger. $300,000 ordinary shares "were sold on a pro-rata basis 
to the existing stockholders to provide working capital" with no 
outside capital entering the consolidated enterprise. See M. 
Denison, Harvest Triumphant: The Story of Massev-Harris (London, 
1949), pp. 120-21.
■^ See Table 25 in Appendix D.
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sample is biased towards some of the large mergers because of the 
reporting practices of financial manuals and periodicals, 
considerable effort was made to track down the information listed
above for some smaller Canadian issues in order to balance out
2Dthe sample. To an extent this was successful.
The decision whether to use bonds or preference shares for a 
first flotation following a merger promotion seemed to be 
dependent on the jurisdiction of the flotation rather than on the 
idiosyncrasies of individual promoters or any accepted rules of 
Canadian finance. Ten of the 24 flotations took place solely in 
Britain or were aimed mainly at the British market, and of these, 
seven were bond and debenture flotations. British investors 
preferred such securities to preference shares perceiving them as
inherently less risky and, therefore, Canadian promoters tried to
21accommodate this preference. Bond and debenture issues floated
2D . . . .  .Six of the 24 consolidations involved introductory 
flotations of $400,000 or less and were intended for the smaller 
Canadian investment market. These include Carriage Factories 
($300,000 preferred), Dominion Canners ($100,000 preferred), 
Canada Machinery ($200,000 bond), Belding Paul & Corticelli 
($400,000 preferred), Sherwin-Williams ($300,000 preferred) and 
Canada Foundries & Forgings ($150,000 preferred).
^This is, in part, consistent with Kennedy’s thesis that 
the aggregate British portfolio was "bond-laden, conservative and 
chosen to suit the taste of discriminating rentiers". W.P. 
Kennedy, Industrial Structure. Capital Markets and the Origins of 
British Economic Decline (Cambridge, 1987), p. 151. On the other 
hand, many of these "industrial" investments were inherently 
risky as the number of British bondholder committee established 
before the Great War attest. Further, the substantial British 
investment in Canadian mining ventures, notorious for their high 
failure rate, also betrays a less than "risk-adverse" nature. 
See F.W. Field, Capital Investments in Canada (Toronto, 3rd ed.,
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on the London market were proportionately larger than flotations 
of preferred stock. The average size of preferred stock issues 
was roughly one-half the average size of bond and debenture 
issues floated on the London market —  in excess of 1.8 
million.22 In two of the three cases where preferred stock 
issues were floated on the London market, it is interesting to 
note that major bond issues were also floated within just a few
23months of the introductory preferred stock flotation.
In the sample, nine of the 12 preferred share issues were 
intended for the Canadian market. Consistent with North American 
practice, eight of these nine flotations were accompanied by a 
common stock bonus. Also in keeping with financial practices in 
the New World, the par price of one-half of the preferred stock 
issues was discounted. The common stock bonuses ranged between 
2 0 per cent and 60 per cent but almost one-half of the firms in 
the sample passed a common stock bonus of 25 per cent, the most 
customary amount "given" with purchases of preferred stock or 
bonds. In two cases, a 25 per cent preference stock bonus was
1914), p. 14.
22In the 24 firm sample, the unweighted mean size of the 
bond and debenture issues equals $1,803,000 while the mean of the 
preferred stock issues is $875,000. See Table 25 in Appendix D 
for details.
^ h e  two companies were Canada Cement and Canadian Car and 
Foundry. It appears that Max Aitken intended to make both 
preferred and bond flotations on the British market but put the 
preferred issues a few months ahead of the bond issues.
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given to investors along with common stock bonuses but this 
appears to have been a rare practice.
The 14 consolidations that reveal the date of listing on 
stock exchanges indicate a time-lag of between one month and 26 
months for quotation after public subscription. The average 
time-lag was between seven and eight months. The locale of stock 
exchange listing depended on whether investors were largely 
British or Canadian and, if the latter, whether the majority were 
from Toronto or Montreal. It is likely that trading in the 
securities of the consolidations in the unlisted departments of 
the stock exchanges commenced almost immediately after the public 
issue thereby acting like a bridge between the issue and the 
formal listing. The creation of an active secondary market, a 
necessary condition of which was the listing of the companies' 
securities on a major public exchange, was one of the stated 
objectives of most consolidations during the first Canadian 
merger wave according to the statements of intention contained in 
contemporary prospectuses.
7.4 Major promoters during the first Canadian merger wave
The financial information gathered to generate the
^This was offered in the Amalgamated Asbestos and Black 
Lake Asbestos flotations, both of which were promoted by Clarence 
J. McCuaig of McCuaig & Bros. This practice of using senior 
securities as a bonus may have contributed to the great financial 
difficulties of both companies during the coming years.
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statistical series included data on merger promoters and their 
affiliations.25 This supplements the previous case study of Max 
Aitken and the Royal Securities Corporation and provides a 
broader context in which to place their operations. As a 
consequence of the financial press's lack of interest, there is 
little data on the promoters of Canadian manufacturing mergers 
before 1909. Judging by the few names associated with these 
early mergers it appears that the age of the professional merger 
promoter in Canada was ushered in by the Canadian merger wave.26
The appellation "promoter" must be defined lest all 
financiers connected with the securing of capital for industrial 
mergers be identified as such. The full-fledged promoter 
generally did much more than prepare, advertise, help underwrite 
and sell the securities of a new consolidation. He was directly 
involved in the formation of the enterprise itself —  a function 
that included negotiating and purchasing options on existing
See Table 25 in Appendix D.
^ h e  few "merger promoters" active before 1909 hardly 
resembled the professional financiers that emerged out of the 
first Canadian merger wave. John F. Stairs (Acadia Sugar 
Company, 1893) and Robert Jaffray (Canadian Cycle & Motor 
Company, 1899) were general businessmen as opposed to financiers 
specialising in merger negotiation and the promotion and 
underwriting of first flotations. Stairs was a financial and 
industrial "jack-of-all-trades" while Jaffray, although he 
conceived the Canadian Cycle merger, did not have sufficient 
financial muscle to carry out the merger plan and was forced to 
sell out to the George Cox-National Trust group of Toronto. MT, 
4 August 1893, p. 131? 30 September 1904, p. 421? H.G. Stapells, 
"The Recent Consolidation Movement in Canadian Industry", 
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1922, pp. 79-88.
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companies (or purchasing such companies outright), legally 
creating the new enterprise, and deciding upon the amount of 
share capital and its categorisation. Some promoters such as Max 
Aitken went further by first conceiving of the consolidation
t . 77possibilities of a particular industry. While not all three 
aspects of merger promotion —  its discovery, its assembly and 
its presentation —  need be present to identify a financier as a 
•♦promoter'', the following discussion is limited to those 
individuals who performed most of these functions most of the 
time and all three at some point in their careers.
The most significant of the gilded age promoters, measured 
by the number of mergers and their value, were Max Aitken, Arthur 
J. Nesbitt, Garnet P. Grant, Cawthra Mulock and Clarence J. 
McCuaig. Although the function of a promoter, particularly at 
the conception and negotiation stage, is a very individual one 
dominated by personality, this should never obscure the 
organisational nature of promotion. All of the men listed above 
were supported by substantial financial organisations as well as 
more informal but nevertheless crucial networks of financial 
colleagues upon which they could depend in any new merger 
venture. In Canada, the preferred financial intermediaries were 
investment bond houses but trust companies and brokerage houses 
where also used; in practice, all tended to resemble in function
27 .Aitken created the Stelco and Canada Cement mergers but 
acted more as a facilitator in the Canadian Car consolidation.
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wholesale bond houses like the Dominion Securities Corporation 
and the Royal Securities Corporation.
Garnet P. Grant formed the Dominion Bond Company of Montreal 
specifically to "back" his promotional activities. Grant
organised four major consolidations during the first Canadian 
merger wave. The Carriage Factories merger of October, 1909 was 
followed four months later by the Dominion Canners1 merger. In 
July, 1910, the Canada Machinery Corporation made its first 
appearance, succeeded by the Belding Paul & Corticelli merger of 
April, 1911. In every case the Dominion Bond Company was 
assisted in the flotations by a major Montreal brokerage firm.26 
By 1911, Dominion Bond had established an office in London, a 
must for all financial intermediaries involved in large-scale 
merger flotation given the quantity of securities issued on the
. . 39British market.
Arthur J. Nesbitt was one of Max Aitken* s top security 
salesman as well as the Royal Securities Corporation’s European
ro
J.A. Mackay & Co. made the Carriage Factories issue while
C. Meredith & Co. underwrote the largest block of Dominion 
Canners1 stock. C. Meredith & Co., and its principal, Charles 
Meredith, appear to have taken care of much of the financial end 
of Grant’s other mergers as well as the Tuckett Tobacco and 
Dominion Glass mergers. MT, 2 October 1909, p. 1422; 29 January 
1910, p. 543; 19 March 1910, p. 1254; 18 June 1910, p. 2514; 23 
July 1910, p. 415; 22 April 1911, p. 1625; 25 November 1911, p. 
2245. H.G. Stapells, o p .cit.. pp. 88-89, 107-08.
26MT, 21 October 1911, p. 1717.
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emissary in 1907.30 In 1908, Nesbitt severed his connection with 
Aitken and went into business on his own. He conceived the 
Investment Trust Company, became its first general manager and 
convinced a number of other financiers to contribute capital and 
sit on the board of directors. In a 13 month period between
March, 1910 and April, 1911, Nesbitt was responsible for
promoting the Canadian Cereal & Milling, Canadian Steel Foundries 
and International Milling Company of Canada mergers. In at least 
two of the above, Nesbitt assembled and presented the proposition 
through the Investment Trust Company and may even have originated 
the mergers. In the Canadian Steel Foundries merger he was 
acting on behalf of the Canadian Car & Foundry Company, although 
he was directly involved in obtaining the options on the
properties entering the merger. Relying heavily on the British 
market as an outlet for its securities, the Investment Trust 
Company established a London office in early 1910.31 He resigned 
as general manager of Investment Trust in late 1911 and formed 
Nesbitt, Thompson Company, Limited, which, although not a major
player during the gilded age, would become one of the most active
. . 3?promotional firms during the merger wave of the late 192 0s.
3DSee Chapter Three.
•^ MT. 29 January 1910, p. 514; 11 June 1910, p. 2432b? 11
February 1911, p. 648? 22 April 1911, p. 1617.
■%T, 10 October 1908, p. 597? 15 July 1911, p. 321? 25 
November 1911, p. 2220? 25 May 1912, p. 2143. Canada Cement 
Company, Limited, Annual Report, 1927.
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Clarence J. McCuaig was the senior member of the Montreal 
brokerage firm of McCuaig Bros. & Co. McCuaig set off the merger 
wave in April, 1909 with the Amalgamated Asbestos consolidation. 
The public portion of the bond issue was floated simultaneously 
in London, New York, Philadelphia and Montreal. This was quickly 
followed by another asbestos merger promoted by McCuaig and 
associates in September, 1909. McCuaig worked in conjunction 
with some of the most notable lawyers and financiers of Montreal 
as well as the most well-connected French-Canadian financier of 
the day, Rodolphe Forget. Colleagues such a Forget gave McCuaig 
privileged access to the Paris capital market as well as the 
London market. Despite these advantages, Amalgamated Asbestos 
turned out to be the most infamous failure of the merger 
movement.33
Cawthra Mulock, a Toronto stock broker and the principal of 
the stock brokerage company Cawthra Mulock & Co., was the merger 
promoter behind the Maple Leaf Milling Company and Canada Bread 
Company mergers of 1910 and 1911. Measured in terms of public 
offering, Mulock's mergers were in the same class as those 
discussed above but the distribution of securities in his new 
enterprises was limited to the Canadian market —  shares were 
sold mainly in Ontario and their subsequent listing was limited
^ 1T, 10 April 1909, p. 1816? 12 February 1910, p. 716; 5
March 1910, p. 1010? 15 October 1910, p. 1643? 4 March 1911, pp. 
917, 932.
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to the Toronto Stock Exchange. Moreover, unlike all of the 
previously mentioned promoters, Mulock does not appear to have 
had a British connection. He did establish the Guardian Trust 
Company in June, 1910, likely to extend his financial
. . . , , , Ol
manoeuvrability m  his promotional activities.
^MT, 23 April 1910, p. 1724? 4 June 1910, p. 2332.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF MERGER CAUSATION
8.1 The general versus the historically unique explanation
In previous Chapters, some propositions have been put 
forward concerning the appearance of the first sustained wave of 
merger activity in Canada. The emergence of a broad market for 
industrial securities was a necessary precondition for sustained 
large-scale merger activity but, by itself, does not adequately 
explain the appearance of the first Canadian merger wave. 
Certainly, it is of limited value in explaining the precise 
timing of the merger wave and is of no assistance in predicting 
the appearance of subsequent merger waves because of its 
historical specificity. Lamoreauxfs overcapacity theory, another 
historically unique explanation, is subject to the same 
difficulty.1
The evidence suggests that the emergence of a market for 
industrial securities and the introduction of high through-put 
processes were phenomena taking place throughout the gilded age 
and can hardly be used to further particularise the timing of 
merger waves in the United States or Canada. Other operative
N^. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American 
Business. 1895-1904 (Cambridge, 1985). See Chapter Four.
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factors must account for this timing. Moreover, these may be
causal factors common to all merger waves irrespective of
location or historical period. The search for such a "general
theory" of merger activity has actually preoccupied scholars much
2more than the historically unique explanations.
Such a general theory does not impair the validity of the 
historically unique explanations. It is suggested that the two 
operate together and that either form of interpretation is 
necessarily incomplete by itself. To produce a complete 
explanation it is necessary to bring together the general as well 
as the unique factors which result in the occurrence of a certain 
phenomenon at any given time. The two explanations are 
frequently separated only because of the very different 
methodologies they require. In questions of economic history, 
the deductive methods of economic theory normally lead to the 
elaboration of a general model while the inductive methods of 
history spawn the unique explanation and the two often have
2 . •An excellent compendium of modern empirical merger studies 
covering the post-World War II era can be found in The 
Determinants and Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, 
ed. D.C. Mueller (Cambridge, Mass., 1980); M. Gort, "An Economic 
Disturbance Theory of Mergers", OJE. vol. 83, no. 4 (November 
1969); D.C. Mueller, "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers", OJE. 
vol. 83, no. 4 (November 1969); W.F. Shughart and R.D. Tollison, 
"The Random Character of Merger Activity", Rand Journal of 
Economics. vol. 15, no. 4 (Winter 1984).
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difficulty working together. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
test certain regularities in merger activity and thereby arrive 
at a general theory of causation. This will then be used in 
conjunction with the historically unique factors to produce a 
more complete explanation of the first Canadian merger wave.
8.2 The buoyant stock market supposition
The most accepted explanation of the general cause of merger 
waves is the financial theory, so-called because of the central 
role played by "financial” as opposed to underlying "economic" 
factors. It is based on an observable correlation between 
intense spurts of merger activity and high security prices, 
consequently, the expression "buoyant stock market hypothesis"4 
better particularises such a relationship. As will be discussed 
below, however, the precise nature of the correlative 
relationship is so open to question that "supposition" rather 
than "hypothesis" more accurately describes the theoretical 
vagueness of this alleged relationship. The supposition is that 
merger waves are closely associated with, and perhaps caused by,
3 . . .  .On the difficulties of working with the two methods 
simultaneously, see J.R.T. Hughes, "Fact and Theory in Economic 
History", Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, vol. 3, no. 2 
(April 1966).
^his phrase was used in an unpublished working paper by R. 
Sylla, J.W. Wilson and C.P. Jones, "Financial Markets and the 
Great Merger Wave of 1895-1904", presented at the Washington 
Economic History Seminar, 29 April 1988.
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sustained bull markets in industrial share prices and that this 
positive correlation is consistently stronger than the 
correlation between merger waves and real economic activity 
generally measured by industrial output.
The correlation between security prices and merger activity 
has been tested in empirical studies conducted by Nelson, Hannah 
and Tilly on merger waves during the gilded age in the United 
States, Britain and Germany, respectively. The evidence thus far 
is consistent? a strong positive relationship between high share 
prices and merger waves holds for all the countries examined. 
While industrial production and merger activity in the United 
States were more highly correlated during periods of recession 
and depression, Nelson found that, relative to share prices, 
industrial production exhibited a weak correlation with mergers
5during the years of sustained merger activity. Hannah found 
that in a multiple regression of share prices and manufacturing 
production on merger activity, the relationship between the "real 
economic variable" of production and mergers was not only weaker 
than the relationship between the "financial" share price 
variable and mergers but that the former relationship was a 
negative rather than a positive one.6 In his small-sample study
5R. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry. 1895-1956 
(Princeton, N.J., 1959), pp. 116-121.
6L. Hannah, "Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 
1880-1918", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1974), 
p. 9.
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on German mergers, Tilly found a strong positive correlation 
between merger activity and share prices and a weak positive
. . • . 7correlation between merger activity and industrial production.
The buoyant stock market supposition also holds for Canada
with some qualifications. Testing was limited by the absence of
8a share price index covering the years before 1900. So few 
mergers before this date made public security issues or had any 
direct or indirect connection with the public stock exchanges 
that it would be dangerous to blindly regress share prices on 
Canadian merger activity before 1900, even if such data were 
available. Unfortunately, this eliminates a number of
observations thus constraining the number of independent 
variables used in any multiple regression analysis, particularly 
if a large number of lags are employed as they are in causality 
test analysis. To remedy this difficulty and to provide a 
comparison over a longer term, the new merger data was spliced 
onto the series of Canadian merger statistics generated by J.C.
7 .R. Tilly, "Mergers, External Growth, and Finance m  the
Development of Large-Scale Enterprise in Germany, 1880-1913",
JEH, vol. XLII, no. 3 (September 1982), pp. 649-50.
®The sole series of security prices I could locate covering 
the years of the gilded age and the interwar period was an index 
of Canadian common stock prices, 1900-1936=100, published by J.C. 
Weldon in "Consolidations in Canadian Industry, 1900-1948", 
Restrictive Trade Practices in Canada: Selected Readings, ed.
L.A. Skeoch (Toronto, 1966), pp. 236-37.
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Weldon.9
The regression results below indicate that a statistically 
significant correlation between merger activity and stock prices 
generally held throughout the period, 1900-1948. However, the 
relationship was weaker in the first years of the twentieth 
century relative to the years following the First World War. 
This can be explained by the fact that, although the tendency of 
Canadian firms to release their securities for public trading 
strengthened over time, even as late as the Canadian merger wave 
of 1909-1912, less than one-half of mergers involved public 
security issues and substantially less than this number had their 
shares listed on a public stock exchange.^5
More difficult to rationalise is the fact that between 193 6 
and 1942, the normally positive relationship between the two 
variables turned negative revealing a paradoxical exception to 
the general rule. This phenomenon is not unique to Canada. J.F. 
Weston noted a similar negative correlation between security 
prices and mergers in the United States between 1940 and 1947 and
Q . . . .Ibid. There are some methodological difficulties
concerning this procedure in that Weldon did not restrict his 
series to manufacturing industry as defined in the Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics' Standard Industrial Classification Manual 
of 1948. Nevertheless, the number of companies outside this 
definition constituted a relatively small percentage of the total 
sample justifying the use of the series for this purpose.
^See Table 25 in Appendix D.
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concluded that, at least for these years, ”depressed stock prices 
tended to stimulate mergers because buyers could acquire assets 
at a lower cost by purchasing another company, than by building 
the facilities themselves.”11 This could have been what occurred 
in Canada during the last years of the Great Depression given the 
number of companies forced to sell their assets at fire-sale
prices and the opportunities this presented to the few firms who
had managed to survive with a cash balance. Of course, this does 
not answer the question of why this occurred in Canada five years 
before a similar phenomenon appeared in the United States. More 
significantly, it brings into question the whole buoyant stock 
market supposition. In particular, how can low stock prices
dampen merger activity in one historical period of time while, in 
another, they stimulate merger activity?
We must consider the possibility that stock prices are a 
surrogate for the public’s expectations about future industrial 
investment —  the expected yield of capital. If these
expectations are optimistic, stock prices will be high and 
investment in external growth will be stimulated. This indirect 
relationship, however, can break down. In the depth of a 
depression (which, if severe and lengthy, can precipitate a 
collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital according to 
Keynes) or in a war economy, when the state takes over many
^J.F. Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large 
Firms (Berkeley, 1953) p. 81.
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market activities, stock prices may in fact become a very
y> .unreliable surrogate for such expectations. Although it cannot 
be within the purview of this present work to analyse this 
paradox, we can speculate that in such periods, stock prices may 
indeed exhibit little correlation with merger activity or even a 
statistically significant negative correlation.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that there was not a 
direct link between security prices and mergers during the gilded 
age. High-risk financing put a premium on unloading a huge 
amount of securities during the subscription period (generally 
one week). Timing a flotation to coincide with a bull market was 
more likely to produce a success than advancing a flotation in a 
bear market. The study of Max Aitken's activities suggests that 
the level of securities prices was a very important consideration 
to the merger-makers of the first Canadian merger wave. For 
example, when attempting to amalgamate a number of Canadian flour 
mills companies, Aitken was "very anxious to complete a
TO ,
Certainly, a prolonged economic depression or a state of 
war are factors capable of drastically changing existing 
expectations concerning the "prospective yield on capital”, an 
element more important than the current yield according to 
Keynes's formulation of the marginal efficiency of capital. 
Keynes emphasises the state of confidence of the business 
community as the most important determinant of the marginal 
efficiency of capital by being a determinant of the "state of 
long-term expectations". See J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of 
Employment. Interest, and Money (New York, first Harbinger ed., 
1964, orig. publ. 1936), pp. 47, 135-149.
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consolidation while the good bond market*' lasted. Aitken*s 
fellow promoters in the City of London felt the same way and 
urged him to rush the cement consolidation through while high 
stock prices prevailed in order to take advantage of the 
bullishness of the average British investor.^
Using the number of mergers as an index of merger activity 
the stock buoyancy supposition was tested on annual data over the 
entire period, 1900-1948, as well as over sub-periods within 
those years. Although the regressions are restricted to the 
spliced series, regressions on merger activity were also run 
using only Weldon*s series to check the consistency of both 
samples. Similar results were obtained in both cases.
In the following equations, the numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics, F refers to F-statistics, DW is the Durbin-Watson 
statistic and N refers to the number of observations in the 
sample. If ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation produced a DW 
statistic which did not permit rejecting the null hypothesis of 
serial correlation then a generalised least squares (GLS) 
estimate was made using the Cochrane-Orchutt method. Equation 
(1 ) tests the relationship between stock prices and mergers over
23
BBK, letter, Aitken to A.J. Adamson, 17 May 1909, 
A/42/misc W.
M BBK, letter, F. Dunsford of the Anglo-Canadian Finance 
Company, London, to Aitken, 30 June 19 09, A/32/Dunsford.
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T5the entire period, 1900-1948.
(1) MERGER(1900-1948) = -16.588 + 0.325STOCK
(-2.32) (9.27)
R-Bar-Squared * 0.79 F(2,45) « 89.51 DW *= 2.05
N « 49 GLS estimation
As shown in equation (2) the statistical significance of the 
stock-price coefficient drops for the years preceding 1919. The 
goodness-of-fit of the equation also diminishes considerably.
(2) MERGER(1900-1918) = -24.491 + 0.438STOCK
(-1.37) (1.70)
R-Bar-Squared = 0.52 F(2,15) = 10.23 DW = 1.73
N = 19 GLS estimation
By regressing the stock-price variable on only those mergers 
which listed their securities on a public exchange or sold at 
least a portion of their securities through a public flotation in 
equation (3), we can see the test results improve.
(3) NEWMERGER(1900-1918) = -20.659 + 0.317STOCK
(-2.11) (2.42)
R-Bar-Squared = 0.63 F(2,15) * 15.59 DW ■ 1.94
N = 19 GLS estimation
^Equations (1) through (4) were also run using firm 
disappearances in place of mergers as dependent variable. The 
results were consistent in all respects with only a slight 
reduction in their statistical significance. D*« tk* v.ry Urj* »-
ofVi'tiin't .tin* fk# lovrf , K*S«.
CiKMM. Tkit P^ bltwi I«t T*l(Us ,
*^The variable NEWMeRGER was obtained by removing all those 
mergers in Appendix D which did not have at least one of these 
two characteristics.
When the period 1900-1948 was disaggregated into further 
sub-periods, a major structural break was discovered. Between 
193 5 and 1942, the simple stock-price model of merger activity 
loses its predictive ability. During these years, particularly 
from 1935 to 1939, stock prices have a negative correlation with 
merger activity. This predictive failure of the model is
illustrated in Figures 26 and 27.17
In equation (4) the goodness-of-fit for the share-price 
variable increases remarkably when the years after the structural 
break are excluded.
(4) MERGER(1900-1934) = -29.143 + 0.505STOCK
(-9.42) (15.99)
R-Bar-Squared = 0.88 F(l,33) = 255.69 DW = 1.85
N = 35 OLS estimation
In the following section, causality testing of other
variables against the stock-price variable will be restricted to 
the years 1900-1934. It is a period, however, which not only 
frames the two major Canadian merger booms before the Second 
World War but also includes the critical years of the Great
Depression.
^Appendix E, pp. 283 and 284, respectively. Figure 27 
illustrates the nature of the structural break when the first 
difference operators of mergers and stock prices are regressed.
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8.3 The Granger and Sims tests of causality
The above analysis is limited to simple correlations. 
Little or nothing can be said about causation. To begin 
constructing a general explanation of merger activity, however, 
it is necessary to examine the causative links between merger 
activity and stock prices and between merger activity and other 
variables. Clark, Chakrabarti and Chiang have recently applied 
causality tests to search for the causative links in American
no
mergers between 1919 and 1979. The Granger direct test of 
causality and Sims's two-sided regression test of causality are 
similarly applied to the Canadian data and the results tabulated
. . TQin Appendix E.
Before the procedure is described, the nature of the 
causality implied in these tests and the appropriate context 
within which to place the results must be clarified. At present, 
there is significant debate in philosophy concerning the meaning 
of "causality” and this is mirrored in the controversy in the 
econometrics literature about the nature of causality in
Tp
J.J. Clark, A.K. Chakrabarti and T.C. Chiang, "Stock 
Prices and Merger Movements: Interactive Relations",
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. vol. 124, no. 2 (1988).
TQ
See Tables 26 and 27, pp. 279 and 280, respectively. The 
original specification of these tests can be found in C.W.J. 
Granger, "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models 
and Cross-Spectral Methods", Econometrica. vol. 37, no. 3 (July 
1969); C.A. Sims, "Money, Income and Causality", AER. vol. LXII, 
no. 3 (June 1972).
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estimation procedures. One of the more accepted philosophical 
definitions of causation, ••predictability according to a law or a 
set of laws”, differs somewhat from •'a reduction in forecasting 
variance with respect to a particular information set", the 
definition of causality proposed by the econometrician Clive 
Granger in his direct estimation procedure.20 In particular, if 
X and Y are two time series sets and if past data about X can be 
use to acquire a more accurate forecast of the predicted value of
Y than could have been acquired from past data about y alone,
21then Y can be said to be caused by X.
Although the concept of law or theory does not appear in 
Granger's definition, Zellner has pointed out the danger of 
testing without regard to some a priori theoretical framework, 
what he terms a ,flaw or a set of laws”. These so-called laws can 
be based on information which is fully quantitative (metrical), 
semi-quantitative (topological) or entirely qualitative. The 
qualitative information obtained from the case study of 
investment banking and merger promotion in Chapters Three and 
Four which suggest a direct causative relationship between stock 
prices and merger activity provides us with strong a priori
^ h e  summaries of the philosophical and econometric 
definitions are drawn from Arnold Zellner's discussion in 
"Causality and Econometrics”, Three Aspects of Policy and Policy- 
Making: Knowledge. Data and Institutions, eds K. Brunner and A.H. 
Meltzer (Amsterdam, 1979).
^J.J. Clark, A.K. Chakrabarti and T.C. Chiang, o p .cit.. p.
288.
22B
grounds.
The Granger estimation procedure can be specified as:
A V(t) -T*' .a <k) AY(t-Je) + £ T' b(j) AX(t-j) + e(t) 
k - l  7=1
where Y(t) and X(t) are two stationary series with a(k) and b (j) 
as the corresponding coefficients? e(t) is a disturbance term 
without autocorrelation. The first difference operator, A  , is 
used to transform the data into a stationary series and to dampen 
possible multicollinearity produced as a result of a common time 
trend. Under the null hypothesis that X(t) does not "cause” 
Y(t), we set b(j) * 0 for j * l,2,...,n. In addition to the 
lagged variables, a contemporaneous variable is also included to 
test the importance of the contemporaneous variable relative the 
lagged variables and to test the hypothesis that no causation
exists at all. By placing X as the dependent variable we can
perform the Granger procedure in the reverse direction to test
the null hypothesis that Y does not cause X, specified as 
follows:
A X(t) -f^A(k) AX(t-k) +Ij_B(j)A Y(t-j) + e(t)
In a further causality test, the Sims procedure specified 
below is used to estimate whether the coefficients on the future 
values are statistically significant:
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A  Y (t) = y Tr' A(j) A X(t-j) + 7 ’" B(j)AX(t+j) + e(t) 
*-J=o _ T = i
A(j) is the coefficient on the current and lagged values of 
X and B (j) is the coefficient on the future values of X. Reverse 
causation in the Sims test can be specified as follows:
AX(t) Av(t-j) +£jV b(j)AY(t+j) + e(t)
Both tests of causality employ F-statistics derived from 
constrained and unconstrained equations to determine whether 
causation exists as well as the direction of causation. These 
causation results are illustrated in Tables 18, 19 and 20 below. 
When the null hypothesis is rejected, causation and its direction 
are indicated by an arrow, ~=>. When the null hypothesis is 
accepted the symbol =/=> denotes no causal direction. The 
asterisk, *, indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. The 
dependent variable is, in all cases, the number of mergers in 
Canadian manufacturing industry.
From Table 18, we can conclude that there is an interactive 
relationship between stock prices and merger activity and that 
this relationship is largely contemporaneous, with high stock 
prices causing mergers but mergers in turn producing higher stock 
prices. According to the individual t-tests, this relationship 
holds to a more limited degree when the independent variable is 
lagged one period. Stock prices as recorded in the existing year
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Table 18
GRANGER AND SIMS TESTS ON THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MERGER ACTIVITY (M) AND STOCK PRICES (S)
(Canada, 1900-1934)
Equations Hypothesis F-stat Causation
Granger Test lagged variables=0
(1) & (2 ) b (1)=...=b(4)=0 0.53 S =/=> M
(1) & (3) b (0)=...=b(4)=0 6 .02* S ===> M
(8 ) & (9) B(l)=...=B(4)=0 3.58* M ===> S
(8 ) & (1 0) B (0)=...=B(4)=0 18.49* M ===> S
Sims Test future variables = 0
(1) & (24) b (1)=...=b(4)=0 4.02* S ===> M
(1) & (18) B (1)=...=B(4)=0 2.48* M ===> S
| SOURCE: Tables 26 and 27, Appendix E.
and in the preceding year cause merger activity and, conversely, 
contemporaneous as well as past-period merger activity cause high 
stock prices.
It is likely that the feedback effect between stock 
prices and mergers, when it reaches a fevered pitch, produces 
the phenomenon we call merger waves. Before we can pursue this 
possibility, we should determine the relationship between mergers 
and other variables, particularly underlying "economic” variables 
such as industrial output as was done by Nelson and Hannah as 
well as by Clark, Chakrabarti and Chiang in their more recent 
study. Unfortunately, we are faced with a statistical limitation 
in this respect. There are no annual series of industrial output
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statistics for Canada covering the relevant period. Morris 
Altman has recently completed an annual series of real value 
added for Canadian manufacturing industry but it ends in 1924 
thereby preventing causality testing over the period 1900 to 
1934.22
In its place, real gross national product (GNP) will be used 
as a proxy for general economic conditions to test against the 
financial factor of stock prices. The causality results depicted 
below in Table 19, indicate again an interactive relationship 
between the buoyancy of the economy as a whole and merger 
activity. These findings point out the danger of relying on an 
exclusively financial theory of merger causation. It appears 
that merger activity is encouraged during the prosperous periods 
of the business cycle and that the business cycle itself is 
affected by merger activity, no doubt through the large amount of 
investment represented by rapid rates of external growth. These 
results, though not as statistically significant as the results 
in Table 18, suggest that underlying economic factors are likely 
important in encouraging merger activity and that external growth
^4. Altman, o p . cit.. table 9, p p .  52-53. In a  series of 
two-variable and multi-variable regressions the manufacturing 
variable was not statistically significant. For example:
MERGER(1900-1926) « -40.836 + 0.660STOCK - 0.002MANUF
(-6.02) (5.73) (-0.18)
R-Bar-Squared *= 0.68 F(2,24) « 28.97 DW « 1.73
N *= 27 OLS estimation
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through consolidation and acquisition is a factor in the real 
growth of an economy.
Table 19
GRANGER AND SIMS TESTS ON THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MERGER ACTIVITY (M) AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (G)
(Canada, 1900-1934)
Equations Hypothesis F-stat Causation
Granger Test lagged and contempo­
raneous variables=0
(1 ) & (4) b(l)=. ..=b(4)=0 1.54 A G =/=> A M
(1 ) & (5) b (0 ) =. ..=b(4)=0 3.44* A G ===> A M
(1 1) & (1 2) B(l)=. ..=B(4)=0 1.42 A M =/=>A G
(1 1) & (13) B (0) — •..=B(4)=0 3.31* A M ===> A G
Sims Test future variables « 0
(25) & (26) b(l)=. . . *=b (4) =0 2.23* A G ===> A M
(19) & (2 0) B(l)«. ..=B(4)=0 3.54* A M ===>A G
SOURCE: Tables 26 and 27, Appendix E.
Based on a priori grounds as well as the case study evidence 
already presented, interest rates may determine the level of 
merger activity in two ways. Given that acquisitions and 
consolidations involve a purchase of existing assets, the level 
of interest rates would appear to be an important determinant of 
the decision by owners to choose this growth strategy relative to 
a strategy of assembling new assets, what we call internal 
growth. We can call this the merger investment hypothesis.
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The interest rate variable is also important from the point 
of view of the merger promoter. Max Aitken, for example, 
depended upon large amounts of borrowed money to finance his 
options to purchase and, if the consolidation went forward, to 
cover the cash portion of the purchase of the assets of existing 
industry owners and to provide immediate operating expenses for 
the new entity. Promoters, therefore, by means of call-loans, 
borrowed very large amounts of money on a short-term basis 
recouping their outlays with the successful issue of the 
consolidation's securities. It seems logical, therefore, that 
the lower the cost of borrowing such money the greater the 
capacity of promoters to engage in further merger activity. We 
can call this the capacity hypothesis.
In testing the above hypotheses against merger activity, we 
are limited to a long-term rate of interest due to the 
unavailability of short-term interest rate data covering the 
years in question. According to Table 20 below, we must accept 
the null hypothesis of no relationship between merger activity 
and interest rates. It must be emphasised, however, that we 
cannot accurately test the capacity hypothesis or perhaps even 
the merger investment hypothesis without a short-term interest 
rate variable and until we have such data it is dangerous to draw 
any definite conclusions from these causality results.
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Table 20
GRANGER AND SIMS TESTS ON THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MERGER ACTIVITY (M) AND INTEREST RATES (I)
(Canada, 1900-1934)
Equations Hypothesis F-stat Causation
Granger Test lagged* and contempo­
raneous variable=0
(1 ) & (6) b(l)“ ...=b(4)=0 0.09 A I =/=>A M
(1) & (7) b (0 )=• . .*b(4)**0 0.15 A I =/=> A M
(14) & (15) B (1)— •..=B(4)=0 0.58 A M -/«> A I
(14) & (16) B (0 )=• ..=B(4)=0 0.59 A M =/=> A I
Sims Test future variables=0
(27) & (28) b(l)=. ..=b(4)=0 0.34 A I =/=> A M
(2 1) & (2 2) B (1)=• ..=B(4)=0 1.40 A M =/=> A I
SOURCE: Tables 26 and 27, Appendix E.
An alternate measure of merger activity, firm disappearances, was 
used as a control on the main results by recalculating all the 
causality tests using firm disappearances as the dependent 
variable in place of the number of mergers. The results confirm 
to a considerable degree the results obtained using the number of
. 23mergers as a dependent variable.
Consequently, it appears that there is an interactive and 
largely contemporaneous positive causative relationship between
23 .See Tables 28 and 29 in Appendix E, pp. 281 and 282,
respectively.
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merger activity on the one hand and stock prices as well as the 
general level of economic growth on the other hand. Of the two, 
the stronger relationship is that between merger activity and 
stock prices. This aggregate result confirms the micro evidence 
of the importance placed by promoters on the level of stock 
prices in bringing forward merger propositions but it also
reveals that merger activity itself produces higher stock prices.
In effect, this suggests that once stock prices are high 
enough to initiate considerable merger activity the process
begins to feed upon itself pushing stock prices even higher.
The process comes to an abrupt halt through a severe shock which 
appears to be endogenous to the system itself —  the collapse of 
a significant industrial flotation and, along with it, the
temporary loss of confidence in the promoters and investment 
banks behind the issue. The failure of a major industrial issue 
can trigger the failure of other issues, which in turn can 
further erode confidence in the financial system as a whole. In 
Keynes's terms, the marginal efficiency of capital collapses and 
industrial securities become undervalued when only days before 
they were overvalued. Such "market corrections" during the 
gilded age tended to be extreme.
^This close connection between mergers and stock-price 
activity is certainly plausible in the Canadian case before 1914 
as the majority of listed "industrials" had experienced some form 
of merger activity in the preceding five years. AFR. vol. XIV 
(Hay 1914) .
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION
The case study information in Chapters Two through Five can 
now be combined with the aggregate data and causality tests of 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight to present a more complete analysis 
of the connections between corporate promotion, mergers and the 
finance of manufacturing industry during the gilded age. 
Although the methodology employed in both parts may seem 
incompatible, the insights obtained from each can be fused into a 
coherent whole not qualified by the limitations of a macro or a 
micro analysis standing alone.
The technological and organisational changes wrought during 
the second industrial revolution in Canada markedly increased the 
fixed costs of manufacturing firms. This produced a demand for
capital that often exceeded the amount that could be delivered by
profit retention, investment by family or local community
members, or by short-term bank advances. Large amounts of 
capital began to be delivered through the pooling together of the 
funds of thousands of investors, the vast majority of whom had no 
direct connection to the enterprise being funded.
A specialised group of financiers known as corporate
promoters emerged to facilitate the transfer of individual 
savings to manufacturing enterprises. These promoters worked to
237
increase the supply of capital by enlarging the potential pool of 
savings. This was done through the creation of new markets for 
industrial securities and the expansion of the share of savings 
that individual investors were willing to earmark for industrial 
companies relative to other forms of investment including 
government securities and bank deposits. The well-publicised 
security flotation based on pyramidal, high-risk financial 
methods provided the maximum profit incentive possible to 
promoters, underwriters and brokers to search out investors and 
sell the new industrial issues. At the same time, the tremendous 
cost associated with the failure of a flotation was a powerful 
motivation to make issues successful even at the expense of some 
short-term loss.
Corporate promoters were in fact merger promoters as 
consolidations became an essential ingredient in facilitating 
capital issues. The promoter's most important job was to 
"package" the industrial firm in such a way that investors would 
be eager to purchase its securities. This often meant 
constructing new corporate entities through merger. From the 
promoter's perspective industrial flotations and mergers were 
closely connected in two ways. First, firms had to be a certain 
"minimum" size to appeal to public investors. Investors were 
attracted to industrial enterprises with some degree of monopoly 
power and, therefore, which held out the possibility of monopoly 
profits. In industries plagued by overproduction, investors
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assumed that some control over price and output was necessary to 
achieve a minimum level of profitability. Large consolidations 
seemed to promise both monopoly profits and price stability. 
Second, industrial enterprises had to be above a critical size 
before a quotation on a major public stock exchange would be 
permitted. Although a flotation could occur without a subsequent 
public listing, investors were willing to pay more for the 
securities of enterprises they knew would eventually be listed. 
The quotation was itself the mark of a "quality industrial" and 
stock exchanges were thought to reduce fluctuations in the price 
of the securities. From the perspective of the industrial's 
major shareholders, large size was desirable in that it reduced 
the average cost of the capital issue. Given the size of most 
firms in the late nineteenth century, only external growth 
instantaneously achieved through a multi-firm consolidation could 
provide the requisite size to immediately realize all three 
objectives.
Merger promoters, particularly those that initiated 
consolidations, became the dominant financiers of Canadian 
industry at the peak of the Laurier boom which coincided 
precisely with the merger wave of 1909-1912. Max Aitken is 
likely the most extreme example of the promoter who concentrated 
as much on originating mergers as in facilitating finance. 
Naturally, promoters who were responsible for overturning 
traditional methods of finance and who acted as principals rather
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than as mere financial agents, disturbed the status quo, 
producing repercussions within the Canadian polity. The reaction 
took two forms. Mergers themselves were criticised for gouging 
the consumer, preventing new competition, and other non­
competitive practices. Some promoters, in particular Aitken, 
were accused of profiteering and defrauding company treasuries. 
A populist coalition pressured the federal government into taking 
action to stem the tide of mergers. This opposition was not 
successful, however, in obtaining effective antitrust legislation 
or in gaining free trade which, according to the populists, would 
have stripped away tariff protection and thereby destroyed the 
"combines".
Nonetheless, tariff protection did not shield these 
companies from the competition of new entrants which were often 
in the form of branch plants set up by American corporations to 
circumvent high duties. Moreover, it gave no advantage to the 
new consolidations in competing on the international
marketplace. In fact, the export market established by Canada 
Cement, Canadian Car and Stelco was modest. Although all three 
companies quickly instituted managerial and organisational 
changes that characterised the most modern industrial enterprises 
of the twentieth century none pursued an aggressive strategy of 
foreign direct investment. This ”failing" appears to have been 
common to many of the Canadian consolidations created during the 
Laurier boom and to Canadian industrial enterprises generally.
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To explain the appearance of the merger wave of 1909-1912 we 
must reconstruct the stages of a high-risk flotation. First, 
options to purchase were obtained from those companies interested 
in entering the merger. Once agreement was reached, a new entity 
was incorporated. The promotional syndicate would then purchase 
the senior securities of the company at an agreed-upon price 
taking the common shares as promotional profit. The stock would 
then be underwritten and sub-underwritten. With the publication 
of a prospectus stating the value and earning-power of the 
amalgamated assets as well as the objectives of the new entity, 
the securities would be released for public sale through an 
initial subscription heavily advertised by the original syndicate 
and the underwriters. A common stock bonus, a more popular 
feature in North America than in Britain, was offered to these 
investors depending on the inherent strength of the senior 
securities and on the nature of the capital market.
If the stock was fully subscribed or, even better, 
oversubscribed, applications would then be made to have the 
senior securities listed on the stock exchange as promised in the 
prospectus. The choice of exchange depended on where it was 
likely that most future trading in the stock would take place. 
If mainly Canadian investors were involved, then a listing on the 
Toronto and Montreal exchanges would suffice, but if a large 
number of British investors were already involved or if British 
brokers and investors would participate in future security
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issues, an application would be made to the London Stock 
Exchange. The whole process, from merger negotiations to public 
listing, could take as little time as three months or as much 
time as three years. This depended on the difficulty of 
negotiations and the obstacles in obtaining a quotation on the 
London Stock Exchange.
The money thus raised from the public subscription would be 
used to carry out the merger plans as indicated in the prospectus 
which generally included rationalisation and the erection of new 
plant and equipment. The consequences of the merger afterwards 
depended more on the management put in place, the corporate 
strategies evolved, and the trajectory of the industry 
itself, than on the initial financial advantages or 
disadvantages. The impact of finance capitalism with its legacy 
of overcapitalisation and high-debt loads was ultimately a 
temporary one.
While extraordinary profits provided the motive, high stock 
prices furnished the opportunity for mergers. According to both 
the case study research and the aggregate statistical evidence, 
the industrial flotations of newly consolidated mergers were 
dependent on stock market conditions. New merger flotations 
would begin during an upward rise in stock prices, flourish 
during an extended period of high prices and then die off with a 
sustained downward movement of stock market prices. Causality
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tests demonstrate that there was a significant feedback effect in 
that intense merger activity also pushed up stock prices.
Before a sustained wave of merger activity was possible, 
however, an extensive market for Canadian industrial securities 
had to be created. The high stock prices at the turn of the 
century did not produce a significant merger movement in Canada 
because no such market yet existed. This contrasts with merger 
movements at that time in the United States, Britain and Germany, 
all of which had recently witnessed the emergence of markets for 
industrial securities. The market for Canadian industrials was 
being created by high-risk financial methods at the turn of the 
century but there were still too few large manufacturing firms 
and the Canadian investment community was too shallow to support 
a full-blown merger wave. The tremendous growth of manufacturing 
firms combined with the creation of an extensive market in 
Britain for Canadian industrial securities in the following 
decade, were the necessary pre-conditions for the first major 
merger wave. The recurrence of high stock prices in 19 09 was 
sufficient tinder to start the movement.
Merger activity does not occur in a "financial” vacuum, 
however. The level of economic growth must be substantial enough 
to support the average investor's optimistic expectations or a 
speculative phase cannot occur. A simple stock buoyancy theory 
of merger activity, therefore, will never be adequate. This is
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the reason why merger movements are restricted to periods of 
economic prosperity irrespective of the relative level of stock 
prices. This economic factor explains why the normally positive 
correlation between stock prices and merger activity became 
negative during the later years of the Great Depression in 
Canada.
Since the first merger movements of the gilded age, 
sustained bull markets have always been marked by merger activity 
of one type or another. At first, multi-firm consolidations 
constituted the bulk of this activity but acquisitions became 
much more important by the merger boom of the 1920s and dominated 
the post-World War II era. New methods of merger financing 
continue to drive the financial system. Moreover, in this 
process of creative destruction, they may even be capable of once 
again shaking the system to its knees. In New York, where high- 
risk merger flotations were pioneered, the consequences of the 
rise and decline of "junk-bond” financing reverberates throughout 
the financial centres of the world. At the same time, some very 
familiar arguments about the role of promoters, the nature of 
security financing, and its role in the real economy are being 
raised.1
**M. Schrage, "Drexel's Demise Should Be a Warning About 
Financial Innovations”, The Washington Post. 16 February 1990.
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APPENDIX A
REAL GROWTH IN THE CANADIAN ECONOMY, 1885-1918: 
TOTAL GROWTH, SECTORAL GROWTH AND GROWTH 
BY SIC (1948) MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUPS
SOURCE: Derived from M. Altman, "Revised Estimates of Real
Canadian GNP and Growth and Pre and Post World War Two Volatility 
of the Canadian Business Cycle with some Comparison to the 
American Record", unpublished paper, Department of Economics, 
University of Saskatchewan, 1989.
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY FLOTATIONS 
IN LONDON: January, 1905 to December, 1913
SOURCE: Derived from F.W. Field, Capital Investments in Canada
(Toronto, 3rd ed., 1914), Appendix, List of Canadian Flotations
in London, January, 1905, to March, 1912, pp. 259-282.
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Year
1905
1905
1905
1906
1906
1907
1907
1908
1908
1908
1908
1909
1909
1909
1909
1909
1909
1909
1909
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
Table 21
LIST OF CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY FLOTATIONS 
IN LONDON: JANUARY, 1905 TO DECEMBER, 1913 
(£ thousands)
Month Name of Company
Nominal
Amount
Issued
at
Actual
Amount
Mar Imperial Paper Mills
May Western Can Pulp & P
Aug Western Can Cem & Coal
60
300
225
585
par
par
par
60
300
225
585
Feb Cdn General Electric
Jun Cdn Pac Sulphite Pulp
220
83
303
142.5
par
314
83
397
Jun Annapolis Iron Co
Oct Cdn General Electric
140
400
540
92
par
129
400
529
Jan Penmans, Limited
Jul Penmans, Limited
Jul Western Can Flour Mills
Oct Canada Iron Corp
300
170
225
364
1059
97.5 
par 
par
99.5
293
170
225
362
1050
Jan Montreal Cotton Co 200 97.5
Feb British-Cdn Asbestos Co 144 95
Feb National Drug & Chemical 300 par
Apr Lake Superior Corp 1029 90
Jul Dominion Iron & Steel 1200 93
Jul Standard Chemical Co 100 98.5
Oct Canada Cement Company 360 93
Nov Cdn Car & Foundry 648 95
195 
137 
300 
926 
1116 
96 
335 
616
3981 3721
Jan Canada Cement Company 206 par
Feb Cdn Car & Foundry 483 par
Feb Amalgamated Asbestos 624 92
May Nova Scotia Steel & Coal 309 95
May Cdn Oil Prod & Refining 75 par
Jun Dominion Sawmills 800 95
Jul Steel Co of Canada 925 110
Jul National Drug & Chemical 49 par
206
483
575
294
75
760
1017
49
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Year
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1912
1912
1912
1912
1912
1912
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
Nominal Issued Actual
Month Name of ComDanv Amount at Amount
Aug Noiseless Typewriter Co 20 par 20
Nov Lake Sup Iron & Chem 616 par 616
Nov Cdn Mills & Timber 100 par 100
Nov Price Bros & Co 1000 87 870
Nov Cdn North Pacific Fish 400 86 344
Dec Western Can Bag & Env 12 par 12
5619 5421
Mar Cdn Steel Foundries 411 par 411
Mar P Burns & Co. 200 par 200
Mar Lake Superior Paper Co 719 97 697
Mar Spanish River Pulp & P 267 98.5 263
Mar Std Chemical Iron & Lum 200 par 200
Apr Canadian Cottons, Ltd 370 93 344
May Cockshutt Plow Co 750 102 765
May Ames-Holden-McCready 206 101 208
Jun Belding Paul & Cortic 154 90 154
Jun Steel Co of Canada 200 94 188
Jun Dominion Sawmills 1028 97.5 1002
Jun Mond Nickel Co 250 par 250
Nov Wpg Paint & Glass Co 82 par 82
Dec B C Fisheries, Ltd 125 par 125
4965 4889
Apr Dominion Steel Corp 1000 95 950
May Algoma Steel Corp 1130 93 1051
Jun Calgary Brewing & Malt 247 86 212
Jun Riordan Pulp & Paper Co 317 97 307
Jun Riordan Pulp & Paper Co 158 95 151
Oct B C Breweries Ltd 583 95 554
3435 3225
May Phoenix Bridge & Iron 154 96 148
May Phoenix Bridge & Iron 164 50 82
May Cdn Car & Foundry 185 114 211
Jun Dominion Canners, Ltd 154 99.5 153
Jun Dominion Glass Co 296 97.5 288
Jun Imperial Tobacco Co 417 par 417
Jun National Drug & Chemicl 200 par 200
Jul British North Am Tobac 50 par 50
Jul Cdn Car & Foundry 308 107 330
Jul J H Sherrard Manuf Co 150 par 150
Oct Nova Scotia Steel & Coal 200 98 196
Oct San Martin Manuf Co 150 par 150
Nov Dominion Steel Corp 700 97 679
Nov Spanish River Pulp & P 300 96 288
3428 3342
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APPENDIX C
CASE STUDY OF CANADIAN CAR AND FOUNDRY COMPANY, LIMITED 
LONDON SHARE FLOTATION OF 1909
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The following information concerning the underwriting and 
brokering of Canadian Car and Foundry Company’s preference share 
flotation was derived from the documentation submitted by the 
company to the London Stock Exchange concerning an application to 
list $3.5 million common shares and $5.0 million preference 
shares.1 Most of the preference shares were sold to British 
investors during the London flotation of November, 1909. A large 
portion of the common stock was distributed to the various 
underwriters and brokers of the City of London who participated 
in the flotation in payment for their services, despite the 
company's official statement to the London Stock Exchange that 
the entire block of the $3.5 million common shares had "been 
allotted to the shareholders of the amalgamating Companies... in 
payment for property and assets.11.
Included in the documentation was a list of the largest 
shareholders of Canadian Car common stock. Although dated some 
nine months after Canadian Car's preferred stock flotation, the 
document is of value in determining the cluster of British 
investment bankers and brokers involved in the flotation of one 
of the largest Canadian industrials during the gilded age. Table 
22 below is a list of those underwriters and brokers holding
^JSE, MS 18000/145B/759, application to grant a quotation 
for common stock and seven per cent cumulative preferred stock of 
Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited dated 4 March 1910.
2Ibid.
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Canadian Car common stock, ranked according to the size of their 
holdings. With the exception of one name, all had a City of 
London address.
Table 22
ENGLISH UNDERWRITERS AND BROKERS IN THE 
CANADIAN CAR PREFERENCE SHARE FLOTATION OF NOVEMBER, 1909
Name
Common shares 
par value ($)
Western Canada Trust 1,029 400
Fielding Son & MacLeod 629 000
Sperling & Co. 247 700
A.V. Gehlcken (Western Trust Co.) 120 700
T.E. Johns 118 000
Western Canada Trust (I.H. Benn) 86 600
W. MacLeod (Fielding Son & MacLeod) 80 100
Canadian Agency 58 000
E.F. Kelly 40 000
E.G. Redpath (Carr Sons & Tod) 28 900
F.G. Scott (Carr Sons & Tod) 27 000
Lazard Bros. & Co. 27 000
Tomkinson Brunton & Co. 26 200
Holland & Balfour 23 000
Speyer Bros. 22 000
Baker Mason & Co. 18 700
Carl Meyer 15 000
Kleinwort Sons & Co. 15 000
A.E. Bowen 13 500
A.G. Tontes 13 000
L. Gerald 11 200
2,650 000
SOURCE: Derived from LSE, MS 18000/145B/759, list of the
largest holdings in Canadian Car common stock contained in 
a document dated 22 August 1910.
^This was E.F. Kelly whose address was noted as Newbury, 
Berkshire, England.
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The list is an eclectic mixture. Large and established 
investment banks, such as Kleinwort, Sons & Co., Lazard Bros. & 
Co. and Speyer Bros.4, are included along with small jobbing and 
brokerage houses now long forgotten. Some of these smaller
firms, such as Western Canada Trust, the Canadian Agency and
. . .  . . . 5Sperling & Co., specialised m  Canadian security issues.
Ian Hamilton Benn of the Western Canadian Trust Company and 
William MacLeod of Fielding Son & MacLeod were the most 
significant members of the English promotional syndicate. They 
distributed Canadian Car's securities among a broad group of 
underwriting and brokerage houses? and important factor in one of 
the most successful Canadian industrial issues floated on the 
London market during the Canadian merger wave. The profits that 
went to their firms amounted to an aggregate par value of 
$1,658,4 00. Given that a $100 par value Canadian Car common 
stock was worth over $60 when first listed in Canada in early 
1910 (rising to a high of $90 in 1911) , this was a considerable 
profit and goes far to explain "the City's" enthusiasm for 
Canadian industrial flotations. Moreover, in their capacity as 
individual underwriters, Benn and MacLeod received an aggregate
4See S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London, 
1984), pp. 200-201.
5See R.C. Michie, "Dunn, Fischer & Co. in the City of 
London, 1906-14”, BH, vol. XXX, no. 2 (April 1988) for an 
informative summary of the London firms specialized in Canadian 
securities.
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of $166,700 par value common stock as profit.
The Canadian Agency, a London investment bank that had begun 
to specialize in Canadian municipal, industrial, railway and land 
issues by 1906,6 had been responsible for Canada Cement*s London 
flotation of October, 1909. The initial reception to Canada 
Cement's shares was quite good but within a couple of weeks the 
whole issue became "stuck" and the price of the shares began to 
plummet. Aitken sent his top employee to London to investigate 
the situation. They concluded that the Canadian Agency had been 
responsible for the failure of the flotation by not widely enough 
distributing the underwriting of Canada Cement securities. This 
left a bad impression among the various jobbers and brokers 
interested in Canadian securities who then refused to recommend 
the issue. Aitken was furious enough to ensure that the Canadian 
Agency was not put in charge of the Canadian Car and Stelco 
promotional syndicates. Nevertheless, he was concerned about the 
possibility of retaliation and, therefore, allowed the firm to
. 7handle a smaller slice of his subsequent issues.
%arl Grey (Fourth Earl) Papers, Department of Paleography 
and Diplomatic, University of Durham, memorandum by Arthur 
Grenfell on the Canadian Agency, 1914. I am grateful to R.
Michie for informing me about the existence of this archival 
material.
7BBK, letter, Aitken to MacLeod, 18 November 1909, A/38 W.M. 
MacLeod; letters, Aitken and Killam, 14 November 1909, 19 
November 1909, A/36/Killam.
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There were very few large holdings of Canadian Car's common 
stock by Canadian residents.8 Neither Max Aitken nor the Royal 
Securities Corporation held any common stock in the company. 
Aitken and E.R. Wood, the main members of the Canadian 
promotional syndicate, decided at the last minute not to take the 
risk involved in the English flotation thereby giving up a common 
stock profit. As Aitken explained to a colleague:
Wood and I were entitled to 25% of common stock, but we 
let this go altogether rather than take our chances on 
the English issue...The expectation of a good profit 
flitted during the night time, and for the sake of 
avoiding liability I found myself no great amount to 
the good.
^There were only four significant Canadian holdings. 
Nathaniel Curry held $110,000 of common stock while M. Curry, a 
family member, held $13,400. Nathaniel Curry was the President 
of Rhodes Curry and became the new President of Canadian Car. 
The Curry family likely received these shares as payment for 
promotional services and for their shares in Rhodes Curry. A 
member of the large Toronto brokerage house of H. O'Hara & Co.
held $197,700 and J. Redmond of Montreal held $20,000. Both were
likely involved in marketing the small amount of Canadian Car
preference stock reserved for the Canadian market and these 
amounts represent their profits: LSE, MS 18000/145B/759, list of
largest holdings of Canadian Car common stock dated 22 August 
1910.
Q ,
BBK, letter, Aitken to Johnston, 9 November 1909,
A/41/Thompson, Tilley & Johnston.
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APPENDIX D
MERGERS IN CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1885-1918
2 6 1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Jurisdiction of incorporation
and Head office
BC: British Columbia
Fed: Canadian federal laws
Mass: Massachusetts, US
NB: New Brunswick
NS: Nova Scotia
ON: Ontario
PQ: Quebec
General sources of data
AR: Archive
BH: Business history
FM: Financial manual
IC: Industrial Canada
(monthly periodical)
IN: Industrial history
GO: Government Report
MT: Monetary Times
MTAR: Monetary Times Annual Review
TH: Thesis
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TABLE 23
MERGERS BY ALPHABETICAL CODE
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1BB5-1918
MERGER CORPORATE NAME OF MER6ER DATE OF HEAD INCORF SOURCE OF DATA NO. OF
CODE MERGER OFFICE MERGER
AASB Aaaigaaated Asbestos Corporation. Ltd. 04/10/09 Montreal - NT 10 April 09. 1815 95
ACAD Acacia Sugar Rennery Coapany 06/04/93 Halifax - MT 4 Auo 93. 131 30
ACCA Acae Can Nor is, Ltd. 10/31/05 Montreal - 1C Oct 05. 218 73
ACHE Acat Rotor Carnage Machinery Coapany, Liaitec 10/22/10 Haailton - MT 22 Oct 10. 1723 123
ADAH The Adaas Tobacco Coapany 01/09/85 Montreal - MT 9 Jar. 85. 769 1
AMES Aees Hoi can Coapar., 03/01/89 Montreal - MT 1 March B9, 994 6
AHHO Aees-Hc;den McCreadv. Ltd. 03/04/11 Montreal - MT 4 March 11. 932 129
AN DR «nc.o-Bntish Coluabia Packing Co., Ltd. 05/22/90 Ne« Nest BC UP MT 22 May 91. 1429 13
ASEF Aseoto Soap. Ltd. 04/02/10 St John Nb - MT 2 April 1(1, 1420 no
ATF1 The Atlantic Fist. Coapany, Liaited 06/29/0? Lunenburg NS - MT 29 June 07. 2086 83
BA Do Badgerow, Faulkner Vinega- Manukactunng Co. 10/18/89 Toronto - MT 18 Oct 89. 45o 10
BftN The British Coluabia Canning Coapany 03/29/89 London UK UK MT 29 March 89 7
BC1F British Coluabia iron Manufacturing Coapany 04/18/02 Victoria - MT 18 April 02. 1354 57
BCIN British Coluabia Iron Norks Coapany 10/28/92 Vancouver - MT 28 Oct 92, 48' 26
BCPA British Coluabia Packers Association 05/20/02 New Nest BC US FM AFR(III 21) 58
BCP.E B'ltish Coluabia breweries Ltd. 10/26/12 Montreal - MT 26 Oct 12, 642 153
BE AV The Bta>er 0:1 « Gas Coapany, Liaiteo 10/11/01 Irantkoro ON ON MT 11 Oct 01. 471 J*
PEF A Belding Paul I Corticelli Silk Co., utd. 04/22/11 Montreal - MT 22 April 11, 1625 131
PER? Berlin brush Nons 12/14/93 Berlin ON - MT 14 Dec 94, 760 32
BIm I Henry B-rks t Sons, Ltd. 12/31/98 Montreal - BH Hacleod, 68 38
rIRt.2 Henry birks t Sons, Ltd. 04/30/07 Montreal - 1C April 1907, 727 87
BIFF? Henry birrs I Sons. Ltd. 10/07/11 Montreal - MT 7 Oct 11. 1519 141
BLLA Black Late asbestos Co., Ltd. 08/28/09 Montreal Fed MT 28 Aug 09, 924 96
BOLT Canada Bolt I Nut Co., Ltd. 02/12/10 Toronto - MT 12 Feb 10. 714 106
BRANi Brandraa-Henderson. Ltd. ll/10'0fc Montreal Fed AR HLRO BBI. Papers 62
PR AN? brandraa-Henderson. Ltd. 12/31/15 Montreal Fed TH Stapells 169
BAAS British-Canadian Ascestos Coapany. Liaitec 12/31/07 - - IN Mendels 36 90
PRC-61 Doaimon Bn dee Co.. Ltd. 12/07/12 Lachine PC Fed MT 7 Dec 12. 850 155
e-de: Bcair.ion Bridoe Co.. Ltd. 12/21/17 Lachine PC Fed "7 21 Dec 17, 29,5° 171
BAEI Canada t'tac Co.. L t d . 08/12/11 Toronto ON MT 12 Aug 11, 72c 137
BRC'H B'oacton Pulp and Paper Coapanv 06/30/07 Broakalls PC - IC June u7, 863 89
BU*-T F.N. burt Co.. Ltd. 09/11/09 Toronto ON AF HLRO BBK Papers 98
cach: Canadian C.cle and Rotor Co., Ltd. 09/30/99 Toronto - FM AFRU 76) 40
cach: Canadian Cycle ano Rotor Co.. Ltd. 11/16/00 Toronto - MT 16 Nov 00. ©17 46
car Canadian Flour Hills Co., Liaited 12/07/00 Halifax Fed MT 7 Dec 00 49
CArU Canadian Furniture Manukacturers Ltd. 01/11/0! - - MT 11 Jar. 01, 898-99 50
CAMfil Canadian Canners Consolidated Coapanies 04/14/03 Haailton ON BH Elder 21 61
CAR*.? Canadian Canners Liaited 12/31/09 Haailton ON IH Elder 25 104
CANC Canada Paint Coapany 03/04/92 Montreal - MT 4 March 92. 1054 22
CAA3 Canada Carbide Co., Ltd. 07/01/11 Ottawa - MT 1 July 11, I2e 135
CART G. Carter Son I Co., Liaited 06/27/02 St Marys ON - MT 27 June 02. 1676 59
CAST Doaimon Manufacturers, Ltd. 03/22/13 - - MT 22 March 13. 594 159
CASO Canadian Soaps. Ltd. 05/11/12 - - MT || May 12, 1939 147
CAST Canadian Steel Foundries. Ltd. 02/11/11 Montreal - MT U Feb 11. 648 128
Ci*A 1 Canadian Car i Foundry Co.. Ltd. 10/29/09 Montreal Feo AR HLRO IBK Papers 102
CCAP2 Canadian Car t Foundry Co., Ltd. 08/31/12 Montreal Fed MTAR 1912 153
CCEH Canada Ceaent Coapany Ltd. 09/14/09 Montreal Fed AR HLRO IBK Papers 99
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HERSER5 BY ALPHABETICAL CODE
CANADIAN HANUFACTUR1NE INDUSTRY, 1885*1918
HER8EF CORPORATE NAHE OF HCBFrR DATE OF HEAD INCORP SOURCE OF DATA NO. OF
CODE HERGER OFFICE HERGER
CCER Canadian Cereal I Hilling Co., Ltd. 03/19/10 Tconto Fed H! 29 Jan 10. 443 109
CCD1 Canadian Cottons, Ltd. 05/31/10 Hontreal - HT 27 Aug 10, 944 116
cfa: Ca'nage Factories. Ltd. 09/11/09 Hontreal Fed H7 U Sept 09. 1114 97
CGECi Canadian General Electric Co.. Ltd. 10/31/00 Toronto Fed FH AFRII 84) 45
C5EC2 Canadian General Electric Co., Ltd. 05/31/13 Toronto Fed HT 31 Hav 13, 92e 161
CGEC3 Canadian General Electric Co., Ltd. 09/27/13 Toronto Fed HT 27 Sept 13. 536 165
CHEH Stanoard Cheaical Iron i Luaber Co. of Canada 03/31/11 Toronto - HT 8 April U, 1423 130
[ICE Consolidatec ice Coapany, Ltd. 04/09/10 Hontreal - HT 9 April 10. 15lt 111
CITY Citv Dairy Co., Ltd. 09/02/11 Toronto - HT 2 Sert 11, 1021 140
COEN Canadian Jewellers. Ltd. 08/26/11 Hontreal - HT 26 Aug 11, 920 138
CLAY Canadian Consolidated Clav Co.. Ltd. 02/17/12 Pjctou NS - HT 17 Feb 12. 757 145
COO Cocksnutt PIo- Co.. Ltd. 05/12/11 Brantford ON - FH AfR(111 2uC> 133
COIL Canadian Consolidated Oil Co., Ltd. 04/30/04 Toronto - 1C, April 04. 459 64
COLD Canaoian Colored Cotton Hills Co.. Ltd. 04/29/92 Hontreal - HT 19 April 92. 1302 24
con Consolidated Himng 4 Saelting Co. (Coaincoi 02/28/06 Toronto - FH AFR1VI, 2701 79
CONV Canadian Converters Co.. Ltd. 12/31/06 Hontreal - FH AFRdI 141) 84
CORD Censuaers Cordage Coapany 12/31/90 - - BH Acheson art, 80 14
CORD Canadian Hart Corundua Nhee) Co. 11/30/05 Haailton - 1C Nov 05, 261 75
CSAtf The Canacs Sa« Coapany, Liaited 01/01/C5 Ottawa Fed HT 27 Dec 04 , 840 67
DASH Hchnnpr, Cast 4 Hetal Norks Co. 11/23/00 St Cath ON - HT 23 Nov 00. 654 47
BBOX Doaimon Box 4 Package Coapany 05/07/10 - - HT 7 Hay 10. 1913 114
DC AN Doaimon Canners Liaited 02/19/10 Haailton Fed HT 5 Harch 10. 818 108
Df OS Doaimon Foundries 4 Steel, Ltd. 12/31/17 Haailton - TH Stapells 172
DOB, Doaimon Blanket and Fibre Coapany 10/28/91 Hontreal - HT 28 Oct 92. 484 - 23
bqcc; Doaimon Cotton Hills Coapany 02/13/91 Hontreal - HT 13 Feb 91, 1005 15
D0:02 Doaimor. Cotton Hi Us Coapany 10/30/91 Hontreal - HT 30 Oct 91, 516 20
DOC 03 Doaimor. Cotton Hills Coapany 03/18/92 Hontreal * HT IB Harch 92, 1131 23
DOEt Doaimon £i;losives. Ltd. 10/06/10 - - HT 8 Oct 10. 519 122
D'UG National Drug 4 Cheaical Coapany e* Canada. Lto. 12/22/05 Hontreal - HT 17 Nov 05. 64 7a
:=te Doainio" Steel Corporation Ltd. 06 ’30/10 Sydney NS NS FH APR 111 16*) i r
EI-PA EiM'd Partington Pulp and Paper Coapany 06/15/12 - - HT 15 June 12. 2431 150
EDNA Esaardsburg Starch Co. 03/31/04 Cardinal ON - IC Harch (*4, 4 ’ 3 c3
FE:T Canadian Consolidated Felt Co., Ltd. 10/09/09 Berlin ON - HT 9 Oct 09. 1513 101
FuOR Canada Flour Hills Coapany 07/22/11 Toronto - H1 22 July 11. 410 I3e
FOFi Canada Foundries 4 Forgings. Ltd. 02/24/12 Grociviile Fed H* 24 Feb 12, 653 14a
FFOS Frost 4 Nooc Coapany, Liaiteo 05/31/01 Sa Falls ON - HT 31 Hav 01, 1602 53
6ANA Gananooue Spring 4 Axle Co.. Ltd. 12/31/09 Gananooue CN - TH Stapells 19 105
BILL Gill Saart flar.uUctunnc Coapany 06/23/93 Br ockville - HT 23 June 93, 1531 29
GLAS loamion Glass Co., Ltd. 05/24/13 Hontreal Fed HT 24 Hay 13. 903 160
6LCV Toronto Glo»e and lanmng Co., Liaited 01/30/05 Toronto 1C Jan 05. 381 69
6HCC General Hotors of Canada. Ltd. 11/01/18 Oshawa, On Fed HT 15 Nov 18. 33 174
GOOD Goodyear Tire and Rubber Coapany o^ Canaoa 11/12/10 Toronto HT 12 Nov 10. 2022 125
GRAN Granby Consolidated Himng, Saelting 4 Power Co. 0 2/22/01 Toronto - HT 14 June 01, 1609 52
HAST Haailton Steel 4 Iron Co. 12/31/99 Haailton - IN til bourn 42
HOC03 Tt.e Hochelaca Cotton Co. 12/01/85 Hontreal - HT 20 Feb 85. 940 2
hoco: Tr.e Hocnelaga Cotton Co. 04/12/89 Hontreal - HT 12 April 8«. 1179 8
HONS Hooard Saith Paper Hills, Ltd. 11/24/16 - - HT 24 Nov 16, 24A PO
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H E W E R S  BY ALPHABETICAL CODE
CANADIAN HANUFACTUR1HS INDUSTRY. 1685-1916
HEREER CORPORATE NAHE Of BERBER DATE Of HEAD INCORP SOURCE OF DATA W. OF
CCEE BERBER OFFICE BER6ER
HUNT Huntsville Luaber Coapany 11/29/01 - - HT 29 Nov 01, 68v 56
IP IL International Billino Co. of Canada Ltd. 04/22/11 - fed H1 22 April 11. lei? 132
1HO! laperial Cil Coapany. Ltd. 07/01/98 Toronto - BH Eaing 37
•HR! lapenal Tobacco Coapany of Canada 07/11/06 Hontreal Fed HT 4 July 06. 13 91
INVE Inverness Copper Co., Ltd. 12/30/04 Halifax - 1C Dec 05. 329 66
IFCR Independent Portland Ceaent Coapany 09/16/09 Toronto - HT 16 Sept 09, 1215 100
IRON Canada lron Corporation 12/30/08 Hontreal - AR NAC H630 AEE 93
I RUB lndepenoent Rubber Coapany 11/26/10 Herriton ON - HT 26 Nov 10, 2229 126
LAMC1 Lake of the Nooos Nil lino Coapany. Ltd. 07/19/91 Hontreal AR AOnt HS350 16
LAND/ La>e or tne Hoods Pillinp Coapany, Ltd. 04/10/06 Hontreal - AR AOnt HS350 60
LANC3 Lake of the Hoods Hi 1 Imp Coapany. Ltd. 06/05/14 Hontreal - HT 5 June 14. 11,21 166
LEND Lor.oonoerrv Iron Coapany 05/27/67 Hontreal - HT 27 Hay B7, 1402 4
fACH Canada Hachmerv Corporation, Liaited 07/20/10 Balt ON Fed FHAFRUla 72 II 1551 119
HAHA1 Hassev-narris Coapany, Liaited 05/06/91 Toronto - HT 8 Hav 91, 1363 17
HAHA2 Hassev-Harris Coapany, Liaited 12/30/91 Toronto - 6H Denison, 121 21
HAHA3 Hassev-narris Coapanv, Liaited 12/31/95 Toronto - HT 6 Dec 95. 726 36
NAHA4 Bassev-Harns Coapanv, Liaited 10/07/04 Toronto - 60 RCCCI1, 123) 65
BAPl Haple Lea» Hilling Co., Ltd. 04/23/10 Toronto ON HT 23 April 10, 112
HASS Hassey Hanufacturing Coapany 03/14/90 Toronto - HT 14 Harch 90. 1124 12
hath Hatheas Lai no, Ltd. 10/21/11 - - HT 21 Oct 11, 1713 142
BESH Hetal Snmole I Sidinp Co., Ltd. 11/30/12 Ninnipeg - HT 30 Nov 12. 611 154
BF1S Hantiaes Fish Corporation, Ltd. 05/14/10 - - HT 14 Hav 10. 2619 115
BIT! British Coluacia Hills Tiaber and Trading Co. 04/17/91 Vancouver - HT 17 April 91, 12o8 16
BOON Hoonev Biscuit I Candy Coapany, Liaiteo 02/01/12 Stratford ON - HT 1 Feb 13, 297 156
HOPA Hontague Paper Coapanv 12/06/95 - - HT 6 Dec 95, 728 35
HRDH Hontreal Rolling Hills 05/22/03 Hontreal - HT 22 Hav 03, 1571 62
NABR National Breaenes Ltd. 04/03/09 Hontreal - HT 3 April 09, 1774 94
NAPP North Aaencan Pulp I Paper Coapames Trust 05/05/15 Boston, Hass US HT 26 Hav 15. 32 16?
NOCL Nova Scotia Clay Horks. Ltd. 06/01/12 Halifax NS FH AFRlIIIl 3211 146
NC'FO Nova Scotia Steel 4 Forge Coapany, Liaiteo 12/31/69 - - HTAR 1916, 213 11
NORP Canadian North Pacific Fisheries. Ltd. 10/29/10 Toronto Fed HT 29 Oct 10, 1620 124
NOVA Nova Scotia Steel Coapany, Liaited 01/31/95 Nea 61asgoa - HT 24 Jan 96. 653 V’
NSEC Nova Scotia Steel 4 Coal Coapany, Ltd. 07/22/00 Nea Elasgoa - HT 22 July 0 0, lo8 44
OKLEl Ontario Lead and Barbed Hire Co., Ltd. 12'18 65 Toronto - HT 18 Dec 65. 6*9 3
ONuE2 Ontario Lead and Barbed Hire Co., Ltd. 09/20/69 Toronto - HT 20 Sept 69. 346 9
ON ST Cntaric Steel products Co.. Ltd. 06/14/13 - Fed HT 14 June 13. 1002 163
D-IS Otis-Fensor Elevator Co., Liaited 03.17/05 Toronto - HT 17 Harch 05. 1244 70
‘ALU Canadian Pacific Luaber Co., Ltd. 12/31/11 - - TH Stapells 25 144
PAN] Patterson-Hisner Coapany, Liaited 10/16/91 Hoodstock ON - HT 16 Oct 91. 454 19
PEHA Penaan Hanufacturing Co. 04/21/93 Pans OK - HT 21 April 93, 12S4 27
PERL 6.H. Pe'lev Coaoany 12/07/00 - - HT 23 Dec 00. 728 48
PORO Portland Rolling Hills Coapany, Ltd. 06.-28 95 St. John NB - HT 26 June 95, le'6 34
prov Provincial Paper Bills Co.. Ltd 05/31/13 Toronto - HT 31 Hav 13, 934 162
IENF ReMrea flour Hills, Ltd. 12/31/12 - - TH Stapells 28 157
PHODl Rhodes. Curry 4 Co., Ltd. 04/21/93 Aaherst NS - HT 21 April 93, 1258 28
RHOD2 Rhodes. Curry 4 Co., Ltd. 07/21/05 Aaherst NS - HT 21 July 05 74 72
RIOP Riordon Pulp 4 Paper Co.. Ltd. 12/31/10 Hontreal - HT 12 Od 12. 583 127
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HER6ERS Bi ALPHABETICAL CODE
CANADIAN HANUFACTUP.lNE INDUSTKi. 1085-1918
KF.6EP. CORPORATE HAI1E OF HEREER DATE OF HEAD INCuRP SOURCE OF DATA HO. 0r
CODE HEREER OFFICE HEREER
ROJO Acs:p. Jones F Nhitaan. Ltd. v2/16/i0 Halifax Fea HT 12 Feb 10. 714 107
f.CHA Rocers Hinutactunnq Coapanv 01/31/07 Toronto - 1C Jar 07. 322 65
ROVE Rc.il Soar- Coaoan, 11/28.08 Vancouver - HT 26 No. 08. 887 °2
Rl'BRl Canadian Consolidated Rubber Co.. Lie. i 1 / 30/ 06 Htwtrea. - FH AFR1V1I 34 53
*WI2 Canadian Consolidated Rubber Co.. do. 03/31/07 Hontreal - FH AFR'Vll 33. 60
SADl C-eat •f$tern Saodlerv Coapany 04/07/9? Calgary - *7 7 Apr a 1 ??, 133 35
SHEE Sheet net*’. Products Coapany of Canada OS .'06/10 ’orontd - HT 6 Aug lv. 613 ilC
Ep'ER Sberain-aiiiiaas Coapany of Canada uaitco 06:10/11 n&ntreai red «•* jr. juae . 11 m i 17-A
SIEH Sieaon Coapany. Liaited i1i06/05 ::'?ntc Cli r.'i i No 19:2 :( t
':]'*■ *r-e iiepson pr::F Coapan* C; * 1 - 'orpntc - 22 ".a :t. 3c :1
tr.AF Sa.rt «a: Caausv, ..laites .1 24-Cs - - r* AFfiVl. 1:2.
«•»! Spamsr f.tver fyir F :a:er Co.. :s i: * tr P*ti 2<« 1 AuC ... 2.. • c.
: : - ‘<2 iranisn r.i.i r Fy'o i ‘ip«- Co.. :g;o:/i: 'prgnt: 2.'- . Ai-c i... .3. 1:4
;■». rtti' F •idpatic-r u:a:teo IC'-Ol-lv T pronto * 20 Hav 11. 2:32 , -1
: A'« st£v:elo-. ::.*s£ n *'LrO N: - HT IE N:. li. 2:2: 14?
're Car.aoi iter:n Co«.p#n. .inter M'i: ot Cardina. -2V - A; NAC Coapan. rase' 77
E*E1 itee! bOOpan. c* uir.ada. Lts. Ce.'Zu. ! ;• r.aailtt' Fed *R HLF2- 88* f'a:ers l ie
*r i * Coain:* ’ t t:Ce- Cc., It: :•! ■< w Hontrea. - F*1 AFr. .., i4i 1 s8
•*" *k:*ett ~ct-«ccfi Cc.. -to. ufc. vl 112 - - '< 1 June 12, 2./' 149
Eioroe t. *jc-ett : C:. ■ '■ -•enter - t'T 2’ Harcn 03, 1303 60
*.:nooe--r-oert:' Cct;.:r. ,-S 2c; 11 ■.nnice: - HT 2ft Aug 11, 427 J V C
. .2A Jr 116 - i i ? Z *  ?*’!*! Sr c. :i. i*.c: Vancouver - HT 17 Nov ??, 641 41
_.<» - . . . :c L i t u e : * V .04/0! *cr onto ON HT 4 Oct 01. 436-3° 54
- 1 ^ T ■ z cou.f Er3i"ee-;n: » z rn . L.citec 02/15/0! Victoria BC - HT 13 Feb 01. 1045 51
iy~ '.ictorii preying Coar-any 08/11/53 Victoria EC - HT 11 Aug ?3, 158 31
y Nate*'let Hanufactunng Coacar.v 05/28/68 Niter loo ON - HT 28 Sect 6t 5
HE'D Car.aoiar, Nestern Founor* F Supplv Co.. Ltd. 12/31/15 - - TH Stapeils 166
*’E?F *e;tem Cir.ada Flcjr Hiils Coapany. Liaited 10/31/05 7oronto CN 1C Oct 05. 218 74
y*-pL' anaier. ful" t facer fti'ls. .td. ::/3i/i7 - - Tri Stapells 1*3
uilhnsr* cjcuo*1 Co.. tts. v5 31/05 Toronto - 12 Hav 05. c23 ' 1
r.C m Cs'-adii'- •esterr. Luaoer Coaoar.v > *•  21/10 - ;r *7 23 April lO 113
iaa-t atpos. Ltd. i:-:i/i: Hontreal - HT II Dec il 13e
nOOL Canaoiar aooien Coapany. Liaited 02 • lo/OO - - HT 16 Feb CO. Iv’S 42
♦ ♦ ♦  T c te i ♦ * *
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TABLE 24
NUHBEf:. VAlUE AND SIC OF NEf 6EF:S I
CANADIAN HANL'FA[TUMN5
l€»SEA CODE CIS CDS CDN UE Ul m i l CONS FI*n Al'tN
WTE E!C SIC SIC SIC SIC OF OF DISAP BOND
1946 199'. CATEG CATEG CATES VEST ACQ *OOu
65S1 h Iv .T. 230 1221 lj; 111 H a j
:5Cl HCC01 •*n4. J*. 1629 (1 H c ; ■j
E534 C'Nl EI T'.lJ. 3058 v v V c 1 0
S7C2 LC’iL 32* 2919 tv V c j
36i3 Nr. tO 320 2841 >v it C 1 0
B9C1 APE: 241 Oi*» J 'iA IV XI 11 (111 It a 1 0
9cC'l DC At, 210 102! u H c 4 o
E ’Cr HOC 02 *vc-v 1829 : v (1 V a i 0
rsfe* ONl E- *•1? <.kk • 305c xvi H a i {*
6964 JAI/6 2 12 1031 u H A i 0
i * NOFC 325 2818 t , N r i A
Sis! «AS5 311 2111 x . n h 4 i 0
«v b : ANBF 210 1021 n K c 7 *
9m C2F.D 2 c 5 18C9 1 V (1 H c 6 A
8101 d ::ci ■>r,">ik'i 1829 IV XI N c S it
9132 HIT] 285 2512 v u VI x v ti c 1 (.
sic: PAHAI 311 3111 x v u H c 1 /
9lC3 l ANOI 214 1051 U H a 1 0
9lt4 P AN ] 311 3111 XVI1 M c 1 0
9164 C0CC2 It'; 1629 1* *: H a 1 0
9104 b a « a : 311 3111 > .11 H a 1 ✓
92S1 CANP 364 3'5l xvi X IV H c
9201 d o ::: ^•r *■• 1629 1 V > 1 H a 1 {•
8:02 c:.c * e m,A Jk 122' IV XI H c c 0
C1C4 DC'Gl '■.cc+ J J 1S21 IV XI H c 1 0
«204 b: i w w*.'J 2841 \V H a 1
v-o: PE«A •>ccA JJ 1621 1. xi H c 0
8".c: FHODi l i t 32tl XI xvix H 1 V
e:c: e :l l 32-.' 2941 » V !, a 1
s: b : AC 10E1 u H c •» /
t ”0“ VIBF A-*. 1131 11 N c ..
c:34 6EPB 3c i 39? I * VI J XII XVII H 1 1!
9*01 NOVA 32* 2C J9 X r V c 1 •j
9522 P090 32' 3059 XVI H c l 0
9564 "9FA 284 2711 V) 1) V1J1 XV! V a 1 0
85 p a h a : 311 3111 »V11 H a 1 0
;5C3 IPD! r*>tj 3611 XV XI I V h c «
96 E I A H 343 3921 XII XVI VI H a 1 0
9962 SADl 249 1711 IV XI] 1 XI) H c 0
99C3 c a : « i 332 3931 XI (VII H c /
9°64 UNCA 210 1021 11 H c 0
99 W S T 325 2918 (V V c 1 0
000] NCOL 255 1621 IV (1 H c 4 0
ooe: Nss: 325 2919 XV V c 1 2500
0084 CGECl 35 33 XI U XVI11 VI11 V a 1 /
0004 CACB2 3j2 3931 11 (VII H a 1 /
INDUSTFi. i6B5-!91S
ISSUE A'JTH ISSUE AUTri ISSUE TC’AL ASSET PUFCH n o . cr
BOND PBEF PPE8 COUPON COPPOt. CAF value PA ICE HEREER
$000 *000 1000 *000 *>00 <000 *00u $000
A (• 0 It 0 >) 1
0 0 0 ( o •j 0 2
0 0 V 0 0 lj V 0 V
A 0 0 c (. 1000 v 300 4
V 0 0 0 0 (l A ’« r
V 0 c 0 0 o o o C
0 0 6 0 0 500 0 /
(i 0 0 •j 0 •j •> 370 B
V V 0 (. V jl 8
V V 0 (. 0 lv
0 0 o o (• i 11
0 0 0 0 A 0 0 (j 1 *3
/ 500 250 500 ■>C' 0 c- i\ 13
A V 0 ( 0 (1 o 0 14
0 0 0 0 0 0 c- 0 15
V V 0 V 0 0 0 0 lb
/ / z 500(> 3000 0 2700 v 17
0 0 0 o o 0 0 fcO 18
0 0 0 V o 0 •) 0 19
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
* z / 5000 3500 o 3200 500 21
0 0 0 0 «. 0 <) 0 22
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 23
0 0 0 0 0 0 c 24
0 ft A o 250 •3 0 HCA tj
0 0 (I (1 o 0 0 eo 2d
0 lj 0 lj 0 0 0 0 n-'A •
j f\ lj 0 (l 250 130C. V 26
u V lj (? (I r ( 0 2°
z 1400 1400 14.-j 14k v 0 2 s vO A 70
•> v‘ V C A 0 21
0 ii 0 0 0 0 •> 32
V 0 0 0 {• •j V 0 37
0 •0 0 V it 0 0 v JJ
o 0 0 0 0 0 •• •cv*J
lj 0 0 0 (> 0 V •2 36
(• 0 0 it •> A v v 37
0 0 0 •J c 0 0 36
0 0 0 A o 250 0 •j 38
X 3000 2500 3000 3000 il V •j 4v
I. o A V V 500 V V 41
0 0 0 0 0 2000 (. C 42
0 0 V I.1 (• 769 0 j 43
2500 2000 1030 5000 3090 0 0 0 44
AT 3u» 300 1200 1200 0 2200 J.-V i:
X 700v 2500 300m 30u0 0 v 0 4e
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BERGEN CODE CD*.' erf.' cdn us ui
MTE sic sic sic s:c sic
l?48 I960 CATES CATEG CATES
0/04 35s *• 32e 3,;.i<?v XVI V
00*4 fe:l :b5 it. - vn VI XV
DC 24 ir.ri 214 1051 11 1
Vi Cl CArJ 2S> 2t:i vn Vll XV
■’VI ’.ENS 322 294! XV Vll
C1Q1 SPAN 345 2529 til XV VI
:ifi2 FFOS 21 3111 >•11 V
0104 CVffi 11 3*91 XVI1 XXI XV
.104 BEAv *rr 3611 tv XI IV
0104 HjM 65 2512 VI1 Vll XV
• - n- EC I 20 294! rv
vl'il SOFA i v 10:: 11 1
0:0: CAF.T 14 1051 11 1
■ yr 1 
-*K 4 T.:» 30 1221 11 111 111
:oe: C-*«i 12 103! 11 1
03t: won nr » J 2919 xv V
04S! ElrkA 26 1049 11 1
>.452 COIL 7C! J 3611 XV x: IV
0404 NAHA4 11 3111 XV] 1 V
(•404 42 nr *\q * 7 111 XV VI
0551 C5-H 2 a 3063 XVI V
(=551 TElT 52 1624 IV XI
r-53! tlC.' 45 2493 1 v Xl l ] xii
0531 C7IS 24 3192 X VI1 1 VI 1
.'ic.{C Mil 1 • 3111 XVII V
•>503 hod: 34 3241 XI xv it X
0504 A2CA 26 3042 XVI V
0504 KE5F i4 1051 11 1
35C-4 COF.U 6l 357! XIV >1 . xiv
.554 P .J 5 63 3741 *VI X IV
. t S l STO?. iz . 109? 11 J
"6&: SNA* tZ 1931 j « XI
Vo 31 CDN I 45 252? XU $ , VI
06 C 2 LANQ2 14 1051 11 1
Ot93 SIMP 64 3511 XIV XIV 11 V
VO04 BF AN! 64 3751 XVI X IV
>634 AUSF.l 29 1511 111 xi; IV
(•0 COW 7; 2434 VI V Xll  1
C7wi FOMA 20 2C41 XV V
0701 F./BR2 23? 1511 111 XU iv
>702 BlRr.2 [43 3?21 Xll XVI VI
0702 ATFI 210 1021 11 1
0702 BAO« 214 2711 VI11 Vl l ) XVI
07 BRAS 342 XIV XIV XIV
0303 IM:T 230 1221 11 1:1 111
0804 FSTS 385 3761 XVI X IV
NUMBER. VALUE AND SIC OF «EK5E?S IF.
CANADIAN HANUFACTUB INS INDUSTRY, 16;5*1?16
HOB 12 CONS FI AN auth ISSUE AUTH ISSUE
OF Of. D1SAF BON’D BOND FFEF FFEF
VEFT ACC 1000 <000 1000 <000
V t j (1 (1 0 0
H c 0 0 0 •J
H » 1 •J 0 (I 0
H c 16 If I f 2000 1300
V i 1 0 0 0 0
H c 0 0 0 0
H 4 1 0 0 (1 0
H c 2 / / 600 800
W C 1 / / nc 1C
H i 1 (1 0
H c (% 0 (• 0
H C 44 / / 1500 1250
H i 1 0 0 0 .*»
H * 0 0 «j 0
H C e 0 6
V i 1 0 0 0 V
V A 1 0 *1 0 0
H C •> 0 0 0 0
H , 1 0 0 0 v
V 4 1 0 0 0 V
H C 1 0 0 0 0
H c 3 3370 3060 7500 5000
H c 1 0 V is 0
« c 1 0 0 0 f
H i 1 0 0 (• 0
V 4 1 (1 0 0 Q
H t 1 0 0 0 0
H c 1 0 0 0 0
H t 1 0 0 0 0
H c 15 0 0 •)
H c / / 1250 1250
H i 1A V / 500 400
V c J * ? * /
H 4 l 750 750 1500 1500
H * 1 0 0 i\ 0
H C 1 500 370 500 220
H c 2 2600 2600 I960
H c 3 0 0 C' i)
V i 1 (> 0 v 0
H 4 2 0 0 0 0
H i 1 0 0 0 0
H i 1 0 0 0 V
H 4 1 0 0 0 0
H C 5 15000 7500 1875 ie?5
H z 3 0 a 0 0
H C 0 0 0 0
AUTH ISSUE TOTAL ASSET FUFCN NO. CF
OflnON COWON
<000 1000
C*P
<000
VALUE
<000
PRICE HERSEF 
<000
0 300 0 0 47
0 (1 0 0 15: 46
•• V 650 0 0 46
1000 1000 *) 1660 0 50
0 0 0 c V C «W4
ij 0 0 V 0 r 2
ij l> 0 0 0 mNv
6 00 600 •1 0 0 54
175 !’5 0 V Ij 55
0 0 (1 0 2*'c 5s
:» ( 0 V v r  -
2500 15 *0 0 i 56
0 0 90 0 (1 5?
v (i 0 0 0 60
A 2500 0 0 61
(= 0 0 0 0 62
0 C 0 0 0 63
V 0 0 0 0 64
V 0 0 0 0 eS
0 (j 0 0 0 66
lj t* 125 y lj 6?
*.t A ■
iJ 1. . 1650 ij 0 0 66
•j .) 0 0 lj 66
0 0 lj lj (• 70
0 ij 0 lj 0 .  71
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 •j c 0 73
(= 0 0 0 0 74
1 ij 75 0 0 nr
0
1250
0
1250
“j 0
1973
0
500 ^r .'* 0 V 150 78
5500 47ij.j {»' 0 0 ?c
2500 2000 0 II 950 60
4 0 0 V 61
1250 9"0 V 0 U 82
3000 26/5 0 .j ij 83
0 0 0 V v 64
V 0 (1 ; V 85
V 0 0 0 0 86
11 0 0 0 Vi 8"
0 0 0 0 0 85
0 0 0 0 0 6=
8125 8125 0 0 0 90
»• <> 30000 0 y Q J
V 0 0 0 V 92
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NUNBEF, VA.UE AND SIC OF nERGERS IN
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1865-1916
NEP6CF CODE CDN CDS CBN US U' KftlZ CONS FIRM AUTH ISSUE AL'TH 15 SUE AUTH ISSUE total ASSET PURCH NO. OF
DATE SIC s:c SIC SIC SIC OF OF. DISAP IOND BOND FREF PPEF COfWON COHflON CAP VALUE PRICE MERGER
1946 198C CATEG CATEG CATEG VERT ACC #000 #000 #000 #000 (000 (000 #000 #000 #000
.604 IRON "•MCJ + J 29io . XV V H c nL 2500 2500 3000 2600 5000 4000 V 0 0 92
v9c: NAFF AN4 1151 ) 11 ii H c 13 2500 2000 4000 •v-^r L * 4. 6000 nnc m 0 0 V 94
A«SF 3b2 3592 xiv XIV xiv H C 4 15000 7500 1E75 1875 6125 6125 0 (: (. 95
o? c; ELLA -•6. <1V X ’.V XI v H c Tyj 1500 1000 1000 1000 3000 3000 0 500 V 9;.
09Q3 c f a : 339 3299 >*1X X H C * 1000 500 2000 1200 2000 1100 0 .'j °7
0981 h P T 329 2811 ix IX xvi V c 3 1500 1500 7500 7500 7500 7500 0 800 0 9S
0SC3 CCE** 3c7- 3521 xiv XIV XI V H c 10 8000 5000 11000 10500 19000 13500 M P O O O {• cc
0953 IFOR 3c3 5521 xiv xiv xiv H c 7 0 0 0 0 t*f 0 10000 4000 0 100
.•954 FELT 25 c !°!1 v IV XI H c 2 500 5-0 500 500 1500 1500 ;< 0 0 1(1
u>34 CCAF1 35c 3261 x] kv:x X H C 2 4000 3500 7500 5000 5000 2500 0 7500 :■ 102
•«B# SIEf* 283 2521 via VI XV H c 5 / i f 500 400 500 500 (t i / 0 107
0 9 CANN2 212 163-1 i li 1 H i 1 0 0 (• o 0 0 (- 0 t 104
O* SANA 32- 3099 * XVI V H » 1 0 0 0 (l 0 0 0 0 0 105
1001 6DLT 317 3053 x xv V H c 3 1000 650 1250 900 1250 900 o 0 0 106
i"Cl F u j j 210 1021 i ii 1 H c n4 2000 1660 900 845 850 B5C 0 0 0 107
iOCl K A N 212 1051 i n 1 H c 17 2500 1500 5000 2100 5000 2100 0 2350 n 106
1 CD 1 CCEF 214 1051 l u i H c 7 1000 750 2000 1250 2000 1250 i 0 0 109
1061 ASE? 383 3761 xvi X iv H C 50 5'J MtAJ nc 126 92 0 0 0 110
iOQ2 CICE 349 399° t v|j XXI X VI1 H c 4 (> 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111
1062 HrfL 214 1051 i 11 1 H t 1 / / 2500 2500 2500 2500 0 3770 0 112
ivs: NLC'N 2E5 2512 v n VI „v H • 1 0 V 0 •3 0 0 o 0 A 117• DFOl 2B? 2732 v n VI XV H t 1 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 114
: >02 HF1S 210 1021 i 11 i C nL 250 125 500 100 500 300 o 0 0 115
1082 CCGT 25 2 1829 v IV XI H c i 5000 5000 4500 357 6 3500 2716 0 0 0 116
1 Ol-2 DFTE 323 291 x XV V V c 1 2500 1500 0 0 50000 35c00 0 0 o 117
1062 STtl 525 291 x XV V V C 4 10000 6850 10000 6500 15000 11500 0 13350 V 118
10C3 "ACh 324 3193 x XVI V H c 4 1000 400 1500 850 150!.- e25 •» •j 0 119
1)03 5HEE 526 3022 x X V1 V H c 2 (l 0 •j 0 o 0 5000 0 0 120
•'>04 e r a : 22 v 3259 x XVI V V C n 1500 1C,-, 2000 3c 2 30 i  0 1110 0 u o 121
i :-G4 S & l 561 3r 99 vvi X Iv H t 0 0 .) o 122
1-04 h > E V * ^ 312-1 xi • .11 X V c i 0 i‘ 0 0 0 1000 •'» 123
i >.>54 NQFF * ! M 1021 i 11 1 H c z 1947 1947 / 4000 4-»j0 •J v tj 124
i ‘.<04 GOOD 239 1511 i n XI) IV H » i .*1 0 0 0 0 (t 0 125
1054 IFL'F 236 1712 i n Xll kill H c rJ 0 {■ 0 V 0 0 500 0 (• I2t
10 FI OF 294 2*11 « i n v n i XVI H c I 2500 1500 1500 15 >0 4500 4500 0 • • 12"
2181 CAST v")C 2C 39 x X'. V H c J 5000 3e50 2000 1400 3000 3000 ■V 3000 0 125
210! AH h Q 2-1 p i : iv Xll) Xill H C 1 1500 1000 5000 2500 5000 3500 0 0 0 12«
2181 CHE* 38c 37J2 xvi X 1. V c 3 1060 1000 3750 2500 2250 2250 0 0 0 130
1102 BEFA 260 is:9 v IV XI H c 4» 1000 750 1250 650 1250 750 11 lelO i< 131
n c : I AIL 214 3051 i 11 1 H t 1 1000 750 2000 1250 2000 1250 0 0 0 132no: C O D 311 3111 i XVI 1 V v a •NA v f / 7500 5000 7500 5000 •) 0 .1 133
n o : SHEF 384 375! xvi V IV H c 1 4000 2450 4000 3000 4000 4000 0 4000 v 134
1103 CARL 360 3711 xvi X IV H C A 2000 1280 150 150 2000 600 1.1 l‘ 0 135
1103 flop. 214 1051 i 11 I H C 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 V 0 0 136
1105 BRED 2le 1072 i 1! I H C M 1250 1250 1250 1250 2500 2500 0 840 .1 127
no; Cw-EM 343 3921 xii XVI VI H C J / 2500 2500 25.-0 2500 0 0 y 138
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Of
!6ER
139
140
Ml
m :
14J
144
145
146
147
ME
145
ISO
151
is:
m
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
lt5
1 fe
le’
168
lt9
170
171
172
1*3
174
i::5
NUHBEF, VALUE AND SIC OF HER6EPS IN
CANADIAN HANUFACTUfiiNE I N D U 5 T h , 18E5-1918
CDN CDN CDS US u> HOF II CONS FIAr AUTH ISSUE AUTH ISSUE AUTH ISSUE TOTAL ASSET
SIC SIC SIC si: s;: OF OF DISAP FOND FOND PREF PNEr COMON COHHDN CAP VALUE
1946 1980 CATEG CATE6 CATEG VERT ACS $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $ 000 $ 000 $000
334 3231 XI xvsx X H C j 0 0 0 0 , 0 3-000 1)
209 104] i; s H 6 I * 0 700 450 5tS 565 G v
343 392! XU >Y1 VI H i 1 0 (I 0 0 it 0 0 c
200 1012 n 1 H C 2 2000 1200 2500 2000 2500 2000 it 0
255 1621 1 v XI H a i A A 0 o 0 0 V
285 vi i .1 xv H c a 2000 1750 i f If 3000 2000 o 0
364 3511 XIV xiv XIV H c 2 (i r. 0 0 o (• 2000 0
335 3251 XJ tvix X V 2 750 500 2000 1250 2000 1250 1300
385 37c 1xvi X IV H c 1 0 U 600 525 1200 600 V
3e4 3511 XIV xiv XIV N c ? if * 1000 200 1000 300 V 0
23. 1221 ii : n 11! H 1 if if 2000 2000 2500 2500 0
2C4 2711 X U  l Vll! XVI V a 1 i, i 0 0 V 0 0 0
294 2712 V I 11 VI 11 XVI H a 1 4000 4000 3000 2250 4000 3000 (I 0
336 32 ol 11 X V1X X V a 1 4000 4000 7500 5000 5000 3500 0 20800
222 1131 si is H 2 5000 3250 i f a 5000 3000 (I 0
326 3049 XVI V ri a V if if 500 500 1000 1000 0 G
315 3029 xvi Vll H 1 0 V 0 0 0 0 6500 0
2 u  j 193: IV XI H c 1 J0 if 2500 1000 2500 1500 ■) I-
2M 1051 11 1 H c 1 0 Cr 200 100 300 150 0 0
216 1071 1! i H c 0 0 0 0 M 0 0
288 256] Vll VI XV H c 4 550 550 1000 1000 2000 2000 0 v
3e5 3561 xiv XIV XIV H c 3 3000 2000 3000 2600 5000 4250 0 4300
35 .3 xi i i X V I 11 V 1 U V a 1 12000 10000 2000 2000 1000c 8000 0 0
294 27 n V I 11 V I 11 111 K c i 0 2400 2400 2600 2600 0 0
32° 3099 XVI V V c 3 600 600 750 750 750 750 II i*244 2712 *i n v: 11 XVI H a 2500 2425 10000 6 700 10000 8000 o 0
33 <in X V I 11 V I 11 V a 1 12000 10000 2000 2000 10000 8000 0 (
214 1051 11 1 H a 1000 1000 1500 1500 2500 2100 0 0
294 2*11 V I 2 VI 11 » Vl H c i f if 2000 1590 1000 1000 »)
3 >96 XV! u c 0 0 0 0 0 1000
364 •it ( Xvi X IV h 1- v 0 0 0 0 if y
294 7“ i' VI IS VI 11 XVI H a 1 <1 0 475 475 834 814 1* r
* *■ K. 3029 XVI .11 V a 1 if •\t 0 0 0 0 6500*> -.c 29! XV V H c 1 if fs 1000 *20 5000 300" {j (»
2 * * 2*1! V I12 V I 11 xvi H c 3 10000 6550 2: vO 2100 8000 6000 o ;
334 3221 11 XVII X - c J 0 ij 0 0 0 0 0 0
4o4 168617 123417 180575 137301 324600 252436 7475c 1C 1153
t\0 I A rO ^ » o
•zero
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TABLE 25
SECURITY FIMAMCINB Att KEPGEF PfcOPOTID* 
TH£ CWiAIiAA HER6EF. «VL. |b>*-M:
**6fF UTE Of 
CODE PU6i.lt 
ISSUE
•WUN* TYPE PFEV IE ONUS : OF *A!« PPlNtlFAL INSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE! SEE RAF, NITH 70TAl LULUS PBMCTEfs ArfItlATlON
CISC ISSUE ISSUE! Or Of PROCTER
CAF ISSUE
IjuO
rocr
E1CHMSE
L1STEL
GAP;
ISSUE
E»CH
in
N«tF - - * - - - - - - - -
•ABB f t : 1^ 10 3v :c fco-^e t°: 7SU 251; sr. i* C '% Actuiig NcCuiip bos A to. USE TSE PHSE LSE *
K i+ Set:: le?’ lOuC 6s-: Pi' rsit SOlc ioc: CAN C ) Iktuiig MctuilC Bros. 1 tO. USE TSE 4
i'ri H,.c 3f- h ti ¥ ° i •»*■»-■m/m [-« f f Ffint i A IU:ii« I to. no -
I un St:'. ;c;.; Frf* Pir 2k\  t 1(01 CAN A E A*fi A E A»es A to. TSE
**r« StM! 1M 16 iv Pre» ♦93 os: W. P Aitifn Fovil Seourities to'poritior *SE TSE LSE c
If C- - - * - - - - - - - -
* t. •
::af :
:v«
A:. |F.-f
ftp. I
i : Pff
Frf pi'
65: l*
1C»'S [AN
I L Pc6i66on tanadifr Cenpoiiditec Rutter
p Aitkf fcoyii Securities Co’t5ri*.ior PSE TSE lSE
- - - - - - - - - - -
fcl.T - - - - - * - t Hirris - - -
kj: - - - - - - - - - . -
HAN Ujne 1*10 100 Fref p»r 251c si CAN S ? bin! Ooaimon Bone Coat<n. TSE uni :s*.ee •I
: n i At'i j 1S 3 0 1:5c Frei Pi' 501c ioc: Can A >• NfStltt Invrttaent T»uit Coatinr TSE S
ASEf - - * - - - - - - - -
CItE - - - - - - - - - - -
PtFk Hi. Hi;' I iv? (ref Pi' .r» . eoi CAN C Rulocl tothr* Hu lock 4 tc. TSE A
ILL** - * * - - - - - - - -
DKi - - - - - - - - - . .
ins - - * - - - - A H Bnttiir - - -
CCCT Ao'ii mi 18CC Bone be: - Jcl ft - - LSE PSE 4
OSTE - 15C( Oft - * - » E F Nooc Ooamion Secuntm Co'p. TSE USE LSE -
STEL •ilM. me «0i> Bone - Bel u» f. Aittffi FOiil SfLU'ltlfl to'CO'iliOn TSE USE LSE !■:
N-I* .'ul. m*' I,-.:. Sor.o Pir 251: so: Can 6 F 6?ant toainjon Bent Co*tin» TSE
SiEE - - - - - . - - - -
SfAD "i. 1*3! T i Frf 1 Pir ovlt :oo: CAN H ffllit! ffllitt t Ffllitt -
r :<£ i - - - - - - - . - .
-:nt - - - - - - - - - -
Nl'f N: IVjf- Oet Bsc - iio: L‘* * Pifier.rif Cmioii'- fco'thf'n Fi;Ui> -
ruwi. • - * * - - - - -
if if - - - - - - - - -
fit* - - - - - - - - -
E AS i vi* IS 12 7/.?e Bert Pi' - »r>a.. Il J Nfititt Invfttaent TfU^t Co«oi'» -
tNr". P- mi i Bone Ii .1 * H-01 I- L Nc6itO?n tinioiin Consolioitr: Ruttf PSE
CHE- Ai'Cn lfl! ! Ovi frf* Pi' - Bui Ul - -
BEff April 1«1] 4(«- Frf* P9E.L rs‘»c 471 CAN F 6'ant Ooiinion Bcno Coaoinv -
iPU V , i’ll r •»* ... Bone B9E.S - 7ol CAN v Nrttitt Invettaent Trust totting -
to:* i’ll •*r«■ • w- F'f< t;c: - / +> N u* - -
SREF .Ur,f l’ll :o^ f'f* B’5 2«t if*. CAN K tahin Ptl-Lonoor. Securities Corp PSE
C«f G - - - - - - - - -
rLOf - - - - . - . .
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SECURITY FINANC1H6 AND MERGER PROMOTION 
THE CANADIAN MERGER NAVE, 1909-1912
MERGER DATE Of 
CODE PUBLIC 
ISSUE
AMOUNT TYPE PREN. IbONUS
ISSUED SEC FAR. «1TH
IOoO DISC ISSUE
I OF MAIN PRINCIPAL
TOTAL LOCUS PROMOTER 
ISSUED OF 
CAP ISSUE
INSTITUTIONAL 
AFFILIATION 
OF PROMOTER
STOCK
EXCHANGE
LISTED
r-RED Julv 1911 lT'O Rond *96.5 251c 1001 CAN C Muiock C flulock I Co l6uaroian Trust) TSE
COEN - . . . .  - - ja Machay MacMy L Co.
tL,d; . . . . . . . .
C IT t
EIFK3 - - - - - - - -
M A T H  - - - - - - - -
ST AN - - - - - - - -
£ A . U  - - - - - - - -
CtA )
FOR6 Ac mI I9i: 150 PrH *00 - HI CAN - -
CASO - - - - - - - -
NOCL - - - - - - - -
TTOB - - C Meredith C Meredith I Co. HSE
EDPA - - - - - - - -
SPAM - - - - - - - -
CCAR2 Hav In 13 900 Pret #114 - Uk internal Canadian Car I Foundry LSE M5E TSE
ACRE Oc*. 1912 25?4 Bond *95 - 981 W.
MESA - - - - - - - -
BF'DG 1 - - - - - - - -
N C D I  - - - - - - - -
R'ENF - - - - - - - -
GAP:
ISSUE
ETCH
•os
11
272
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FIGURE 22, MERGERS & FIRM DISAPPEARANCES
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING, 1885-1918
number
firm disappearancesmergers
0 * 4
1886 1dOO 19061890 1896 1910 1915 1918
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FIGURE 23, SMOOTHED MERGER DATA <*>
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING, 1885-1918
number
Firm disappearancesMergers
10
o ' N - 4
1886 1916 1918190018961890 1906 1910
( * )  The data was smoothed by removing the largest merger (measured by the number o f f irm  
disappearances) in  every year.
2
7
5
FIGURE 24, ACQUISITIONS & CONSOLIDATIONS
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING, 1885-1918
number 
2 5 -|
20 -
15 -
10 -
5 -
0  -
1886 1890 1896 1900 1905 1910 1916
acquisitions consolidations
1918
2
7
6
FIGURE 25, CAPITALISATION
CANADIAN MANUFACTURING MERGERS.1885-1918
(Cdn $ millions)
total auth cap (TAC) 
auth cap (AC) 
total ias cap (TIC) 
issued cap (IC)
20
1886 1890 1895 1900 1906 1910 1916 1918
APPENDIX E
CAUSALITY TESTS ON MERGER ACTIVITY
IN CANADIAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1934
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TABLE 2f)
ES T i M A T r s  nr g r a n g c r  r r r,T rf g r f s s i o n s  tor m f r g f r  a c ti vit y, 
coi'mon st ock pr ic es, cup, and interest pates
Canada,  1900 - i o i a
NO.
of
eq.
1 ndep .
var  .
C X
a ( 1 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  laqqed 
dependent v a r i a b l e
a ( 2 )  a( 3) a ( 4 ) b ( 0 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  Incremental  
v a r i a b l e
b( 1) b( 2) b( 3) b( 4)
R 2
R2
r
( k -1 ) ( n- k )
D.W.
PSS
Oependent v a r i a b l e :  ^ ) M ( t )
( 1) A M ( t - k 1 0 .6 ?3 
( 0 . 3 3 )
0.251  
(1 .47)
- 0 .  26? 
( - 1  . 48 )
0.1 27 
( 0 . 7 2 )
- 0 . 3 7 4
- 2 . 0 9 )
0 . 1 9
0 . 0 8
1 .76 
( 4 , 3 0 )
1 .87 
3779.4
( ?) A M ( t - k )
A S ( t - J )
0 . 7  25 
( 0 . 3 1 )
- 0 . 0 1 8
( - 0 . 0 5 )
- 0 . 6 91  
( - 1  .25)
- 0 . 1 5 2
( - 0 . 2 8 )
- 0 . 9 7 8
- 2 . 0 6 )
0 . 4 0 2  
( 1 . 3 8 )  (
- 0 . 1 4 4
- 0 . 4 4 )
0 . 494  
(1 .55)
0 . 167
( 0 . 8 7 )
0 . 3 4
0 . 0 8
1 .33  
( 8 . 2 1 )
1 .80 
3078 .0
( 3) A M ( t - k )  
A S ( t - J  )
0 . 0 9 ?
( 0 . 0 7 )
- 0  858  
( - 3 . 5 3 )
- 0 . 6 7 3
( - 2 . 1 7 )
- 0 . 3 4 8  
( - 1  13)
- 0 . 6 6 7
- 2 . 4 7 )
0 . 6 5 0
( 6 . 8 5 ) *
0 . 335
( 2 . 0 4 )
0 . 147
( 0 . 7 8 )
0 . 497  
( 2 . 7 8 )  •
0 . 2 1 0  
(1 .96)
0 . 8 0
0.71
8 . 9 8
( 9 . 2 0 )
1 .78 
920 . 53
( «) A M ( t - k )
A G ( t - j )
- 0 .  ?06 
( - 0 . 0 8 )
0 . 1 5 6
( 0 . 7 2 )
- 0 . 3 6 5  
( - 1  .68)
- 0 . 1 4 8
( - 0 . 6 7 )
- 0 . 3 5 7  
-1 .59)
0 . 013
( 0 . 8 5 )
0 . 0 0 3
( 0 . 1 6 )
0 . 0 2 9  
(1 96)
- 0 . 0 1 9
( - 1 . 1 7 )
0 . 3 5
0 . 1 4
1 .71 
( 8 . 2 6 )
1 .8? 
3055.3
( 5) A M ( t - k )
A G ( t - J )
- 2 . 4 4 9  
( - 1  .07)
0 . 0 0  2 
( 0 . 0 1 )
- 0 . 4 0 8
( - 2 . 1 4 )
- 0 . 1 7 8
( - 0 . 9 3 )
- 0 . 1 9 4
- 0 . 9 5 )
0 . 0 3 3
( 3 . 0 2 ) *
0 . 006
( 0 . 4 ? )
0 . 0 0 9
( 0 . 6 2 )
0 . 0 3 0  
( 2.  27) •
- 0 . 0 14
( - 0 . 9 3 )
0 . 5 2
0 . 3 5
3.01
( 9 , 2 5 )
1 .73 
2238.4
( 6) A M ( t - k )
A K t - j )
1 .034  
( 0 . 4 ! )
1 .221 
( 0 . 9 4 )
- 0 . 2 3 9
( - 0 . 9 7 )
0 . 0 5 3
( 0 . 2 2 )
- 0 . 3 2 6  
-1 .22)
- 5 . 1 4 9
( - 0 . 5 4 )
0 . 3 63
( 0 . 0 3 )
- 5 . 6 4 2
( - 0 . 4 9 )
-1 .003  
( - 0 . 0 9 )
0 . 2 2
- 0 . 0 8
0 . 7 3
( 8 , 2 1 )
1 .85 
3 6 3 3 . 2
( 7) A H ( t - k )  
A M t - J )
0 . 9 5 2
( 0 . 3 7 )
0 . 2 6 2
( 1 . 0 7 )
- 0 . 2 5 8  
( - 1  -03)
0 . 0 8 8
( 0 . 3 5 )
- 0 . 2 9 0  
-1 .06)
- 6 . 9 9 3
( - 0 . 7 5 )
- 3 . 2 3 0  
( - 0 . 3 2 )  (
- 0 . 0 7 3
- 0 . 0 1 )
- 2 . 6 1 6
( - 0 . 2 1 )
- 2 . 1 8 0
( - 0 . 1 9 )
0 . 2 4
- 0 . 1 0
0 . 6 9
( 9 , 2 0 )
1 .85 
353 4 . 2
AM ) A ( 2 ) A( 3) A(4) 8 ( 0 ) 8 ( 1 ) 8 ( 2 ) 8 ( 3 ) 8 ( 4 )
Oependent v a r i a b l e :  & S ( t )
( 8) A s ( t - k ) 1 .366  
( 0 . 3 9 )
0 . 6 1 0
( 3 . 0 1 )
- 0 . 3 9 3  
( - 1  65)
- 0 . 1  22 
( - 0 . 5 0 )
- 0 . 131
- 0 . 5 4 )
0 . 44
0 . 3 5
4 . 9 0
( 4 . 2 5 )
2.00
859 7 . 6
( 9) A s ( t - k )  
A " ( M )
0 . 975
( 0 . 3 2 )
0 . 1 0 3
( 0 . 2 7 )
- 0 . 4 4 7  
( - 1  .06)
- 0 . 0 0 5
( - 0 . 0 1 )
- 0 . 0 6 6
- 0 . 2 7 )
1 .293  
( 2 . 6 8 ) *  (
- 0 . 0 2 8
- 0 . 0 4 )
0 . 3 0 2
( 0 . 4 3 )
- 0 . 4 7 9
( - 0 . 7 8 )
0 . 6 7
0 . 5 4
5 . 2 5
( 8 . 2 1 )
1 .98 
5 11 3 . 3
( 1 0 ) A S ( t - k )
A H ( t - J )
0 . 1 9 2
( 0 . 1 1 )
-0 . 3 31  
( - 1  .50)
- 0 . 2 9 2  
( - 1 . 2 3 )
- 0 . 5 3 8
( - 2 . 2 1 )
- 0 . 2 4 6  
-1 . 75 )
1 .079  
( 6 . 8 5 ) *
1 .313  
( 4 . 8 5 ) *
0 . 7 1 8  
(1 .73)
0 . 4 6 6  
(1 .17)
0 . 577  
(1 .53)
0 . 9 0
0 . 8 6
20.06
( 9 , 2 0 )
1 .96 
15 29 .2
Dependert  v a r i a b l e : & G ( t )
(11) A G ( t - k ) 6 9 . 05  2 
(1 .96)
0 . 4 4 0
( 2 . 4 0 )
- 0 . 2 0 3
( - 0 . 9 9 )
- 0 . 0 5 0
( - 0 . 2 4 )
- 0 . 3 0 7  
-1 .42)
0 . 2 2  
0 .1  2
2.17
( 4 , 3 0 )
2.05
906 4 7 6 . 9
( 1?)
( 1 3 )
4 G ( t - k )  
A M ( t - j )
A G(t  - k ) 
A " ( t - l )
67 . 6 9 9  
(1 .74)
69.361  
( 2 . 0 5 )
0 . 2 1 5
( 0 . 9 1 )
0 . 1 1 ?
( 0 . 5 4 )
- 0 . 1 8 1
( - 0 . 7 4 )
- 0 . 2 0 1
( - 0 . 9 4 )
- 0  009 
( - 0 . 0 4 )
- 0 . 2 4 6
( - 1 . 1 3 )
- 0 . 1 7 3
- 0 . 6 7 )
- 0 . 0 1 7
- 0 . 0 7 )
8.071  
(3  .02 ) *
4 .648  
( 1 . 3 7 )
3.389
0 . 1 4 )
1 .293  
( 0 . 3 8 )
4 . 241 
(1 .36)
0 . 9 0 8
( 0 . 2 6 )
2.103
( 0 . 7 0 )
-4 .921  
( - 1  .41)
- 2 . 0 44
( - 0 . 6 4 )
0 . 3 6
0 . 1 7
0 . 5 3
0 . 3 7
1 .85 
( 8 . 2 6 )
3 .18
( 9 , 2 5 )
2.15
744 3 38 . 2
2.06
545339.1
Dependert  var  1 a b l e : ^  1 ( t  )
( 1 9 )
( 15 )
( 1 6 )
A l ( t - k )
A K t - k )  
A " ( t - | )  
A K t - k )  
A ^ ( t - I )
0 009 
( 0 . 1 5 )
- 0  01 2 
( - 0 . 2 0 )
- 0  008  
( - 0 . 1 1 )
0 .  210 
(1 .05)
0 . 2 7 4  
( 1 . 2 ? )  
0 254
(1 I D
- 0 . 1 4 7
( - 0 . 7 S )
- 0 . 0 6 ?
( - 0 . 2 4 )
-0 , 0 61  
( - 0  . 24)
0 . 5 6 0  
( 2 . 6 5 )
0 . 4 3 3  
( 1 . 6 0 )
0.411  
(1 .SO)
- 0 . 3 5 0  
-1 .62)
- 0 . 1 6 8
- 0 . 6 3 )
- 0 . 1 7 2
- 0 . 6 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( - 0 . 7 S )
0 . 006  
( 1 . 0 6 )  (
0 007 
( 1 . 1 7 )  (
- 0 . 0 0 3
- 0 . 4 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
- 0 . 6 9 )
0 . 0 0 5
( 0 . 8 8 )
0 005 
( 0  91)
0 005 
( 0 . 8 ? )
0 . 004
( 0 . 5 9 )
0 . 2 6
0 . 14
0 . 34
0 . 0 9
0 . 3 6
0 . 0 7
2. 22 
( 4 , 2 5 )
1 .35 
( 8 . 2 1 )
1 .24 
( 9 . 2 0 )
1 .89 
2 .26  25
1 .90 
2.0258
1 .90
1 .9705
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TABLE 27
ESTIMATES OE SIMS TEST REGRESSIONS TOR MERGER ACTIVITY, 
COMMON STOCK PRICES, GNP, AND INTEREST RATES
Canada, 1900 -  1934
No. I ndep. 
of var .
eq.
O C
B(1)
Coef f icient  of  future  
var iable  
B(3) B ( 2) B( 1) A(0)
Coeff icient  of  current and 
lagged var iable  
A(l )  A ( 2) A(3) A(4)
R2 F 
R2 ( k - l ) ( n - k )
D.W.
RSS
Dependent v a r i a b l e :A M ( t )
(17) A s ( t - j ) -0.15A
( -0 . 0 9 )
0.489
(4.77)
-0.159
( -1 .3 2 )
0.037
(0.28)
0.104
(0 .82 )
-0.039
( -0 . 31 )
0.53
0.44
5.49
(5 ,24 )
2.95
2164.3
( 18) A s ( t / j ) 
A S ( t - j )
-0.115
( - 0 . 0 8 )
-0.013
( - 0 . 16 )
0.091
(1 .02 )
-0.219
( - 2 .2 3 )
0.428
(4.41)
0.235 
( 2 . 2 9 ) *
-0.046
( - 0 . 45 )
0.072
(0.70 )
0.092
(0.90 )
-0.044
( - 0 . 43 )
0.77
0.66
7.28
(9 ,20 )
2.90
1084.5
(19) A G (t - j ) -0.800
( -0 . 38 )
0.033
(3.25)*
0.000
(0.01)
-0.010
( -0 . 83 )
0.023
(2 .02 )
-0.021
( - 1 . 71 )
0.41
0.31
4 .09 
(5 ,29 )
1 .70 
2737.1
( 2 0 )  A G ( t / j )  
A G (t - j )
2.301
(0 .88 )
-0 .029
( - 2 .8 7 )
-0 .00 2
( - 0 . 19 )
0.012
(1.23)
0.005
(0.51)
0.019
(1.88)
-0.003
( -0 .26 )
-0 .010
( -0 . 98 )
0.026
(2 .58 )*
-0 .040
( - 3 .1 0 ) *
0.63
0.49
4.64
(9 ,25 )
2.00
1747.5
(21) A K t - j ) 0.608
(0 .25 )
-6.877
( -0 .79 )
-9.277
( -1 . 04 )
3.729
(0 .43 )
-2.431
( -0 . 23 )
-0.511
( - 0 .0 5 )
0.11
-0.07
0.60
(5 ,24 )
1 .49 
4119.8
( 2 2 )  A l ( t / J )  
< J I ( t -J )
1.383 
(0 .56 )
18.387
(2 .06 )
3.263
(0 .36 )
-0.864
( - 0 . 09 )
-0.406
( - 0 . 04 )
-12.536
( -1 . 17 )
-12.675
( - 1 . 13 )
9.430
(0 .96 )
8.801
(0 .78 )
-5.889
( - 0 . 54 )
0.39
0.09
1.29  
(9 ,18 )
1.2?
2810.4
b(4) b( 3) b( 2) b ( l ) a (0) a ( 1) a (2) a (3) a(4)
Dependent var iable:  A s ( t )
( 2 3 ) A M ( t - j ) 1.016 
(0.66)
0.942
(6.55 )*
1 .049 
(7 .51 ) *
-0.102
( -0 . 71 )
-0.350
( - 2 . 4 8 ) *
-0.237
( - 1 . 56 )
0.86
0.83
33.83
(5,28 )
2.23
2187,7
(24) ) 
A M ( t - j )
1 .050 
(0.68)
-0.084
( -0 . 57 )
0.073
(0 .47 )
-0.237
( -1 . 48 )
0.275
(1 .71 )
0.779
(4.53 ) *
1 .168 
(7 .24 ) *
-0.236
( -1 . 46 )
-0.239
( -1 . 53 )
-0.297
( -1 . 9 0 )
0.88
0.83
19.12
(9,24 )
2.15
1885.2
Dependent var iable:  A G ( t )
(25) A M ( t - j ) 51.930 
(2 .09 )
6.940
(2 .93 ) *
4.266
(1.86)
2.340 
( n .99)
0.066
(0 .03 )
-4.109
( - 1 . 65 )
0.47
0.38
5.24
(5 ,29 )
1.87 
614362.9
( 2 6 ) A M ( t / j )
A H ( t - j )
50.397 
( 2.02)
-2 .370
( -0 . 98 )
4,199  
(1 .67 )
-1 .042 
( -0 . 40 )
3.249
(1 .23 )
5.052
(1.78)
6.504
(2.45 )*
1 .367 
(0.51)
1 .093 
(0 .43 )
-4.108
( - 1 . 60 )
0.55
0.38
3.33
(9 .25 )
1.72
531559.0
Dependent variab le:  A l ( t )
(27) AM(t -J) 0.00?
(0.05 )
-0.006
( -1 .19 )
0.008
(1.65)
-0.004
( -0 . 95 )
0.003
(0 .62 )
0.008
(1.55 )
0.24
0.10
1 .75 
(5 ,28 )
1 .40 
2.354
(28) A M ( t / j )  
A M ( t - j )
0.005
(0.09)
-0.004
( - 0 . 7 3 )
0.001
(0 .24 )
0.001
(0.22)
-0,004
( -0 . 72 )
-0.005
( -0 . 91 )
0.007
(1.22)
-0.004
( - 0 . 63 )
0.001
(0 .13 )
0.008
(1 .51 )
0.28
0.01
1 .03 
(9 ,24 )
1 .38 
2.226
TABLE 28
ESTIMATES OF GRANGER TrST REGRESSIONS TOR riPM DISAPPEARANCES, 
COMMON STOCK PRICES, GHP, AND INTEREST PATES
Canada, 1900 - 1914
No. I ndep 
o f  v a r .  
eq.
o c
a ( 1 )
Coef f 1c i e nt 
dependent  
a( 2)
o f  laqqed 
v a r i a b l e  
a ( 3 )  a ( 4 ) b ( 0 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  increment a 
v a r i a b l e  
b f l )  h ( 2) h ( 3) h( 4)
R  ^
R?
F
( k - 1 ) ( n - k )
D.W.
RSS
Oependent v a r i a b l e : & F ( t )
{ 1) A F ( t - k ) 0 .704
( 0 . 1 3 )
- 0 . 0 28
( - 0 . 1 6 )
- 0 . 1 6 5
( - 0 . 9 3 )
0 .026
( 0 . 1 5 )
- 0 . 2 2 2  
-1 . 21)
0 .07
- 0 . 0 6
0 .54
( 4 , 3 0 )
2 .02
30679.1
( 2) A F ( t - k )  
A S ( t - J )
- 0 . 1 3 2
( - 0 . 0 2 )
- 0 . 3 5 9
( - 1 . 1 1 )
- 0 . 2 8 8
( - 0 . 6 7 )
0.191
( 0 . 4 5 )
- 0 . 1 4 7
- 0 . 4 1 )
0 .950  
( 1 . 5 6 )  (
- 0 . 6 1 8
- 0 . 9 4 )
0 . 1 7 2
( 0 . 2 5 )
- 0 . 0 7 9
( - 0 . 1 6 )
0.21
- 0 . 1 0
0 . 6 8
( 8 , 2 1 )
1 .96 
24527.4
( 3) A F ( t - k )  
A S ( t - J )
- 2 . 5 9 2
( - 0 . 6 3 )
- 0 . 7 8 3
( - 3 . 5 7 )
- 0 . 4 2 2
( - 1 . 5 4 )
- 0 . 2 6 3
- 0 . 9 4 )
- 0 . 4 2 8  
-1 .83)
1 .531 
( 5 . 6 5 ) *
0 .447
( 1 . 1 3 )
0 .094
( 0 . 2 1 )
0 .895
( 1 . 9 8 )
0 . 2 1 2
( 0 . 6 8 )
0 .6 9
0 .56
5 .04
( 9 , 2 0 )
1 .91 
9453.5
( <)  A F ( t - k )  
6 G ( t - J )
1 .747 
( 0 . 2 6 )
- 0.081
( - 0 . 3 8 )
- 0 . 2 4 4
( - 1 . 1 1 )
- 0 . 1 8 2
- 0 . 8 2 )
- 0 . 1 3 3
- 0 . 6 1 )
0.051 - 0 . 0 3 7  
( 1 . 3 0 )  ( - 0 . 8 9 )
0 .084
( 2 . 1 1 ) *
- 0 . 0 8 8
( - 2 . 0 3 )
0.31
0 . 1 0
1 .49 
( 8 , 2 6 )
1 .92  
22559.9
( 5)  A F ( t - k )  
A G ( t - J )
- 5 . 3 5 2
( - 0 . 8 6 )
- 0 . 2 2 3  
( - 1  .18)
- 0 . 3 5 6  
( - 1 . 8 6 )  (
- 0 . 2 4 0
- 1 . 2 5 )
- 0 . 0 8 2
- 0 . 4 4 )
0 .089
( 3 . 1 8 ) *
0 .029  
( 0 . 8 3 )  (
- 0 . 011
- 0 . 3 1 )
0 .087
( 2 . 5 4 ) *
- 0 . 0 6 2  
( -1  .60)
0.51
0 .34
2.90
( 9 , 2 5 )
1 .82  
16074.5
( 6) 4 r ( t - k )
4 l ( t - J )
1 .933 
( 0 . 2 9 )
- 0 . 0 7 7
( - 0 . 3 5 )
- 0 . 0 9 6  
( - 0 . 4 4 )  (
- 0 . 0 6 8
- 0 . 3 2 )
- 0 . 2 1 9
- 0 . 9 6 )
-  21 .256 
( - 0 . 8 7 )
7 .716
( 0 . 2 9 )
- 6 . 8 1 6
- 0 . 2 4 )
•  16 . 683  
( - 0 . 5 7 )
0.14
- 0 . 1 8
0 .44
( 8 , 2 1 )
1 .89 
26445.2
( 7) 4 F ( t - k )  
^ K t - J )
1 .910 
( 0 . 2 8 )
- 0 . 0 6 6
( - 0 . 2 9 )
- 0 . 0 9 5  
( - 0 . 4 3 )  (
- 0 . 0 4 4
- 0 . 2 0 )
-0 .191
- 0 . 8 1 )
- 1 5 . 7 1 9
( - 0 . 6 4 )
- 1 7 . 7 5 2
( - 0 . 7 0 )
6 .415
( 0 . 2 4 )
1 .323 
( 0 . 0 4 )
- 2 0 . 5 7 7
( - 0 . 6 8 )
0 .16
- 0 . 2 2
0 . 4 3
( 9 . 2 0 )
1 .88 
2591 9 .4
A ( l ) A ( 2 ) M3) A( 4)  1 B(0) 8 ( 1 ) B( 2) B( 3) 8 ( 4 )
Dependent v a r i a b l e :  A S ( t  ]
( 8)  A S ( t - k ) 1 .366 
( 0 . 3 9 )
0 .6 1 0
( 3 . 0 1 )
- 0 . 3 9 3  
( - 1 . 6 5 )  {
- 0 . 1  22 
- 0 . 5 0 )
-0 .131
- 0 . 5 4 )
0 .44
0 .35
4 .90
( 4 , 2 5 )
2.00 
8597 .6
( 9)  A S ( t - k )  
4 F ( t - j )
1 .608 
( 0 . 4 9 )
0 .329  
(1 .05)
- 0 . 4 6 5  
( - 1 . 3 8 )  (
- 0 . 4 7 3  
-1 .35)
- 0 . 1 9 0
- 0 . 7 6 )
0 .  277 
(1 .67)
0 .087
( 0 . 4 0 )
0 .296  
(1 .38)
0 .184  
(1 .00)
0 . 5 8
0 . 4 2
3 .63
( 8 . 2 1 )
1 .94 
6435.1
( 10)  4 S ( t - k )  
) F ( t - J )
1 .660 
( 0 . 7 9 )
- 0 . 0 5 3
( - 0 . 2 5 )
- 0 . 2 1 7  
( - 0 . 9 9 )  (
- 0 . 5 4 2
- 2 . 4 3 )
- 0 . 1 58  
-1 .00)
0 . 4 0 2
( 5 . 6 5 ) *
0.421
( 3 . 8 8 ) *
0 .203
( 1 . 4 4 )
0 .220
( 1 . 6 0 )
0 . 2 4 2
( 2 . 0 7 )
0 .84
0 .77
11 .51 
( 9 , 2 0 )
1 .90 
2480.3
Dependert  v a r i a b l e :  A G ( t )
( 11)  A G( t - k ) 69.05  2 
(1 .96)
0 .440
( 2 . 4 0 )
- 0 . 2 0 3  
( - 0 . 9 9 )  (
- 0 . 0 4 9
- 0 . 2 4 )
- 0 . 3 0 7  
-1 .42)
0 . 2 2
0 . 1 2
2.17
( * . 3 0 )
2.05
906476.9
( 12)  i G ( t - k )
\ r ( t - j )
79.683  
(1 .95)
0 . 2 5 2  
(1 .06)
- 0 . 2 8 6  
( - 1 . 1 6 )  (
- 0 . 0 3 5
- 0 . 1 5 )
- 0.301  
-1 .15)
1 .599 
( 1 . 2 4 )
1 .261 
( 0 . 9 6 )
0 .646
( 0 . 4 8 )
- 0 . 5 7 2
( - 0 . 4 4 )
0 . 3 0
0 . 0 9
1 .40 
( 8 . 2 6 ) 8 1 7 l M
( 13)  l c ( t - k )  
U ( t - J )
74.045
( 2 . 1 1 )
0 .086
( 0 . 4 1 )
- 0 . 1 6 8  
( - 0 . 7 8 )  (
- 0 . 3 0 5
- 1 . 3 7 )
- 0 . 0 1 5
- 0 . 0 6 )
3.227
( 3 . 1 8 ) *
1 .860  
( 1 . 6 7 )
2.047
( 1 . 7 7 )
1 .234 
( 1 . 0 6 )
- 0 . 1 4 4
( - 0 . 1 3 )
0 . 5 0
0 . 3 2
2 .80  1 .99  
( 9 , 2 5 )  582270.3
Dependent v a r i a b l e :  A I ( t )
( 14)  A K t - k )
( 15 )  A l ( t - k )  
i F ( t - j )
( 16 )  3 l ( t - k )  
\ r ( t - j )
0 . 009
( 0 . 1 5 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
( - 0 . 0 3 )
0.001
( 0 . 0 2 )
0 .210
( 1 . 0 5 )
0 .223  
(1 .02)
0 .196
( 0 . 8 7 )
- 0 . 1 4 7
( - 0 . 7 5 )
- 0 . 0 8 3
( - 0 . 3 5 )
- 0 . 0 7 3
( - 0 . 3 0 )
0 .560
( 2 . 6 5 )
0 .519
( 2 . 0 6 )
0 .509
( 2 . 0 0 )
- 0 . 3 5 0  
- 1 . 5 2 )
- 0 . 2 4 8
- 0 . 9 5 )
- 0 . 2 6 9  
-1 .01)
-0 .001
( - 0 . 6 4 )
0.001
( 0 . 3 6 )
0.001 
( 0 . 3 1 )  (
0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 0 5 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
- 0 . 0 1 )
0 .0 0 2
( 0 . 8 0 )
0.001
( 0 . 7 4 )
0 . 0 02
( 0 . 8 6 )
0.001
( 0 . 7 0 )
0 .26
0.14
0.31
0.04
0 . 3 2
0.01
2 . 2 2
( 4 , 2 5 )
1 .16  
( 8 , 2 1 )
1 .05 
( 9 . 2 0 )
1 .89 
2.2625
1 .88  
2.1278
1.87  
2.0855
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TABLE 29
ESTIMATES OF SIMS TEST REGRESSIONS FOR FIRM DISAPPEARANCES 
COMMON STOCK PRICTS, GNP, ANO INTEREST RA.TES
Ca nada, 1900 - 19.14
No. I ndep. 
of var.  
eq.
oc
B(4)
Coef f lc le r t  of future  
var iable  
8(3 )  B ( 2) 8(1) A(0)
Coeff icient  of  current and 
lagqed var iable  
A( 1) A(?) A( 3) A(4)
R? F 
R^ ( k - 1 ) ( n - k )
D.W.
RSS
Dependent var iable:  A F ( t )
(17) AS( t-J) -0.294
( - 0 . 06 )
1.099 
(3.72)
-0.435
( -1 .25 )
0.005
(0 .01 )
0.302
(0.83 )
-0.213
( -0 .5 9 )
0.42
0.30
3.43
(5 .24 )
3.05
18016.7
09
r+ 
r+ 
* 
X - 0 . 362
( -0 . 0 7 )
0.040
(0.15 )
0.274
(0 .89 )
-0.549
( - 1 . 63 )
0.951
(2.86 )
0.5R7
(1.67 )
-0.198
( -0 .56 )
0.097
(0 .27 )
0.282
(0 .80 )
-0.250
( - 0 . 71 )
0.59
0.40
3.16
(9.20 )
3.01 
1 27 4 0 .2
(19) AG(t -J) -0 .322
( - 0 . 0 6 )
0.075
(2 .81 ) *
0.002
(0 .06 )
-0.047
( - 1 . 54 )
0.075
( 2 . 50 ) *
-0.077
( - 2 . 3 4 ) *
0.43
0.33
4.38
(5 .29 )
2.01
18734.2
(20)  I G ( t / j )  
AG ( t - j )
6.284
(0 .84 )
-0 .060
( - 2 . 0 9 )
-0.003
( - 0 . 12 )
0.031
(1 .14 )
-0.000
( - 0 . 02 )
0.050
(1 .71 )
-0.005
( -0 .17 )
-0.047
( -1 . 58 )
0.080
(2 .77 ) *
-0.117
( - 3 . 1 6 ) *
0.56
0.40
3.54
(9.25 )
2.20
14466.1
(21)  M ( t - J ) 1 .071 
(0 .17 )
-19.940
( -0 . 89 )
-17.584
( -0 . 77 )
15.929
(0 .72 )
-0.083
( - 0 . 0 0 )
-16.115
( - 0 . 6 0 )
0.13
-0 .06
0.69
(5 .24 )
1 .96 
26974.7
(22) A I ( t / J )  
A l ( t - j )
3.098
(0.50)
53.188
(2 .36 )
7.250
(0.31 )
-7.011
( - 0 . 30 )
-12.793  
( - 0 . 50 )
j
-31.436  
( -1 .16 )
-23.827
(-0.R4)
34.695
(1.25 )
27.415
(0.96 )
-31 .356 
( - 1 . 14 )
0.42
0.13
1.43
(9 .18 )
1.70  
17994.6
b(4) b( 3) b( 2) b ( D  | a (0) a (1) a( 2) a(3) a(4)
Dependent v a r i a b l e : A S ( t )
(23) 4 F ( t - J ) 1 .035 
(0 .49 )
0.412
(5 .92 ) *
0.400
(5 .88 ) *
0.026
(0 .38 )
-0.104
( - 1 . 51 )
-0.054
( - 0 . 75 )
0.73
0.68
15.13
(5 .28 )
1.80
4160.9
(24) 4 F ( t / j )  
AT ( t - J )
0.962
(0 .46 )
-0.029
( -0 . 40 )
-0.043
( - 0 . 60 )
-0.070
( - 0 . 98 )
0.110
(1 .55 )
0.399
(5 .51 ) *
0.409
(5.79 )*
0.004
(0 .05 )
-0 .089
( - 1 . 25 )
-0 .057
( -0 . 78 )
0.77
0.69
8.99
(9 .24 )
1 .70 
35 24 .5
Dependert var iable:  & G ( t )
( S ) & F ( t - J ) 51.851 
(2 .01 )
2.981
(3.44 )*
2.044
(2.41 )*
1 .362 
(1.59 )
0.180
(0.21 )
-0.925
( - 1 . 0 3 )
0.43
0.33
4.33
(5 .29 )
1.80  
669461 .2
(26)  A F ( t / J )  
A F ( t - J )
51 .882 
(2 .03 )
-0.901
( -1 . 0 1 )
1 .301 
(1 .47)
-0.101
( -0 .1 1 )
1 .199 
(1 .36)
2.832
(3 .15 )*
2.439
(2.78 )*
1 .367 
(1 .55)
0.416
(0 .47 )
-0.714
( - 0 . 79 )
0 .52
0.34
2.97
(9 .25 )
1 .57 
565452.5
Dependent variab le:  A I ( t )
(27) A F ( t - j ) 0.008
(0 .15 )
-0.001
( -0 .8 4 )
0.001
(0 .63 )
-0.001
( - 0 . 58 )
0.001
(0.5R)
0.003
(1.48)
0.15
-0.01
0.95
(5 .28 )
1 .58 
2.6403
(B»!(({')! 0.010(0 .19 ) -0 .002( - 0 . 9 7 ) -0.000( - 0 . 26 ) 0.001(0 .32 ) -0 .002( - 0 .9 1 ) -0 .002( -0 .95 ) 0.001(0.31) -0.001( -0 . 51 ) 0.000(0 .24 ) 0.003 (1 .34) 0.21-0.08 0.72(9 .24 ) 1 .48 2.4312
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FIGURE 26
STRUCTURAL BREAK IN THE 
SIMPLE STOCK PRICE MODEL OF MERGER ACTIVITY
Plot of Actual and Static Forecast
87.0000
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1.0000
1948194019291918
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FIGURE 27
STRUCTURAL BREAK IN THE 
SIMPLE STOCK PRICE MODEL OF MERGER ACTIVITY 
(USING FIRST DIFFERENCE OPERATORS FOR MERGERS AND STOCK PRICES)
Plot of Actual and Static Forecast
41.0000
20.5000
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